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Abstract
This is a predictive Note that will examine the doctrine relating to war-time detention and
endeavor to decipher who currently maintains a right to challenge executive detention in the wake
of Boumediene. This Note therefore does not centrally discuss the authority of the United States
to detain wartime prisoners, what procedure is due to detainees, the wisdom of the Boumediene
approach to constitutional domain, or any other related issues. Instead, this Note will attempt to
define the outer contours of the Suspension Clause by looking through the Boumediene prism to
determine who may presently invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause and in what con-
texts outside of Guanta´namo Bay those protections apply. This Note proceeds in three parts. Part
I provides a background on habeas corpus, the heart of the protection preserved in the Suspension
Clause, and its semblance in the extraterritorial arena. Part II outlines the history leading up to
Boumediene and the law surrounding this decision. Part III will then critically analyze Boume-
diene and its progeny against the Court’s prior precedent in order to develop a framework for
analyzing the Suspension Clause. Part III finally uses these concepts in several hypothetical sce-
narios in order to better illustrate the length and strength of the Suspension Clause, as it stands
today.
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NOTES 
FROM BAGHDAD TO BAGRAM: THE LENGTH & 
STRENGTH OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE 
AFTER BOUMEDIENE 
Justin D. D’Aloia* 
INTRODUCTION 
Hafizullah Shahbaz Khiel is an Afghan father of seven.1 After 
serving five years away from his family as a prisoner in the 
detention camp run by the U.S. Navy at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 
Khiel was released to Afghan authorities.2 He was soon cleared of 
all charges and finally reunited with his family in Afghanistan in 
December 2007.3 But less than a year later, U.S. forces raided 
Khiel’s home and he was once again taken into custody.4 Since 
then, he has been held at a U.S.-operated Afghan internment 
camp with nearly 600 others, notwithstanding documents from 
Afghan authorities proclaiming his innocence.5 
The U.S. Constitution sets out the basic structure for a 
democratic form of government. Yet it provides little, if any, 
guidance as to whether, or under what circumstances, any of its 
 
*  Editor-in-Chief, Fordham International Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, 2010, 
Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2006, Rutgers University. The author wishes to 
thank Liz Shura and Jared Limbach for their thoughtful comments and guidance 
throughout the drafting process. Special thanks are also due to my parents, Susan and 
David, Kristen D’Aloia, and Mary Katherine Houston for their continuous support and 
encouragement. 
1. See Kathy Gannon, Guantanamo Prisoner Freed, Arrested Again, MSNBC, Feb. 7, 
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29071536 (“Hafizullah was a village elder and a 
father of seven . . . .”). 
2. Id. (stating that “[t]he first time Hafizullah was seized, in 2002, he spent five 
years at Guantanamo” and that “[u]pon Hafizullah’s release in 2007, the Afghan 
government held him for three months and then cleared him of all charges”). 
3. Id. (“[T]he Afghan government cleared him of all charges in December 2007”). 
4. Id. (indicating that “Hafizullah and 13 others were arrested” in a September raid 
but that “[t]he others were later released”). 
5. Id. (“Afghan officials have signed documents attesting to his innocence, but he is 
still in custody at Bagram Air Base, along with about 600 other prisoners.”). 
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provisions have force beyond the sovereign territory of the 
United States. Throughout important episodes of American 
history, the U.S. judiciary has been called upon to answer 
discrete questions concerning the Constitution’s 
“extraterritorial” application.6 Nevertheless, the law in this area 
remains unsettled and no clear rubric exists for answering 
questions of this nature.7 Notwithstanding the common adage 
that the Constitution applies in toto within the territory of the 
United States,8 the more accurate approximation is that its 
application is circumstantial, both domestically and abroad.9 
In June 2008, the Supreme Court extended a right to alien 
prisoners held by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to 
challenge the legality of their detentions under the Suspension 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in the landmark case of 
Boumediene v. Bush.10 The case offers a significant contribution to 
U.S. constitutionalism by indicating that aliens located beyond 
the strict borders of the United States can receive constitutional 
 
6. See José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1660–62 (2009) 
(identifying “continental expansion, colonial administration, and conventional war” 
and, more recently, “initiatives undertaken to combat international terrorism” as 
periods that produced questions concerning the reach of the Constitution beyond the 
borders of the United States). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in 
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power 
over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002) (outlining the evolution of extraterritorial 
constitutional jurisprudence within context of U.S. history); Gerald L. Neuman, Who’s 
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) (same). 
7. See Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1660 (“Despite nearly two centuries of decisions on 
this issue, the law remains unsettled, and no framework for analyzing these claims is 
clearly defined, much less well established.”); Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case 
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 467–72 (2007) (recognizing the debate 
circling the Constitution’s coverage); Neuman, supra note 6, at 944 (summarizing that 
the current state of the Constitution’s scope is the result of “a mosaic of inconsistent 
rules and rationales rather than a true synthesis”). 
8. See, e.g., Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial 
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 808 n.40 (2005) (collecting authority indicating 
that Constitution does not always apply within the United States); see also Cleveland, 
supra note 6, at 17–18 (observing that express text of several constitutional clauses limit 
their application domestically to only “states” or “citizens”). 
9. See, e.g., Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1664 (summarizing the juridical approach to 
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution as “context-specific, tailored to the 
needs of the case, and sensitive to the practical limitations of enforcing a particular 
rule”); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After 
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 977 (2009) (providing examples where 
constitutional protections sometimes do not inhere domestically). 
10. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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protection. Nevertheless, there remains wide speculation as to 
who else, such as Khiel, may be entitled to this right because of 
the Court’s limited holding.11 
This is a predictive Note that will examine the doctrine 
relating to war-time detention and endeavor to decipher who 
currently maintains a right to challenge executive detention in 
the wake of Boumediene. This Note therefore does not centrally 
discuss the authority of the United States to detain wartime 
prisoners, what procedure is due to detainees, the wisdom of the 
Boumediene approach to constitutional domain, or any other 
related issues. Instead, this Note will attempt to define the outer 
contours of the Suspension Clause by looking through the 
Boumediene prism to determine who may presently invoke the 
protections of the Suspension Clause and in what contexts 
outside of Guantánamo Bay those protections apply. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a 
background on habeas corpus, the heart of the protection 
preserved in the Suspension Clause, and its semblance in the 
extraterritorial arena. Part II outlines the history leading up to 
Boumediene and the law surrounding this decision. Part III will 
then critically analyze Boumediene and its progeny against the 
Court’s prior precedent in order to develop a framework for 
analyzing the Suspension Clause. Part III finally uses these 
concepts in several hypothetical scenarios in order to better 
illustrate the length and strength of the Suspension Clause, as it 
stands today. 
I. HABEAS CORPUS: DOMESTIC ORIGINS AND 
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution12 has 
enjoyed a relatively unremarkable inspection since it was ratified 
 
11. E.g., Del Quentin Wilber, In Courts, Afghanistan Air Base May Become Next 
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, June 29, 2008, at A14 (quoting Professor David Cole of 
Georgetown University Law Center as stating “Kennedy’s decision in Boumediene leaves 
open the question as to what other places the [right extended in Boumediene] extends”); 
see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 259, 279 (2009) (“As for detention in other locations . . . several passages 
[in Boumediene] foreshadow the possibility that functionalism may often lead to the 
denial of habeas rights.”). 
12. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (reproducing the text of the 
Suspension Clause). 
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into permanency as part of the original Constitution in 1788.13 
But several recent acts of Congress14 have propelled this 
historically dormant constitutional provision back into the 
spotlight15 and, more broadly, caused the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reevaluate its jurisprudence relating to the general reach of the 
Constitution outside of the sovereign territory of the United 
States. In order to fully appreciate these innovations, a brief 
overview of the law relating to habeas corpus and the 
extraterritorial scope of the Constitution is necessary. Part I.A 
begins by exploring the basics of U.S. law relating to the writ of 
habeas corpus. Part I.B will then outline the handful of cases to 
address the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. Finally, 
Part I.C will take up the issue of standing that arises when habeas 
corpus is invoked extraterritorially, beyond U.S. borders. 
 
13. The dearth of case law on the Suspension Clause is the result of several factors. 
First, the writ of habeas corpus, which the Suspension Clause safeguards, was enacted 
into positive law by the first Congress, leaving little need for persons seeking habeas 
relief to fall back on the text of the Constitution. See infra note 33 and accompanying 
text (outlining the historic evolution of the statutory grant of habeas corpus). Second, 
the protections of habeas corpus were formally suspended only on rare occasion and for 
limited periods of time, providing the U.S. Supreme Court with few opportunities to 
analyze the Clause even in that context. See An Act Temporarily to Provide for the 
Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for 
Other Purposes § 5, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692 (1902) (used as authority to suspend the 
writ in a territory during an insurrection in 1905); Hawaiian Organic Act § 67, ch. 339, 
31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900) (used as authority to suspend the writ in Hawaii after the 1941 
attack on Pearl Harbor); An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes § 4, ch. 
22, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (1871) (authorizing President Grant to suspend the writ to quell 
the Ku Klux Klan rising in the southern United States); An Act Relating to Habeas 
Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases § 1, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755, 
755 (1863) (authorizing President Lincoln to suspend the writ during the Civil War). 
For an intriguing presentation on what is achieved by a valid suspension, see Amanda L. 
Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009) (arguing that 
suspension acts as a temporary displacement of core due process rights). 
14. See infra notes 214–19 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of recent 
acts passed by Congress in connection with the “war on terror”). 
15. The only recent case before the Supreme Court to take up a meaningful 
consideration of the Suspension Clause prior to Boumediene was Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). But see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 
651, 664 (1996) (concluding that an act barring Supreme Court review an appellate 
body’s denial of leave to file a second habeas petition did not amount to a constitutional 
suspension of the writ); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (rejecting the argument 
that the alternative collateral review procedure for state prisoners in the District of 
Columbia did not work a constitutional suspension). The significance of St. Cyr with 
regard to the Suspension Clause is discussed infra at note 33. 
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A. Foundations of Habeas Corpus in U.S. Law 
Historical authorities depict the writ of habeas corpus as a 
“bulwark” of individual liberty.16 To Thomas Jefferson its 
protections represented one of the “essential principles of our 
government.”17 This legal instrument has even gained the status 
of the “Great Writ” among U.S. jurists.18 Yet, the phrase “habeas 
corpus” translates rather plainly from Latin as “that you have the 
body.”19 So how do the elegant descriptions and bland definition 
reconcile? 
A writ is a written court order that requires an authority to 
carry out a specific directive.20 A writ of habeas corpus, more 
specifically, commands a custodian to produce the body of a 
prisoner before the court at a specific time and place so that the 
court may inquire into the basis of their detention.21 The 
 
16. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 147 (1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“The 
writ has always been justly regarded as the stable bulwark of civil liberty.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (arguing 
that habeas corpus is a “bulwark” against arbitrary punishment). Blackstone was first to 
describe the common-law writ as a “stable bulwark of our liberties.” WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *137. 
17. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 3 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 317, 321–22 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1905). 
18. See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95–96 (1807) (first U.S. case 
identifying habeas corpus as the “great writ”). This language was likely borrowed from 
Blackstone, who described habeas corpus as the “great and efficacious writ.” 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 3 COMMENTARIES *131. Paul Halliday and Edward White 
identify, however, that the earliest use of the term is found in GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-
DICTIONARY 348 (London, 1729). See Paul D. Halliday & Edward White, The Suspension 
Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 580 
n.10 (2008). 
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004); BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1400 (8th ed. 1914) [hereinafter BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY]. 
20. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1640; BOUVIER’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 3496. 
21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY , supra note 19, at 728 (defining habeas corpus as 
“[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court . . . to ensure that the party’s 
imprisonment or detention is not illegal”); BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, 
at 1400 (defining habeas corpus as “[a] writ directed to the person detaining another 
and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and place 
. . . to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall 
consider in that behalf.”); see also, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830) 
(“This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the body of Tobias Watkins 
before this court, for the purpose of inquiring into the legality of his confinement in 
gaol [sic].”). The phrase “writ of habeas corpus” as it is used in this Note and 
throughout U.S. law refers to the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et 
recipiendum. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95 (“It has been truly said, that [habeas 
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traditional function of a habeas corpus action is to secure release 
from an illegal detention.22 An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus is in essence an attack on the legality of someone’s 
custody over another person.23 Thus, the court does not pass on a 
prisoner’s guilt or innocence, but rather examines whether the 
prisoner’s liberty was restrained in a manner consistent with the 
law.24 In order to make this determination, the writ demands that 
the prisoner’s jailer provide a sound legal basis for the 
confinement.25 If a court is satisfied that a person’s liberty was 
 
corpus] is a generic term, and includes every species of that writ. To this it may be 
added, that when used singly—when we say the writ of habeas corpus, without addition, we 
most generally mean the great writ which is now applied for; and in that sense it is used 
in the constitution.”); BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1400 (“This writ was 
in like manner designated as habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum; but, having 
acquired in public esteem a marked importance by reason of the nobler uses to which it 
has been devoted, it has so far appropriated that generic term . . . The Writ of Habeas 
Corpus.”). At common law, the writ of habeas corpus took on several other forms that 
acted on the body of a prisoner including ad deliberandum, ad prosequendum, ad 
respondendum, ad satisfaciendum, and ad testificandum. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 3 
COMMENTARIES *129-30 (defining each of the habeas corpus varieties); see also Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 97–98 (considering the use of each of the lesser-known habeas corpus 
writs in relation to U.S. law). 
22. See R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 5 (2d ed. 1989) (conveying that 
the writ tests “the legality of [the] cause” of a prisoner’s confinement); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The role of habeas corpus is 
to determine the legality of executive detention, not to supply the omitted process 
necessary to make it legal.”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he 
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”). 
23. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 484 (“[T]he very essence of habeas corpus is an attack 
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . . .”); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 
545, 586 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he very purpose of the Great Writ is to 
provide some means by which the legality of an individual’s incarceration may be 
tested.” (citations omitted)). 
24. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (“[I]n a civilized society, government 
must always be accountable [and] if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with 
the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate 
release.”), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 745 (1991) ("Our cases 
after Fay that have considered the effect of state procedural default on federal habeas 
review have taken a markedly different view of the important interests served by state 
procedural rules."); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (“[O]n application for habeas 
corpus we are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. We consider 
here only the lawful power of the [military] commission to try the petitioner . . . .”). 
25. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008) (“The [writ of habeas 
corpus] protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the 
Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 
U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner 
who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful 
custody.” (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1885))). 
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deprived in a manner contrary to the law, the writ will issue and 
direct their release.26 
The writ of habeas corpus finds its roots deep in common 
law tradition.27 Early colonists brought its protections to the 
United States as a self-evident aspect of their civil heritage in the 
formative years of the Nation.28 After achieving independence 
 
26. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 342 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[H]abeas is a challenge to unlawful custody, and when the writ issues it prevents 
further illegal custody.” (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 489)); Wales, 114 U.S. at 571 
(“[The] purpose [of the writ] is to enable the court to inquire, first, if the petitioner is 
restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the court can do nothing but discharge the writ. If 
there is such restraint, the court can then inquire into the cause of it, and if the alleged 
cause be unlawful, it must then discharge the prisoner.”); cf. Eagles v. United States ex 
rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311 (1946) (“If the writ is to issue, mere error in the 
proceeding which resulted in the detention is not sufficient.” (citing United States ex rel. 
Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924))); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (“We are not speaking of mere disorder, or mere irregularities in 
procedure, but of a case where the processes of justice are actually subverted. In such a 
case, the Federal court has jurisdiction to issue the writ.”). 
27. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (“Habeas corpus . . . throw[s] its 
root deep into the genius of our common law.’” (quoting Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 
471, 484 n.2 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in turn quoting Sec’y of State for 
Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)))). In 
1215, Magna Carta established that “[n]o free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or 
stripped of his rights or possessions . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by 
the law of the land.” Magna Carta art. 39 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: 
DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND BILL OF RIGHTS 17 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). The final 
version of Magna Carta, confirmed by Henry III when he assumed control of the throne 
in 1225, which differs slightly from the charter established in 1215, can be found in THE 
BIRTHRIGHT OF BRITONS: OR THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION, WITH A SKETCH OF ITS 
HISTORY, AND INCIDENTAL REMARKS 23–29 (London, L. Waylon 1792). In short, habeas 
corpus is believed to derive from this vernacular. See, e.g., 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 
OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND *52–53 (reflecting on the origins of the writ); WILLIAM S. 
CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS INCLUDING JURISDICTION, FALSE 
IMPRISONMENT, WRIT OF ERROR, EXTRADITION, MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI, JUDGMENTS 
ETC. WITH PRACTICE AND FORMS 3 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1886) 
(grounding earliest arguments for habeas corpus in Magna Carta); ROLLIN C. HURD, A 
TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT 85–89 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2003) 
(1858) (same). A discussion on the common-law evolution of the writ is beyond the 
scope of this Note because Boumediene incorporates the history of the writ into its 
analytic framework. See infra note 225 (concluding that common-law history was not 
dispositive as to the writ’s geographic reach). However, for an illuminating presentation 
of the Anglo-American history of the writ of habeas corpus see generally Halliday & 
White, supra note 18 (presenting a thorough examination of habeas corpus in English 
history through a review of rare common-law texts). 
28. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) (“[The writ] was brought to 
America by the colonists, and claimed as among the immemorial rights descended to 
DALOIA_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  4:17 PM 
964 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:957 
from British rule, the writ received prominent endorsement in 
the original text of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution reads: “The Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”29 Fully 
aware of the writ’s fundamental place in preventing arbitrary and 
oppressive governmental power, the Framers specifically 
sanctioned the writ in order to ensure its vitality in the new 
republic.30 Individually, habeas corpus is a mode of procedure.31 
 
them from their ancestors.”); WILLIAM WAIT, 5 THE PRACTICE AT LAW, IN EQUITY, AND IN 
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, IN ALL THE COURTS OF RECORD IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 502 
(Albany, W. Gould 1875) (quoting colonists as regarding the writ as the “dearest 
birthright of Britons.”); see also CHURCH, supra note 27, at 35–40 (illustrating that the 
writ was in use in the early colonies of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Jersey, and 
Virginia prior to the Revolution); A.H. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. 
HIST. REV. 18, 20–26 (1903) (specifying that early colonists employed the common-law 
privilege of habeas corpus until Queen Anne extended the Habeas Corpus Act to the 
colonies in 1710). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The caution used to narrowly circumscribe the 
grounds for the suspension of the writ provides further evidence of how highly the 
Framers regarded its protections. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (“That the Framers 
considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident 
from the care taken to specify the limited grounds for its suspension . . . .” (citing Akhil 
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509 n.329 (1987))); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, 
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007) (“[T]he Suspension Clause 
[itself] signals the historic importance of habeas corpus . . . .”). This ancient protection 
has achieved a similar status in U.S. jurisprudence. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
126 (1982) (“The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our 
jurisprudence.”); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (contending that the writ of 
habeas corpus is “jealously guarded” by the courts); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. at 95 (“The 
great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient 
defence of personal freedom.”). 
30. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244 (“[T]he common-law writ all too often had 
been insufficient to guard against the abuse of monarchial power. That history 
counseled the necessity for specific language in the Constitution to secure the writ and 
ensure its place in our legal system.”); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1986) 
(“[E]xplicit reference in the Constitution . . . testifies to the importance of the writ of 
habeas corpus.”). Blackstone described habeas corpus as “the most celebrated writ in 
the English law.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 3 COMMENTARIES *129. The writ was 
central to the preservation of common-law liberties. See id. at 1 COMMENTARIES *135 
(“Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty; for if 
once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily 
whoever he or his officers thought proper . . . there would soon be an end of all other 
rights and immunities.”); David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: 
Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV 59, 64 (2006) (noting that “the development of the 
writ in England was closely linked with the need to make effective the guarantees of the 
Magna Carta, especially that of due process of law” (citing ROBERT S. WALKER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 
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But, more generally, by holding all branches of government 
accountable for their actions, the writ has the salutary effect of 
securing personal liberty for all and establishing the rule of law.32  
This protection is currently codified in section 2241 of the 
judicial code.33 That section provides that federal courts may 
 
88 (1960))). Consistent with these beliefs, Alexander Hamilton denounced arbitrary 
imprisonment as “the favorite and most formidable instrument[] of tyranny.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511–12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
31. See supra note 22 (characterizing habeas corpus as a tool to secure release from 
illegal detention). 
32. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (appreciating habeas corpus as 
strengthening the separation-of-powers design); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401–02 
(1963) (“Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is 
inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.”); 
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“All the officers of the government, from 
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. [The writ] is 
the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting 
office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that 
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the 
authority which it gives.”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126 (1866) (perceiving 
habeas corpus as “guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of 
unlimited power”). 
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). The writ of habeas corpus was originally enacted 
into federal law by the first Congress in 1789 as a consequence of the newly ratified 
Constitution. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Ex parte Bollman, 
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (describing the first Congress as enacting the Judiciary 
Act under the “immediate influence” of the “injunction” imposed by the Suspension 
Clause). Several amendments to the habeas statute were precipitated by significant 
sociopolitical events, but section 2241 is the direct successor to the original grant 
conferred in 1789. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (“Federal courts have been authorized to 
issue writs of habeas corpus since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . .”); 
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 n.2 (1981) (“The present codification [in § 2241 et 
seq.] of the federal habeas statute is the successor to ‘the first congressional grant of 
jurisdiction to the federal courts’ . . . .” (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 485)); see also Fay 
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9 (1963) (conveying that “[a]ll significant statutory changes 
in the federal writ have been prompted by grave political crises” and listing 
amendments). Prior to Boumediene, it at least remained analytically possible to conclude 
that the Suspension Clause did not embody an inviolate right to habeas corpus and 
instead stood as a congressional directive because it is framed in prohibitory language 
and located in article I of the Constitution. Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362, 1372 (1953) (implied in the Constitution), with Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus 
for Convicts—Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 344 (1952) 
(requires congressional authorization), and RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WESCHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1287 n.3 (5th ed. 2003) 
(collecting literature arguing that the exclusive source of habeas corpus is statutory). In 
2001, the Court avoided the delicate question of whether the Suspension Clause 
contains a parallel right to habeas corpus by invoking the canon of constitutional 
avoidance and concluding that the petitioner’s statutory ability to seek habeas relief was 
not repealed. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314–15 (2001). 
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issue a writ of habeas corpus “within their respective 
jurisdictions”34 so long as the prisoner seeking the writ falls 
within one of five enumerated categories.35 For purposes of 
section 2241, a court acts “within” its jurisdiction when the 
custodian of the person seeking release may be reached by that 
court’s process.36 It bears mention, however, that Congress is free 
to alter or expand its statutory habeas corpus scheme to the 
extent that it does not transgress the Constitution.37  
The writ has evolved since colonial times to cover a wide 
 
34. § 2241(a). For a discussion on the history and meaning of the jurisdictional 
limitation in the federal habeas statute, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442–43 
(2004) (noting that the jurisdictional clause was added by Congress to avoid the 
possibility of judges issuing the writ from afar). 
35. See § 2241(c). Specifically, the writ will not extend to a prisoner under § 
2241(c) unless: 
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or 
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an 
act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or [a directive] of a 
court or judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen 
of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or 
omitted under any [authority] claimed under the [directive] of a foreign state, 
or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law 
of nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify for trial. 
Id. 
36. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973) 
(“[T]he language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court issuing the 
writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can be reached by 
service of process, the court can issue the writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ . . . even if the 
prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.”); cf. Ex parte 
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944) (explaining that jurisdiction still rests “if a respondent 
who has custody of the prisoner is within reach of the court’s process even though the 
prisoner has been removed from the district since the suit [began]” because the 
jurisdiction of the of the District Court under section 2241 “may be in no way impaired 
or defeated by the removal of the prisoner from the territorial jurisdiction for the 
District Court”). 
37. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (“Within constitutional 
constraints,” judgments about the scope of the habeas corpus statute are “normally for 
Congress to make.”); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941) (“[There is] no 
doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common law procedure on 
habeas corpus.” (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915)); cf. Boumediene, 
128 S. Ct. at 2276 (“[Prior case law] stand[s] for the proposition that the Suspension 
Clause does not resist innovation in the field of habeas corpus.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 474 (2004) (“As it has evolved over the past two centuries, the habeas statute clearly 
has expanded habeas corpus ‘beyond the limits that obtained during the 17th and 18th 
centuries.’” (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977))); Felker v. 
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996) (detailing expansion of statutory habeas relief from 
time of first Congress to present). 
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range of restraints on liberty,38 but is historically intended to 
serve as a vehicle to review the propriety of executive detention.39 
Therefore the writ, at its core, ensures that executive detentions 
are carried out in accordance with law.40 
B. The Fringe of the Constitution: Beyond U.S. Borders 
A natural point of departure for analyzing the 
extraterritorial scope of the Suspension Clause is the Supreme 
Court’s methodology for determining the general reach of the 
overall Constitution. But there is no settled approach to extricate 
from the Court’s case law.41 This section will provide a brief 
narrative on the historic evolution of this topic. 
At the time the Constitution was drafted, the Framers 
contemplated that the United States would acquire new lands.42 
 
38. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973) (explaining that “over 
the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge 
from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law” and listing 
numerous examples); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (observing that the writ of 
habeas corpus “is a procedural device for subjecting executive, judicial, or private 
restrains on liberty” and collecting cases). 
39. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At 
its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the 
legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been 
strongest.” (citing Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus: Extra Judicial Detentions, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 1208, 1238 (1970))); Pressley, 430 U.S. at 386 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(observing that the “Great Writ was [traditionally] a remedy against executive 
detention” (citing P. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1513–14 (2d ed. 1973))); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1948) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (contending that “[t]he historic purpose of the writ has been 
to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial”). An English court 
recounted its historic uses similarly: “[The writ] has through the ages been jealously 
maintained by Courts of Law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the 
Executive at the cost of the liege.” Sec’y of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923] 
A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
40. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (“At all other times [other 
than during suspension], it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring 
that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” (citing St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. at 301)); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 260 (1882) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus 
has been often used to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even his life, against the 
assertion of unlawful authority on the part of the executive . . . .” (citing Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 2)). 
41. See supra note 7 (recognizing that no clear rubric exists for determining the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution). 
42. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cls. 1–2 (granting Congress the power to annex 
new states and promulgate rules for U.S. territories); see also Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of 
Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (proclaiming that under the authority 
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Yet, with few exceptions, there was little need to explore the 
outer limits of the Constitution’s geographic coverage during this 
era because Congress usually “extended” the Constitution by 
statute to newly acquired territories during the era of westward 
expansion.43 
One such exception arose in 1891. In the case of In re Ross44 
a U.S. sailor45 was tried and convicted by a U.S. consular tribunal 
for murdering a fellow crewman in a Japanese harbor.46 As to his 
 
of the Constitution the United States possesses the inherent power to “acquir[e] 
territory, either by conquest or by treaty”). 
43. For an exhaustive list of these statutes relating to the Louisiana Purchase 
through the annexation of Hawaii, see Burnett, supra note 8, at 825 n.127 and 
accompanying text. This is not to say that constitutional questions never arose in the 
outer territories during this period. See, e.g., Canter, 26 U.S. at 542 (passing on the 
constitutional question by relying on treaty provisions); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 
How.) 437, 460 (1850) (providing Seventh Amendment protection to the Iowa territory 
without clearly identifying the Constitution or statute as the source); Benner v. Porter, 
50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850) (article III does not serve as Florida’s “organic law”); 
United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467, 488 (1853) (holding section 2 of article 
III controls venue for offenses committed outside of State jurisdiction); Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856) (applying the Fifth Amendment to 
territories to provide slaveholders with property rights); Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (applying the Constitution of its own force to the Utah Territory); 
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550 (1888) (same for District of Columbia); Ex parte 
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 183 (1888) (implicitly recognizing Double Jeopardy rights of a 
Utah resident); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 28 (1889) (relying on statute for 
protection in Montana); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 40 (1890) (questioning the applicability of the 
Constitution and relying instead on statute); McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 
184–85 (1891) (observing the ambiguity as to the application of article III to U.S. 
territory); American Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466–68 (1897) (extending the 
jury trial right to Utah without identifying the source of protection); Springville v. 
Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 709 (1897) (identifying the Constitution as applying of its own 
force to the Utah territory); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346 (1898) (resolving that 
jury trial rights applied of their own force to territories, generally). But the case-to-case 
inconsistencies between the justices left open the question of whether the entire 
Constitution applied of its own force within U.S. territories. Burnett, supra note 9, at 985 
(noting that “a number of the nineteenth century cases on the application of the 
Constitution to the territories were ambiguous”); Cleveland, supra note 6, at 207 (noting 
tension between these decisions). 
44. Ross v. McIntyre (In re Ross), 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
45. John Ross was technically a British citizen, but, consistent with maritime 
custom, attained the fictitious benefit of U.S. citizenship as a result of his membership 
on the boat. See id. at 472 (“By such enlistment [on an American ship] he became an 
American seaman . . . and as such entitled to the protection and benefits of all the laws 
passed by congress on behalf of American seamen, and subject to all their obligations 
and liabilities.”). 
46. See id. at 456–57 (outlining the events of the murder and trial). 
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trial, the Supreme Court flatly concluded that the Constitution 
has no operation outside of the legal border of the United 
States.47 This bright-line interpretation was a display of what 
many now refer to as a strict territorial view of constitutional 
domain.48 More importantly, by couching its language in terms of 
the claimant’s relative place,49 rather than the claimant’s class of 
membership or cause for asserting constitutional coverage, the 
Court solidified a geographic view of the Constitution’s province 
that would predominate in case law for years to come.50 
The issue garnered significant attention at the turn of the 
century as a result of U.S. imperial ambitions to expand 
overseas.51 Considerable dispute surrounded the acquisition of 
Hawaii and other islands ceded to the United States in the 
Spanish-American war.52 In a series of opinions generically 
known as the Insular Cases,53 the Court resolved the lingering 
 
47. See id. at 464 (“The constitution can have no operation in another country.”). 
48. See Burnett, supra note 9, at 997 (portraying Ross Court as espousing a model of 
“strict territoriality”); Neuman, supra note 6, at 918 n.39 (same); see also Cleveland, supra 
note 6, at 23 (explaining territoriality as deriving from principle that “a sovereign’s 
jurisdiction to legally regulate conduct was coterminous with its territory”). 
49. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464 (“[The Fifth and Sixth Amendments] apply only 
to citizens and others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for 
alleged offenses committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners 
abroad.” (citing Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891))). 
50. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 918 (“Strict territoriality prevailed as dogma for 
most of American constitutional history, until its overthrow in [the mid-twentieth 
century].”); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2521 
(2005) (equating the “demise” of strict territoriality with developments in the mid-
twentieth century). But see Kent, supra note 7, at 492–96 (2007) (acknowledging that 
legal thought prior to the mid-twentieth century was predominantly “territorial” but 
arguing that the United States did acknowledge rights of citizens abroad during this 
era). 
51. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 208 (“The acquisition provoked extensive 
academic and political debate over the legal status of the territories, the scope of 
congressional authority over them, and the extent of constitutional protections . . . .”); 
Neuman, supra note 6, at 958–59 (describing period as age of “imperialist competition 
with other great powers”). 
52. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 959 (noting political controversy surrounding 
constitutional status of new territorial acquisitions). 
53. “Insular Cases” is an imperfect term that is used to collectively refer to the 
series of cases relating to the governance of newly acquired, non-contiguous territories 
at the turn of the century. E.g., JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO 
RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 3 n.1 (1985). The list of cases includes 
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901), 
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901), Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901), Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 182 
U.S. 222 (Dooley I) (1901), Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (Dooley II), 
DALOIA_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  4:17 PM 
970 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:957 
issue of the Constitution’s independent force in the territorial 
possessions of the United States.54 Justice White’s theory of 
“territorial incorporation” emerged through these cases as the 
new paradigm.55 Under this model, lands ordained by Congress 
as territories gained status as part of the “United States” and thus 
fell under the full umbrella of the Constitution, but 
“unincorporated” possessions, which ultimately retain their 
institutions and traditions, only received fundamental liberties.56 
Many cite the Insular Cases for the ready proposition that the 
Constitution applies “in full” within the United States, but only 
provides “fundamental” coverage to unincorporated territories.57 
However, the distinction is a bit more subtle: the creation of a 
new legal hierarchy of territories was based on the difference in 
 
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901), Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 
U.S. 197 (1903), Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), Kepner v. United States, 195 
U.S. 100 (1904), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mendezona v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904), Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), Trono v. 
United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907), Kent 
v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907), Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909), Dowdell v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913), Ocampo 
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), and finally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 
(1922). 
54. Of the entire group, only a handful of the Insular Cases actually reached 
constitutional issues. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13 (right to jury trial); Ocampo, 234 U.S. 
at 98 (same); Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 329–32 (same); Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 528 (same); 
Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148–49 (same); Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 217–18 (same); Dooley II, 183 U.S. 
at 157 (Export Clause); Downes, 182 U.S. at 287 (Uniformity Clause). 
55. See TORRUELLA, supra note 53, at 62–84 (identifying Justice White’s theory of 
“territorial incorporation” as model to gain majority opinion in cases); Frederic R. 
Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 823 
(1926) (same). 
56. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 291–93 (White, J., concurring) (first case articulating 
White’s theory that distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated territories). 
57. See, e.g., José Julián Alvarez González, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional 
Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 319 n.38 
(1990) (describing Insular Cases as standing for authority that Constitution applies in full 
within incorporated territories, but only fundamental protections run to unincorporated 
territories); Daniel E. Hall, Curfews, Culture and Custom in American Samoa: An Analytical 
Map for Applying the U.S. Constitution to U.S. Territories, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 79–
80 (2001) (same); Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a 
Good Idea—and Constitutional, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 331, 343 (2005) (same); John M. Van 
Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag 
Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 449 (1992) (same). These authorities were originally 
compiled by Christina Duffy Burnett in Burnett, supra note 9, at 1020 n.171, and 
Burnett, supra note 8, at 808 n.40. 
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objective ties to the United States.58 This doctrine again advanced 
a constitutional synthesis that fell along geographic lines, but it 
also inched away from strict territoriality by sustaining the 
Constitution’s presence in lands not technically within the strict 
legal borders of the United States due to the objective 
circumstances of those places.59 
The Court revisited the reach of the Constitution in 1956. In 
relatively brief opinions, the Court relied on the precedent of 
Ross and the Insular opinions to dispose of a set of companion 
cases brought by citizens convicted abroad for the murder of 
their military spouses by courts-martial without a jury trial.60 But 
the following term the Court took the rare step of granting a 
petition for rehearing61 and reversed itself.62 Justice Black, writing 
for a plurality, started with a sweeping passage: 
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United 
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill 
of Rights. The United States . . . can only act in accordance 
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution [and if] 
the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is 
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of 
 
58. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 293 (basing applicability of constitutional protection on 
“an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relations to the United States”); see 
also Burnett, supra note 9, at 983–94 (contending that “the difference between 
[incorporated and unincorporated] territories with respect to the application of 
constitutional provisions has never been as great as courts and commentators have 
argued.”). 
59. See Burnett, supra note 9, at 993–99 (arguing that Boumediene was correct to 
observe that the Insular Cases are best understood as extending, rather than retracting, 
constitutional protections); Neuman, supra note 6, at 918 n.39 (postulating that a form 
of “global due process” can be seen in the Insular Cases with regard to unincorporated 
territories). Though shying away from a strict view of territoriality, this model still found 
citizenship irrelevant. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 237 (remarking that citizenship 
proved “irrelevant” in the Insular Cases); Neuman, supra note 6, at 981 (perceiving that 
“not even the Insular Cases relied on a distinction between the rights of American 
citizens and the rights of subject peoples in the territories”). 
60. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (1956) (denying article III jury trial 
right and Sixth Amendment protection to citizens convicted abroad by courts-martial); 
Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956) (disposing case on basis of Kinsella). 
61. See Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956) (granting petition for rehearing). 
62. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“[A]fter further . . . 
consideration, we conclude that the previous decisions cannot be permitted to stand.”). 
Justice Harlan, the only member to flip from the original majority, curiously cited time 
constraints as his reason for granting the rehearing. See id. at 65 (claiming that a serious 
consideration of the questions presented “was [not] possible in the short interval 
between the argument and decision of the cases in the closing days of last Term.”). 
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the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should 
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in 
another land. This is not a novel concept.63 
Black treaded directly through Ross and the Insular Cases. He 
found Ross “erroneous”64 and sharply criticized the Insular Cases 
for discriminating between which essential liberties to extend to 
a population over which the United States exercises plenary 
control.65 By making full constitutional coverage coextensive with 
government action, Black favored an absolute extraterritorial 
design of the Constitution—at least to the extent that citizens 
were implicated.66 Although the concurring opinions of Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan reached the same result, they would have 
remained true to the spirit of the Insular Cases and only afforded 
citizens located abroad an abridged set of core rights.67 
Specifically, Justice Harlan proposed that constitutional 
protections should apply abroad in all instances when not 
 
63. Id. at 5–6 (internal citations omitted). Ex parte Quirin bears mention because in 
that case a citizen combatant was not entitled to protections of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments even though he was convicted and held within the United States. 317 U.S. 
1, 44 (1942). But he was denied these protections not due to his citizenship or status, 
but rather because the constitutional rights he claimed depended on the crime(s) 
charged and his offenses did not give rise to their protections. See id. 
64. Reid, 354 U.S. at 12. 
65. See id. at 9 (“[W]e can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and 
choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly 
fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the 
Constitution and its Amendments.”). Black manifested his dissatisfaction with the 
Insular Cases by declaring that “neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given 
any further expansion.” Id. at 14. 
66. See id. (“If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the 
Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the 
Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes.”). 
67. See id. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (advocating the “‘fundamental right’ 
test” as the proper basis for resolving the case); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I 
cannot agree with the suggestion that every provision of the Constitution must always be 
deemed automatically applicable to American citizens in every part of the world.”). 
Those who sided with Justice Black must have perceived the unsavory consequence of 
taking the position of the concurring justices in the case at hand because the jury trial 
right in issue was already rejected in a series of Insular decisions as not carrying 
“fundamental” status. See supra note 54 (listing the subset of Insular Cases that reached 
constitutional issues). Gerald Neuman, in his seminal 1990 work, supra note 6, at 970, 
notes that Justice Black’s position eventually garnered a majority three years later in a 
series of companion cases involving similar issues. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. 
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
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“impracticable and anomalous” to do so.68 Notwithstanding the 
lack of consensus amongst the plurality, one noteworthy 
observation is the Court’s shift away from a tradition steeped in 
geography towards one that favors the citizen’s individual 
rights.69 
After over thirty years, the Court, in 1990, put limits on the 
potential of Reid. Again as a plurality, the Court determined in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez70 that the Fourth Amendment did 
not prohibit a warrantless search by federal agents of an alien’s 
home in Mexico after he was arrested and extradited to the 
United States.71 Chief Justice Rehnquist, invoking a characteristic 
social contract theory of the Constitution, reasoned that “the 
people” referenced in the Fourth Amendment was a term of art 
that was intentionally narrower than “person” and did not 
encompass Verdugo-Urquidez.72 Verdugo-Urquidez was 
involuntarily in the United States for only several days at the time 
of the search and lacked the “substantial connections” that vest 
other resident aliens with constitutional privileges.73 The Chief 
Justice also dismissed Reid as limited strictly to citizens.74 Justice 
Kennedy concurred, but instead endorsed Harlan’s earlier 
“impracticable and anomalous” test in order to make a case-by-
case determination based on the totality of circumstances.75 Many 
describe Kennedy’s approach as a “global due process” view of 
the Constitution that favors global application as balanced 
against countervailing administrative exigencies.76 The contrast 
 
68. Reid, 345 U.S. at 74. 
69. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 968 (“Reid v. Covert thus represents a modern 
realignment of the municipal law approach, taking into fuller account the exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction over American citizens worldwide under the nationality 
principle.”); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights 
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 31 (1985) (“Reid and its progeny 
abandoned the territorial view of the compact, affirming that individual rights must be 
respected wherever federal officials act.”). 
70. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
71. See id. at 274–75 (rejecting the contention that the Fourth Amendment protects 
an alien from government search abroad). 
72. Id. at 265–66. 
73. Id. at 271–72.  
74. See id. at 270 (“Since respondent is not a United States citizen, he can derive no 
comfort from the Reid holding.”). 
75. Id. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
76. Gerald Neuman was the first to coin this term and ascribe it to Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 920 (associating global 
due process with Kennedy). This characterization has gained significant recognition in 
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between Rehnquist and Kennedy is of great practical import—
both would agree that the Constitution is not omnipresent, but 
Kennedy’s approach suggests that, at least in some circumstances, 
aliens abroad can find solace in the protections found in 
Constitution.77 
As the foregoing illustrates, there is a constant exchange in 
the Court that precludes a settled line of precedent from 
emerging from its extraterritorial jurisprudence. The resulting 
impact is an uncertain normative and legal framework for 
conclusively determining the geographic range of the 
Constitution. 
C. Habeas Corpus at the Fringe: An Issue of Standing 
The judicial power of the federal courts is limited by article 
III of the Constitution to the resolution of “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”78 This fundamental precept ensures the 
judiciary’s proper role in the tripartite system of government 
envisioned in the Constitution.79 The requirement stems from a 
belief that the judiciary should not use its remedial powers in a 
case not properly before the courts.80 
 
recent years. See Burnett, supra note 9, at 1030–31 (referencing Neuman’s model of 
“global due process”); A. Hays Butler, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Boumediene v. Bush: 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 6 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 149, 173 (2008) (same); Kent, supra note 7, at 470 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez as a 
prototypical example of “global due process”); Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, 
Toward a Limited-Government Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 637, 661 (2007) (mentioning the concept of “global due process”). 
77. See Kent, supra note 7, at 477 n.83 (indicating Kennedy left the issue of whether 
aliens outside the United States can invoke Constitution open); Neuman, supra note 6, 
at 975–76 (postulating that the history of “political and jurisprudential assumptions . . . 
demonstrates that the distance between Rehnquist’s opinion and Kennedy’s 
concurrence is wider than a superficial reading might suggest”). 
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
79. See DiamlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“[T]he case-or-
controversy limitation is crucial in maintaining the ‘tripartite allocation of power’ set 
forth in the Constitution.” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)); Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (stating that “[n]o principle is more 
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the 
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies”). 
80. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (“If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the 
courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”); 
Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (conveying that case or 
controversy requirement “assures[s] that courts will not ‘pass upon . . . abstract, 
intellectual problems,’ but adjudicate ‘concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries.’” 
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Every party that invokes the courts’ powers must have some 
personal interest at the outset of litigation in order to display that 
they have “standing” in the dispute.81 To satisfy this aspect of the 
case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff must, in the familiar 
words of the Court, “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed 
by the requested relief.”82 Standing in no way rests on the merits 
of a claim; but, in a circular way, the personal injury asserted can 
often turn on the legal source of the alleged harm.83 Stated 
differently, the alleged injury must result from the invasion of a 
legally protected interest,84 and where there is no legal right to 
that interest, statutory or otherwise, a claimed invasion of that 
protection results in no legal injury.85 
In a habeas corpus action, there are two parties attendant to 
the writ: the prisoner seeking relief and the custodian to whom 
 
(quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(second alteration in original)). 
81. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (indicating that 
litigants must have a “‘personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the 
litigation’” to satisfy standing (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: 
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973))); see also Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of standing is an essential 
and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). 
82. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
83. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Although standing in no way 
depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, it 
often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted. The actual or threatened 
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing.” (internal citations omitted)); Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the 
statute.” (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., 
concurring))); Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968))). 
84. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (“[T]o satisfy 
our standing requirements, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be an invasion of a concrete 
and particularized legally protected interest.” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)); Raines, 
521 U.S. at 819 (“We have also stressed that the alleged injury must be legally and 
judicially cognizable.”); cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (“[T]he standing question . . . is 
whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can 
be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.”). 
85. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 227 (dismissing claim for lack of standing based 
on interest that is not a “legally recognizable right”); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 
752 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Because these appellees have not alleged any 
legally cognizable injury . . . they lack standing.”). 
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the writ is directed.86 Under current law, a federal court acts 
within its jurisdiction when the custodian may be reached by the 
court’s process.87 However, the prisoner seeking relief must first 
have standing in order to invoke the court’s equitable power.88 In 
the vast majority of habeas applications, this is not usually an 
issue because it is widely recognized that the writ of habeas 
corpus is available to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.89 As a result, the Court has entertained a 
variety of habeas petitions from enemy alien and enemy citizen 
combatants detained within the sovereign territory of the United 
States and its possessions.90  
But for prisoners held abroad, the immediate question 
becomes whether they are entitled to the protections of the writ 
and thus have standing to challenge their detention.91 Courts 
addressing the rare situation have often framed the issue in terms 
 
86. See supra notes 21, 25, 36 and accompanying text (recognizing the prisoner who 
seeks relief and his or her jailer as the two individuals involved in a habeas corpus 
proceeding). 
87. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (requiring the jailer’s presence in the 
jurisdiction of the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus). 
88. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (describing the “standing” aspect 
of the article III “case or controversy” requirement). 
89. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (“[A]bsent suspension, the 
writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United 
States.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2) (emphasis added)); cf. Foley Bros., Inc. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (“[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is [presumed] to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”). Quite importantly, this construction does not discriminate between aliens and 
citizens. See, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1953) (implying that an alien 
may challenge deportation proceeding by habeas corpus under the Constitution); Clark 
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (noting the historic use of statutory habeas corpus 
by noncitizens (citing United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888); In re Kaine, 
55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852))). 
90. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (entertaining application by enemy citizen 
captured abroad and held on U.S. mainland); Heikkila, 345 U.S. 229 (alien subject to 
deportation due to alleged membership in Communist Party); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (same); United States ex rel. Eicenlaub v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (alien subject to deportation for violation of Espionage Act); 
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (enemy alien detained in United States and 
subject to removal order); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (enemy alien tried and 
detained in U.S. insular possession); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (enemy aliens 
and enemy citizen imprisoned on U.S. mainland); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 
(1866) (enemy citizen held by Union state during the Civil War). 
91. See supra note 85 (discerning that standing rests on protected legal interests). 
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of jurisdiction.92 Jurisdiction, however, is an imprecise term with 
diverse meaning.93 At bottom, the threshold issue in these cases is 
more appropriately one of whether the prisoner seeking relief 
has standing—i.e. that they hold a legally protected interest in 
habeas review—to challenge their detention.94 This is the 
primary focus of the hypothetical cases presented in Part III.C. 
II. THE CONTEXT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
Boumediene broke historic ground in June 2008 by 
undertaking a thorough review of the Suspension Clause and 
extending its protections to a group of prisoners detained 
outside of the United States.95 The case, however, did not arise by 
mere happenstance. It was one of many challenges initiated by 
prisoners detained in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.96 This Part will set out the events that forced 
the Court to focus on the Suspension Clause for the first time in 
 
92. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (“These two cases present the 
narrow but important question whether the United States courts lack jurisdiction to 
consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured 
abroad.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (“The ultimate question in 
this case is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-a-vis military 
authorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.”); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 
199 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is an important question of jurisdiction 
that lies at the threshold of these cases.”). 
93. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 867–71 (listing numerous 
meanings). As observed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, “jurisdiction” is a nebulous term that carries with it over fifty 
recognized definitions. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 222–23 (2009). 
94. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.. 2229, 2262 (2008) (“Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of 
the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay. . . . Petitioners, therefore, are 
entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”); 
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (“The question now before us is whether the habeas statute 
confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive detentions of aliens in a 
territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but 
not ‘ultimate sovereignty.’”); cf. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777 (“The foregoing 
demonstrates how much further we must go if we are to invest these enemy aliens . . . 
with standing to demand access to our courts.”). 
95. See infa notes 242–51. 
96. For a sampling of important federal cases initiated by these prisoners, see 
Torture’sNotUs.net, Court Cases, http://www.torturesnotus.net/pb/wp_162218b9/
wp_162218b9.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing various cases at different stages of 
litigation in federal courts). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also 
maintains a website that provides regular updates on all pending cases related to 
Guantánamo detentions. See U.S. Dist. Ct. for the D.C., Guantanamo Bay Case 
Information, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/public-docs/gitmo (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) 
(supplying docket updates on all pending cases). 
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recent history. First, Part II.A provides a brief summary of the 
U.S. commitment to embark on a “war on terror,” and the 
nature of the military campaigns waged as part of that resolve. 
Part II.B explains the character of the detentions carried out by 
U.S. forces during this war. Part II.C rounds out the discussion 
with an overview of the legal challenges to these detentions that 
set the stage for a modern revival of the Suspension Clause. 
A. September 11th and the “War on Terror” 
On September 11, 2001, commercial airplanes were used to 
attack the World Trade Center in New York City and the 
Pentagon defense complex in Arlington, Virginia (“September 
11th” or “9/11”), causing the single largest loss of life on U.S. 
soil due to a hostile attack.97 President Bush soon informed 
Congress and the public that the Al Qaeda terrorist network was 
behind the attacks and described a new approach that the United 
States would take against those responsible as a “war on terror.”98 
Congress swiftly reacted with a joint resolution known as the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) that granted 
the President the power to use “all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
[September 11th attacks] or harbored such organizations.”99 
 
97. See 9/11 COMM’N, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 311 (2004), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf. The report estimates that a total of 
2973 persons lost their life as an immediate result of the attacks. Id. 
98. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response 
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347 (Sept. 20, 
2001) [hereinafter 9/11 Joint Session Speech] (reproducing text of speech). Al Qaeda 
eventually conceded involvement, see Full Transcript of Bin Laden’s Speech, AL-JAZEERA, 
Nov. 2, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web/20070613014620/http://
english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=7403 (providing translation of 
original video aired on the Arab media network Al-Jazeera), after initially equivocating. 
see Bin Laden Says He Wasn’t Behind Attacks, CNN, Sept. 17, 2001, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/ (quoting Bin Laden as 
stating “I would like to assure the world that I did not plan the recent attacks, which 
seems to have been planned by people for personal reasons.”); Tom Bowman et al., 
Taliban Face Ultimatum Warnings: Give Up Bin Laden or Feel the ‘Full Wrath’ of U.S., BALT. 
SUN, Sept. 17, 2001, at 1A (reporting that bin Laden issued a statement denying 
responsibility for attacks). 
99. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115 Stat. 224 
(codified in note at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
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Vested with this broad authority, the President issued an 
expansive military directive on November 13, 2001 that 
authorized the indefinite detainment of individuals suspected of 
terrorism without formal charges100 and the option to try them by 
military commission.101 
As is described at length elsewhere,102 the United States 
initiated attacks in Afghanistan and later in Iraq in order to 
achieve its ambition of obstructing terrorism. While both 
missions were successful in ousting the incumbent government 
from control,103 U.S. forces have since remained in each country 
in order to fulfill a handful of responsibilities. 
During the nascent stages of the military campaign in 
Afghanistan in 2001, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security 
Council authorized the creation of a temporary international 
security assistance force (“ISAF”) comprised of several dozen 
countries to patrol Kabul and the surrounding locale.104 At the 
request of the U.N. and the Afghan government, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) assumed responsibility 
over the ISAF and expanded operations to the whole of the 
country.105 In late 2002, the United States and the Afghan 
 
100. See Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism, § 2(a)(1), 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1665, 1666 (Nov. 
13, 2001) (subjecting to the order any person who “is or was a member of . . . al Qaida” 
or “has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international 
terrorism” that are adverse to the United States). 
101. See id. § 4(a) (“Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried 
by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission . . . .”). 
102. See generally AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (Tom Lansford et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2009) (collecting essays on the causes and implications of the war on terror); RICHARD 
A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (2004) (providing a detailed account on the 
motivations to launch attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: 
THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN 
IDEALS (2008) (same). 
103. See generally TOMMY FRANKS, AMERICAN SOLDIER (2004) (providing a first-hand 
account of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq); DAVID E. THALER ET AL., 
FUTURE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2008) (outlining 
the U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
104. See S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001) (authorizing the creation of 
a security force). 
105. See Press Release, N. Atlantic Treaty Org. [NATO], NATO to Assume 
Command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul on Monday, 11 
August 2003 (Aug. 8, 2003) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-
091e.htm (announcing change in control); see also S.C. Res. 1510, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1510 (2003) (expanding mandate from Kabul to the entire country). Under the 
command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, forty-two nations voluntarily 
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government formalized a status of forces agreement (“SOFA-A”) 
through an exchange of diplomatic notes that governs the 
presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.106 In part due to the 
agreement’s broad language, U.S. forces are endowed with 
considerable authority to act as they need and the instrument 
cedes criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel to the United 
States.107 Most recently, U.S. President Barack Obama authorized 
a 17,000-soldier troop surge in Afghanistan in order to realize the 
goal of uprooting Al-Qaeda.108 
As for Iraq, the United States led a multinational force 
 
contribute troops and each province in Afghanistan falls under the care of a 
participating nation. See NATO, ISAF Contributing Nations, http://www.nato.int/isaf/
structure/nations/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing participating nations); 
NATO, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/
index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (outlining regional breakdown). For a map 
depicting the breakdown of forces, see NATO, Map of Afghanistan Showing the Regional 
Commands (ISAF RCs) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ISAF PRTs) (Apr. 3, 2009), 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
106. See Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian 
Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with 
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, 
Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities, U.S.-Afg., May 23, 2003, Temp. 
State Dep’t No. 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316 [hereinafter U.S.-Afg. SOFA]. For a copy of 
the original documents, see Declaration of Colonel Charles A. Tennison Ex. 2 (attached 
as Ex. 1 to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus), Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2009) (No. 06-CV-
01669), available at http://sites.google.com/a/ijnetwork.org/bagram-public-library/
Home/maqaleh/18.1Exhibits.pdf [hereinafter Tennison Decl.] (attaching as an exhibit 
a copy of original diplomatic notes). Despite attempts to arrange a new compact, the 
SOFA-A still remains in effect. See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan 
Strategic Partnership, U.S.-Afg., 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 863, 864 (May 23, 2005) 
(committing to “develop appropriate arrangements and agreements” to spell out terms 
of U.S. authority in Afghanistan); Karen DeYoung, Only a Two-Page 'Note' Governs U.S. 
Military in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2008, at A07 (reporting that the diplomatic 
note still controls U.S. presence, notwithstanding the May 2005 Joint Declaration). 
107. U.S.-Afg. SOFA, supra note 106, ¶¶ 5, 7 (granting to the United States the 
right to “exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States personnel” and to “import 
into, export out of, and use in the Republic of Afghanistan any personal property, 
equipment, supplies, materials, technology, training or services required to implement 
this agreement.”). 
108. See Statement on United States Troop Levels in Afghanistanm 2009 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 89 (Feb. 17, 2009) (announcing a troop surge in Afghanistan); see also 
Helene Cooper, Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops, Feb. 18, 
2009, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (specifying that President Obama authorized a deployment of 
17,000 troops to Afghanistan). 
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(“MNF-I”) under the authority of a sweeping mandate.109 The 
Security Council periodically renewed the mandate of the MNF-I 
at the request of the Iraqi government in order to quell surges in 
violence.110 Before this grant expired, the Iraqi and U.S. 
governments formalized a status of forces agreement (“SOFA-I”) 
permitting U.S. forces, as separate from other MNF-I coalition 
members, to remain in Iraq through the end of 2011.111 The 
SOFA-I requests U.S. “assistance” in “maintain[ing] security and 
stability in Iraq.”112 At first blush, this language may appear to 
parallel the authority granted to the MNF-I by the U.N. Security 
Council.113 But the SOFA-I makes all U.S. military actions subject 
to the supervision of a joint oversight committee.114 This 
partnership reflects the desire for Iraqi authorities to assume full 
control over security detail as the United States gradually 
withdraws forces.115 As part of this strategy, U.S. President Barack 
 
109. See S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003) (authorizing “a 
multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute 
to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” for the lifetime of the interim 
governing body known as the Coalition Provisional Authority); cf. Gregory H. Fox, The 
Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO J. INT’L L. 195, 202 (2005) (qualifying the United States and 
United Kingdom as “occupying powers” during this period). 
110. See S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (extending 
mandate of Iraq multinational force (“MNF-I”) in order to promote “restoration of 
stability” in light of June 5, 2004 request from Iraqi authorities); S.C. Res. 1723, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006) (extending mandate through end of 2007); S.C. 
Res. 1790, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007) (extending mandate through 
end of 2008). 
111. See Agreement Between the United States of American and the Republic of 
Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their 
Activities During Their Temporary Presence In Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, art. 24, Nov. 17, 2008, 
Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-6 [hereinafter U.S.-Iraq SOFA], available at https://www.mnf-
iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf (formalizing a timetable for 
U.S. withdrawl). 
112. Id. art. 4. 
113. Compare id. (requesting U.S. forces “for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its 
efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq”), with S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 109 
(authorizing a multinational force “to take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”). 
114. U.S.-Iraq SOFA, supra note 111, art. 4 (“All military operations that are carried 
out pursuant to this Agreement . . . shall be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities 
[under the supervision of] a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee 
(JMOCC) to be established pursuant to this agreement.”). 
115. Id. art. 24 (“Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi 
Security Forces [and] the assumption of full responsibility by those Forces . . . [The 
United States agrees to withdraw forces by December 31, 2011].”); Larisa Epatko, 
Detention Centers in Iraq Move from 'Chaos' to Reform, NEWS HOUR, June 20, 2008, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/jan-june08/
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Obama announced an expedited withdrawal of U.S. forces after 
assuming office in January 2009, but made no mention of any 
changes as to their on-ground responsibilities.116 
B. Detention Abroad and at Home 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the war waged 
against terrorism was not confined to the Afghan and Iraqi 
borders. Detainees have alleged capture off the battlefield in 
locations as diverse as Bosnia and Herzegovina,117 Djibouti,118 
Dubai,119 Egypt,120 Gambia,121 Italy,122 Jordan,123 Macedonia,124 
Pakistan,125 Thailand,126 Sweden,127 the United Arab Emirates,128 
and even the United States.129 Ultimately, though, the vast 
majority of individuals detained in this war ended up in one of 
several notable long-term holding facilities and the United States 
operates a number of other sites that could potentially be used 
for similar purposes. This section will review the detention 
practices engaged in by the United States as part of its war on 
 
detainees_06-20.html (summarizing Iraqi official as stating “the goal is to put Iraqis in 
charge and develop a way for the Iraqi legal system to handle the thousands of people 
already in detention”). 
116. See Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 109 
(Feb. 27, 2009) (“Today, I can announce that . . . the United States will pursue a new 
strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility. . . . [L]et 
me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will 
end.”). 
117. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008). 
118. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 
“High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 5 (Feb. 2007), http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-
report.pdf [hereinafter ICRC RENDITION REPORT] (prisoner Guleed). 
119. Id. (prisoner Nashiri). 
120. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472 n.4 (2004). 
121. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2241. 
122. European Parliament Resoution on the Alleged Use of European Countries by 
the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, 2007 O.J. C 287 
E/309, at 316 [hereinafter European Parliament Rendition Report]. 
123. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
124. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–33 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
125. E.g., Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. 
126. E.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) (petitioner 
al Bakri). 
127. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003 (Agiza v. Sweden), 
¶ 1.1, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005). 
128. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (petitioner Wazir). 
129. E.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). 
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terror. 
1. Detention Abroad 
At the inception of the Afghan offensive in late 2001, the 
U.S. military preferred that Afghan militiamen hold valuable 
prisoners detained in the conflict.130 As U.S. presence grew, the 
Department of Defense (“DOD”) announced that they sought to 
take custody of prisoners in order to gather intelligence.131 As for 
the separate mission in Iraq, U.S. forces performed several 
functions for the Iraqi government under the broad U.N. 
mandate of the MNF-I.132 One of their functions was to detain 
individuals posing a threat to Iraqi security.133 In addition to 
persons posing a security risk to Iraq, the MNF-I also agreed to 
take custody of individuals standing trial on domestic charges for 
the Iraqi government because a large portion of the country’s 
security infrastructure was impaired as a result of the U.S. 
invasion.134 
 
130. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Rumsfeld: Taliban, Al Qaeda 
Dangerous Like Wounded Animals (Dec. 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44377 (“Till [sic] now, American 
commanders had preferred to allow opposition groups to handle all prisoners, saying 
America didn’t have enough of a presence in the region to effectively handle 
prisoners.”). 
131. See id. (“American forces in Afghanistan w[ill] soon start taking prisoners . . . . 
American forces can gather valuable intelligence information from ‘detainees.’”) 
132. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (vesting MNF-I with authority 
to provide security in Iraq). 
133. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (permitting detention as an 
aspect of providing security in Iraq). 
134. See Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (2008) (“Iraq retains ultimate 
responsibility for the arrest and imprisonment of individuals who violate its laws, but 
because many of Iraq’s prison facilities have been destroyed, the MNF-I agreed to 
maintain physical custody of many such individuals during Iraqi criminal 
proceedings.”); U.S. Military May Abandon Abu Ghraib, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-03-08-abu-ghraib_x.htm 
(paraphrasing a U.S. commander as stating, “prisoners [detained by U.S. forces] were 
divided into two groups—‘security detainees’ under American control, and common 
Iraqi criminals under the control of the Iraqi judicial system.”); ANTONIO TAGUBA, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE 
BRIGADE 10 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/
prison_abuse_report.pdf [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT] (“[D]ue to a lack of adequate 
Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security 
internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) . . . in the same facilities.”). 
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a. Guantánamo Bay Naval Station 
The first long-term holding facility used by the United States 
to detain individuals captured on the battlefield was, rather 
unusually, located far off the battlefield at a site known as 
Guantánamo Bay. Guantánamo Bay is a naturally fortified inlet 
on the southeastern edge of Cuba.135 
By way of historic background, U.S. forces overtook the area 
around Guantánamo Bay during the Spanish-American War and 
established military barracks as a base of operations.136 The 
United States assumed control over the whole of Cuba following 
the end of the war in 1898.137 Although the United States 
eventually ceded control back to Cuba, they retained a small 
portion of the island as their own. A rider appended to a U.S. 
army appropriations bill and likewise annexed to the newly 
ratified Cuban constitution, popularly known as the Platt 
Amendment, outlined the terms of U.S. withdrawal from the 
country.138 Among the conditions was a demand that Cuba agree 
to lease or sell territory on the island to the United States for 
purposes of coaling and a naval station.139 In 1903, the first 
President of Cuba granted a lease agreement to the United States 
 
135. See 5 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 532 (2002). 
136. See MARION EMERSON MURPHY, THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY ch. 2 
(1953) (outlining the Cuba invasion); With the Fleet Off Santiago; A $200,000 
Bombardment—Cubans Capture a Spanish Camp—Famine Menaces the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 1898, at A1 (reporting that “the fine harbor [at Guantánamo Bay] will make a 
good American base”). 
137. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. I, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (“Spain 
relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.”); see also KENNETH E. 
HENDRICKSON, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 77 (2003) (suggesting political interests as 
the reason for U.S. post-war occupation of Cuba); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 309 (2003) (observing that the United States 
assumed military control of Cuba after defeating Spain). 
138. See Act of Mar. 12, 1901, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 897–98 (1901); The United States, 
Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, 1901, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ho/time/ip/86557.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (detailing the history of the Platt 
Amendment). 
139. See Act of Mar. 12, 1901 § 7 (“[T]he government of Cuba will sell or lease to 
the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations . . . to be agreed upon 
with the President of the United States.”). The language employed in the Platt 
Amendment superseded a prior U.S. commitment, made at the outset of the Spanish-
American war, to “disclaim[] any . . . intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over [Cuba]” and furthermore “leave the government and control of [Cuba] to 
its people” following the defeat of Spain. Act of April 20, 1898, ch. 24, art. 4, 30 Stat. 
738, 739 (1898) (joint resolution of Congress popularly known as the “Teller 
Amendment”). 
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over an area comprising about forty-five square miles of land and 
water around Guantánamo Bay.140 Notably, the lease stipulated 
that the United States would exercise “complete jurisdiction and 
control” over the area while Cuba would retain “ultimate 
sovereignty.”141 In 1934, the two parties entered into a treaty 
containing a proviso that the lease would remain in effect “[s]o 
long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said 
naval station,” or both parties agree to abandon the lease.142 
On December 21, 2001, the United States announced that it 
would use the naval station at Guantánamo Bay to hold suspects 
recently detained by the military in Afghanistan.143 The Bush 
administration sought a location to house detainees where it 
could exercise a high level of control with minimal oversight or 
restraint and turned to the base at Guantánamo Bay for its 
unique location and legal status.144 The President was advised by 
 
140. See MURPHY, supra note 136, ch. 3 (describing in detail the geography of land 
acquired under lease); History of Guantanamo, CUBA TODAY, 
http://www.cubatoday.com/guantanamo-bay/history/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) 
(recognizing the first Cuban President Tomás Estrada Palma as the individual to offer 
the lease). For the full text of the lease, see Agreement Between the United States and 
Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, February 23, 
1903, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter 1903 Cuba Lease] (reproducing the text of the 
agreement). 
141. 1903 Cuba Lease, supra note 140, art. 3 (emphasis added); see also MURPHY, 
supra note 136, ch. 3 (interpreting the jurisdiction and control provisions as 
interrupting Cuban sovereignty). 
142. See Treaty Between the United States and Cuba Defining Their Relations, May 
29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, Art. 3, 48 Stat. 1682. The 1934 treaty effectively abrogated the Platt 
Amendment, which defined Cuban-American relations up through that time, but most 
of its language was substantially incorporated into the text of the agreement. See id. 
pmbl. (incorporating an excerpt of the Platt Amendment into the body of the 
agreement). 
143. See News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense (Dec. 27, 2001), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2696 
(conceeding that U.S. government is “making preparations to hold detainees” at 
Guantánamo Bay); Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Detention Camp; U.S. to 
Hold Taliban Detainees in ‘the Least Worst Place,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001 at B6 (reporting 
that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that Guantánamo Bay 
would be used to detain Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters). 
144. See KAREN J. GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 
DAYS 5–6 (2009) (providing that officials sought a location that would not be hampered 
by diplomatic negotiations, intergovernmental oversight, or U.S. law); JANE MAYER, 
supra note 102, at 147 (indicating that Guantánamo Bay was selected for its “unique 
legal status” of being “under U.S. control but not under U.S. law”). The administration 
initially considered a diverse host of other locations as potential sites for detention, but 
discarded them for various practical or political reasons. See GREENBERG, supra, at 4–5 
(citing America Samoa, Diego Garcia, Germany, Guam, the Marshall Islands, Pakistan, 
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attorneys within the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) that 
Guantánamo Bay fell beyond the reach of U.S. courts and that 
the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to anyone detained at 
the base.145 On the advice of the DOJ, the Bush administration 
began labeling individuals captured as part of the U.S. war on 
terror as “illegal enemy combatants,”146 in an effort to sidestep 
 
Poland, Tinian, and Wake Island as other areas considered by administration); see also 
Esther Schrader, POWs Will Go to Base in Cuba; Military: Rumsfeld Calls Guantanamo Bay 
‘Least Worst Place’ for Taliban and Al Qaeda Fighters, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at A1 
(“Other, more remote sites mentioned have included Guam and Wake Island in the 
Pacific.”); Seelye, supra note 143 (“Officials said the other options had included Guam 
. . . and ships at sea . . . .”). 
145. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Possible Habeas 
Jurisdiction Over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay Cuba 1 (Dec. 28, 2001) (“We 
conclude that the great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal court could not 
properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at [Guantánamo Bay].”); 
Draft Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
& Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes, II, 
General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) (“We conclude that [the Geneva Conventions] do 
not protect members of the al Qaeda organization . . . . We further conclude that these 
treaties do not apply to the Taliban militia.”). These, along with other U.S. Department 
of Justice memoranda from the same time period, are collected in THE TORTURE 
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29–79 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua l. Dratel eds., 
2005). The third Geneva Convention is one in a series of international treaties that 
provides various minimal protections for “prisoners of war.” Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. U.S. case law embraces the international 
and customary understanding that “lawful combatants” receive “prisoner of war” status, 
whereas those unlawfully engaged in hostilities are separately subject to trial under 
domestic law. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (proclaiming that “[b]y 
universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between . . . those 
who are lawful and unlawful combatants”); Official Statement, ICRC, The Relevance of 
IHL in the Context of Terrorism (July 21, 2005), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705 (“Unlawful combatants do not qualify for 
prisoner of war status. . . . This protection is not the same as that afforded to lawful 
combatants. To the contrary, [such persons] may be prosecuted under domestic law for 
directly participating in hostilities.”). 
146. The status “illegal enemy combatant” is a mix of several terms of art. The laws 
of war differentiate between “combatants,” as members of a nation’s militia, and 
“citizens,” as all other persons. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 145, arts. 2, 4, 
5, (defining the legal status of “prisoner of war”); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 (defining the legal status of “protected persons” not taking part in 
hostilities). Civilian, therefore, is a legal class of persons not subject to military seizure. 
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 178 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007) (indicating that civilians are 
not subject to military seizure under international humanitarian law). Likewise, 
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these requirements.147 The practical effect of concurrently 
precluding U.S. jurisdiction and international humanitarian law 
from Guantánamo Bay was the creation of a law-free zone that 
many labeled as a “legal black hole.”148 As a result, the 
administration quickly garnered sharp criticism from 
international non-profit organizations,149 professional 
 
“combatant” does not imply wrongdoing but is simply a category of persons with 
different rights than “citizens.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004) 
(characterizing “combatant” status as a “legal category”). Although the term “enemy 
combatant” is the source of recent controversy, the Court has historically used it with 
regularity to refer to a combatant with adversarial allegiances. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 
n.1; Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 (1952); In re Yamashita 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946); 
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. Consistent with these principles, an enemy combatant 
who commits hostile acts beyond the bounds prescribed by the laws of war is subject to 
military tribunal as an unlawful, or illegal, combatant. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35 (“[O]ur 
Government has likewise recognized that those who during time of war pass 
surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, 
for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the 
status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.”); see also 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (recognizing that the trial of “unlawful combatants” is 
widely accepted). 
147. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 107 (“Soon 
after September 11th, [Justice Department lawyers] began advising President Bush that 
he did not have to comply with the Geneva Conventions in handling detainees in the 
war on terror. The lawyers classified these detainees not as civilians or prisoners of war—
two categories of individuals protected by the Conventions—but as ‘illegal enemy 
combatants.’”); see also Adam Roberts, The Laws of War, in ATTACKING TERRORISM: 
ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY 186, 202–06 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes 
eds., 2004) (identifying origins and initial use of an indeterminate status with fewer 
protections than “prisoner of war” following September 11th attacks). 
148. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 50, at 2547 (utilizing the term “black hole” with 
reference to Guantánamo); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1133 (2009) (same). Johan Steyn, a prominent English jurist, is 
generally credited as the first to coin this term during a November 23, 2003, speech that 
is reproduced in Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 
(2004) (“The most powerful democracy is detaining hundreds of suspected foot soldiers 
of the Taliban in a legal black hole at the United States naval base at Guantanamo 
Bay . . . .”). The term, as used in reference to the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, 
however, first originated in an earlier English Court of Appeals case. R ex rel. Abbasi v. 
Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [22], 
(2002) 126 I.L.R. 686, 697 (paraphrasing counsel as arguing that his client sits in a 
“legal black hole”). 
149. See, e.g., Richard Wilson, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission Responds to a “Legal Black Hole”, 10 HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 2 
(2003) (denouncing the ongoing detention practices at Guantánamo); Amnesty Int’l, 
USA: AI Calls on the USA to End Legal Limbo of Guantánamo Prisoners, AI Index No. AMR 
51/009/2002 (Jan. 15, 2002) (calling on the United States to end “legal limbo” of 
detainees); Press Release, ICRC, ICRC President Urges Progress on Detention-Related 
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associations,150 and scholars151 worldwide. 
b. Afghanistan 
The first facilities used for detaining prisoners captured in 
the Afghan offensive were, quite practically, makeshift sites 
located near the battlefront in Afghanistan.152 A camp at Bagram 
airfield evolved to become the sole U.S.-managed detention site 
in Afghanistan.153 
The United States took possession of the abandoned 
Bagram airfield after removing the Taliban from control during 
the 2001 invasion.154 Without an aviation need for the space, the 
 
Issues (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/
5v9te8?opendocument (lamenting that detention conditions are subpar). 
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Bar Ass’n, Guantanamo Bay Detainees are Entitled 
to Challenge Their Detention in Court, IBA Human Rights Institute Briefs US Supreme 
Court (Jan. 25, 2004), available at http://www.ibanet.org/article/detail.aspx?articleuid=
dbb08456-daF6-42e4-b6d5-204141e6457a (criticizing military for holding detainees 
outside legal framework); see also Jonathan D. Glater, A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights in Cases 
Tried by Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at A18 (lobbying for access to lawyers). 
151. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that the military tribunal 
erected to try Guantánamo detainees is unconstitutional); Harold Hongju Koh, The Case 
Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 337 (2002) (contending that the military 
commission at Guantánamo undermines the separation-of-powers design). 
152. See Linda Kozaryn, U.S. to Question Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 
18, 2001, available at http://www.defense.gov//news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44340 
(reporting that the initial detainees were en route to facilities at Kandahar Airport and 
aboard the U.S.S. Peleliu); News Briefing, U.S. Gen. Richard B. Myers (Jan. 7, 2002), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1082 
(“There are 302 being held at Kandahar, 38 at Bagram, 16 at Mazar-e Sharif [sic], and 
eight on the [U.S.S.] Bataan.”); News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense 
(Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2197 (recounting that “[t]he preliminary interrogations 
took place in the locations where the detainees had previously been in custody, 
essentially Kandahar and Bagram, but also some other places”). 
153. See News Briefing, U.S. Gen. Tommy Franks (Oct. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3800 (“I think at one 
point we had perhaps two—one in Kandahar, one up in the vicinity of Kabul at Bagram 
air base. Now we use one that is up in the vicinity of Bagram.”); see also Eric Schmitt & 
Tim Golden, U.S. Set to Build Big New Prison in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2008, at 
A1 (confirming that “[a]fter [Bagram] was set up in early 2002, it became the primary 
site for screening prisoners captured in the fighting.”). 
154. See Michael R. Gordon, Securing Base, U.S. Makes Its Brawn Blend In, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2001, at B1 (detailing U.S. occupation of base in December 2001); Eliza 
Griswold, The Other Guantanamo: Black Hole, NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 2007, at 9 (“In late 
2001, as it trounced the Taliban, the United States took possession of the base and 
outfitted [the base] to detain captured combatants.”). 
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military converted a vacant hangar into a makeshift detention 
facility now known as Bagram Theater Internment Facility 
(“Bagram”).155 The United States eventually legitimized its use of 
the space in an indefinite lease agreement with the Afghan 
government on September 28, 2006.156 By its terms, U.S. forces 
are provided with exclusive use of the base.157 Although the lease 
is theoretically indefinite, the United States has signaled that it 
intends to occupy Bagram only as long as necessary to complete 
its military mission and assist Afghanistan in attaining full 
sovereignty.158 
The military initially used Bagram as a clearinghouse to 
screen out from the pool of worldwide prisoners those who 
merited transfer to Guantánamo Bay.159 However, after a 
 
155. See Tim Golden, Topics, Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/
bagram_air_base_afghanistan/index.html (describing location of detention center and 
name of facility); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 101st Division Soldiers to 
Relieve 15th MEU in Afghanistan (Dec. 31, 2001) available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44313 (first official statement acknowledging seven detainees 
at Bagram air base). 
156. See Accommodation Consignment Agreement for Lands and Facilities at 
Bagram Airfield Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Represented by His 
Excellency General Abdul Rahim Wardak Minister of Defense of the Office of the 
Ministry of Defense and the United States of America, U.S.-Afg., ¶ 4, U.S.-Afg., Sept. 28, 
2006 [hereinafter Bagram Lease] (“[T]his Agreement . . . shall continue until the 
United States or its successors determine that the Premises are no longer required for its 
use.”). For the full text of this lease, see Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller Ex. 1, 
(attached as Ex. A to Respondent’s Response to Order to Show Cause and Motion to 
Dismiss or Lack of Jurisdiction), Ruzatullah v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01707 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 
2006), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-
columbia/dcdce/1:2006cv01707/122762/5/2.pdf [hereinafter Miller Decl.]. 
157. See Bagram Lease, supra note 156, ¶ 9 (granting the United States “exclusive, 
peaceable, undisturbed and uninterrupted possession” of the airbase). 
158. See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, 
supra note 106 (embracing a partnership that envisions Afghan assumption of full 
control as resources increase); Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 196, at 4 (Mar. 27, 2009) 
(“[W]e will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of 
Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country 
[and] bring our own troops home.”). 
159. See News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense (Jan. 27, 2002), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2348 
(“[W]hat they’ve done at Bagram and Kandahar is to sort through these people . . . and 
make judgments as to who they believe to be ones that might prove to be particularly 
useful from an information standpoint and sent a group of them [to Guantánamo].”); 
see also Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guantánamo, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A1 (explaining that in early days of Bagram “[m]ilitary and 
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Supreme Court ruling adverse to the Guantánamo detention 
practice,160 this process ceased and Bagram became the preferred 
destination for indefinite detention.161 Because of this 
reshuffling, the prison’s population increased six fold by 2009 to 
a level of somewhere between 550 and 630.162 A vast majority of 
these detainees came from the Afghan battlefield, but a small 
segment of prisoners were relocated to Bagram from remote 
areas of the world.163 
 
intelligence personnel there sifted through captured Afghan rebels and suspected 
terrorists seized in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere, sending the most valuable and 
dangerous to Guantánamo for extensive interrogation, and generally releasing the 
rest.”); Griswold, supra note 154 (“The detention facility was [initially] designed as a 
short-term collection point, where American interrogators sorted erroneous and low-
level captures from those of higher intelligence value.”); Human Rights First, Arbitrary 
Justice: Trials of Bagram and Guantánamo Detainees in Afghanistan 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/usls-080409-arbitrary-justice-report.pdf 
(“Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, many detainees initially were held in 
Bagram and then transferred to Guantánamo.”). 
160. See discussion infra notes 209–12 (extending statutory habeas corpus relief to 
prisoners detained at Guantánamo). 
161. See Golden, supra note 159 (ascribing the influx of detainees to the “Bush 
administration decision to shut off the flow of detainees into Guantánamo after the 
Supreme Court ruled that those prisoners had some basic due-process rights”); Daphne 
Eviatar, Bagram’s Black Hole: Guantanamo Bay Was Bad Enough—Bagram Is Worse, AM. 
LAW., Fall 2008 Supp., at 78 (providing that the “unintended consequence” of successful 
lawsuits prompted the U.S. military to “stop[] sending captured suspects to 
Guantánamo”); see also JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 176 (2007) (identifying “a cabinet-level meeting [on] September 
14, 2004” as time at which the decision was made). The official change of title from 
Bagram Collection Point to Bagram Theater Internment Facility is indicative of this 
shift. Compare News Briefing, Lt. Gen. David Barno (June 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3345 (“Bagram 
Collection Point”), with Battle in Afhanistan Leaves One U.S. Servicemember, One Enemy 
Dead, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=18526 (“Bagram Theater Internment Facility”). 
162. Compare Golden, supra note 155 (estimating 630 as the prison’s population as 
of November 2009), with US Detention Related to the Fight Against Terrorism—The Role of the 
ICRC, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Apr. 3, 2009) (estimating 550 as the population in mid-
2009). 
163. See Golden, supra note 155 (observing that “all but about 30 [of the 630 
Bagram detainees] are Afghans” but some are “brought there from as far away as central 
Africa and Southeast Asia”); ACLU on Obama, Bagram and Secrecy (Salon Radio broadcast 
Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/radio/ 2009/02/
24/aclu/index1.html (quoting an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer as stating that 
“there are two different groups [of detainees]. There are individuals who were seized in 
Afghanistan . . . and the second group, broadly is individuals who . . . were not seized in 
Afghanistan at all. [This latter group] are the exact same people that were brought to 
Guantanamo in 2004.”). 
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Consistent with its position on Guantánamo, the U.S. 
government has asserted that article III courts lack jurisdiction 
over prisoners at Bagram164 and that the prisoners are likewise 
ineligible for “prisoner of war” status under the Geneva 
Conventions.165 As a result, several commentators refer to 
Bagram as yet another “black hole.”166 The Obama 
administration recently endorsed this policy, arguing that 
prisoners at Bagram have no right to challenge their detention in 
U.S. courts.167 
Because Bagram was not designed to accommodate a large 
volume of prisoners and U.S. commitment in the region is long-
term, there was speculation that the DOD intended to construct 
a larger detention camp in Afghanistan.168 As part of a broader 
effort to increase transparency on detainee operations, 
government officials unveiled a new prison on the edge of 
Bagram airfield in late 2009 that will be used in place of the 
 
164. Notably, this belief is based not on the fact that Bagram is located outside of 
the United States, but rather because it is located in an active theater of war. See, e.g., 
Pauline Jelinek, Afghan Detainees Get More Rights Prisoners May Now Challenge Detentions, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 14, 2009, at A4 (“[T]he U.S. military argues that 
Bagram detainees should be treated differently because they are being held in an active 
theater of war.”); Wilber, supra note 11 (contending that prisoners lack rights because 
they are detained “in the zone of war”). 
165. See News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense (Jan. 30, 2002), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2418 
(explaining reasons for denying prisoner of war statuts); see also Tim Golden, In U.S. 
Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2005, at A1 
(paraphrasing a U.S. Sergeant stationed at Bagram as believing that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to detainees); Tom Lasseter, Abuse Plagued Afghan Camps Too; 
Guantanamo: Beyond the Law, SEATTLE TIMES, June 16, 2008, at A3 (summarizing the U.S. 
policy to “withhold Geneva Conventions protections” from Bagram detainees). 
166. See e.g., Eviatar, supra note 161; Carlotta Gall, Video Link Plucks Afghan Detainees 
From Black Hole of Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2008, at A8; Griswold, supra note 154. 
167. See Government’s Response to This Court’s Order of January 22, 2009 at 2, Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 06-CV-01669) (“Having 
considered the matter, the Government adheres to its previously articulated position.”); 
see also Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds a Policy on Detainees in 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A6 (reporting that the Obama administration 
endorsed the Bush policy that “military detainees in Afghanistan have no legal right to 
challenge their imprisonment”); Stephen Foley, Obama Denies Terror Suspects Right to 
Trial, INDEP. (London), Feb. 22, 2009, at 38 (same). 
168. See Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, supra note 153 (outlining plans for a new 
facility); Tim Golden, Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2008, A1 (pinpointing volume as an issue). 
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facility located in the airport hangar.169 Recent reports put the 
number of detainees held in the new complex at somewhere 
between 800 and 1100.170 The new facility is also expected to 
serve as the default location for indefinite detention, although 
the practice of relocating prisoners captured elsewhere to 
Bagram has ceased since President Obama took office in January 
2009.171 Regardless of the number or location of these facilities, 
the foregoing illustrates that the United States, under the auspice 
of NATO, asserts substantial authority through the AUMF and 
consent of the Afghan government to indefinitely detain 
individuals in Afghanistan.172 
c. Iraq 
Eight hundred miles away, the United States was also 
involved in restructuring the public institutions of Iraq. Part of 
this transformation involved the internment of both civilians and 
security detainees.173 As in Afghanistan, the military used a 
number of sites near the battlefield to screen initial detainees,174 
but all long-term prisoners were generally transferred to one of 
three theater-level internment sites at Camp Bucca, Camp 
 
169. See Alan Cullison, U.S. Set to Open New Afghan Prison—Pentagon Pledges Improved 
Transparency and Plans Open Hearings in a Move to ‘Increase Credibility,’ WALL ST. J., Nov. 
16, 2009, at A10; Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghanistan Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, at A8. 
170. Compare David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, U.S. May Expand Use of Its Afghan 
Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1 (reporting that there are about 800 detainees in 
the new prison), and Alissa J. Rubin, As U.S. Frees Detainees, Afghans Ask Why They Were 
Held, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A4 (estimating the current population at about 800), 
with ICRC, Afghanistan: Homemade Bombs and Improvised Mines Kill and Maim Civilians in 
South (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/afghanistan-
update-140410 (indicating that there are roughly 1,100 detainees receiving 
humanitarian assistance). 
171. See Cloud & Barnes, supra note 170. 
172. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 99, § 2(a) (authorizing 
the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations”); Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic 
Partnership, supra note 106, at 864 (“It is understood that in order to achieve the 
objectives contained herein, . . . U.S. and Coalition forces are to continue to have the 
freedom of action required to conduct appropriate military operations based on 
consultations pre-arranged procedures.”). 
173. See supra notes 133–34 (establishing that U.S. forces in Iraq carried out 
detentions in several capacities). 
174. See News Briefing, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, (May 4, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2963 (recognizing 
existence of “14 or 15 tactical facilities” where detainees receive a “first assessment”). 
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Cropper, or a pre-existing prison located in the city of Abu 
Ghraib.175 
In October 2002, an estimated 13,000 prisoners deserted the 
Abu Ghraib jail after President Saddam Hussein announced an 
unprecedented general amnesty.176 The United States took 
possession of the vacant prison after assuming control of Iraq 
and quickly converted the preexisting compound into an 
internment facility.177 Long-term, large-scale detention facilities 
were also erected at several military bases, most notably Camp 
Bucca in the south and Camp Cropper at Baghdad International 
Airport.178 In response to backlash over widely publicized reports 
of detainee abuse, the U.S. military announced that all detainees 
held at Abu Ghraib would be transferred to other camps and 
control of the prison relinquished to Iraqi authorities.179 At their 
peak, these U.S. facilities collectively held some 26,000 
 
175. See id. (clarifying that Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, and Camp Cropper are the 
“three main theater-level facilities” where all detainees end up after initial assessments). 
176. See EA Torriero, Hussein Frees Prisoner; Tens of Thousands Let Go in What U.S. 
Calls a Ploy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the prisoner release); Iraq 
‘Empties Its Jails,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
2343843.stm (describing the release as “an unprecedented general amnesty”); see also 
GlobalSecurity.org, Abu Ghurayb Prison, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/
iraq/abu-ghurayb-prison.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (estimating that 13,000 were 
released from Abu Ghraib). 
177. See Martin Asser, Abu Ghraib: Dark Stain on Iraq’s Past, BBC NEWS, May 25, 
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3747005.stm (providing a first hand 
account of the April 2003 take-over of the prison and indicating that it “has been re-
designated as the Baghdad Central Detention Center, now holding up to 5,000 Iraqis 
detained by US forces for a variety of offences”); Suzanne Goldenberg, End of Infamous 
Prison: Abu Ghraib, Symbol of America’s Shame, to Close Within Three Months, GUARDIAN 
(London), Mar. 10, 2006, at 3 (reporting that U.S. troops set up at Abu Ghraib in April 
2003 to “hold the overflow of detainees”). 
178. See David Enders, Camp Bucca: Iraq's Guantánamo Bay, NATION, Oct. 27, 2008, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081027/enders (quoting a retired U.S. colonel as 
describing the use of Camp Bucca as a holding center for the “massive population of . . . 
detainees that have no intelligence value” and Camp Cropper as a “center for 
interrogations.”); Robert F. Worth, U.S. to Abandon Abu Ahraib and Move Prisoners to a 
New Center, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at A10 (listing Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca, and 
Fort Suse as operating detainee prisons in Iraq); see also TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 134, 
at 7 (acknowledging the use of Abu Ghraib prison, Camp Ashraf, Camp Bucca, and the 
“high-value” internment center at Camp Cropper as U.S. detention facilities in a 
confidential report). 
179. See Goldenberg, supra note 177 (reporting that the prison would be closed 
and prisoners transferred to other U.S. facilities); Worth, supra note 178 
(supplementing that the prison will be handed over to the Iraqi government after all 
prisoners are transferred). 
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detainees.180  
A U.S. military unit under U.S. chain of command known as 
task force 134 administers all detention operations in Iraq.181 The 
SOFA-I, however, significantly alters their detention practice by 
requiring all detainees in U.S. custody to be released or turned 
over to Iraqi authorities.182 The agreement further proscribes the 
active detention of Iraqi citizens without official sanction from 
Iraq.183 In continuing the gradual transition to full control, 
detainee operations at Camp Bucca ended on September 17, 
2009.184 According to the MNF-I, there still are roughly 6000 
detainees remaining in U.S. camps as of March 2010.185 
d. Extraordinary Rendition and Black Sites 
The U.S. government also utilized several other facilities 
located off the battlefield to hold detainees captured in the war 
on terror. In early 2005, the media began to reveal several covert 
tactics employed by the U.S. government in their effort to gain 
 
180. See Enders, supra note 178 (estimating that “[t]he total number of those 
officially in US custody in Iraq has fluctuated between a low of 7,200 and more than 
26,000 since 2005”); Solomon Moore, In Decrepit Court System, Prisoners ja Iraq’s Jails, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A16 (projecting total number at about 26,000). 
181. See Task Foce 134, Camp Bucca Changes Hands, U.S. NAVY, Jan. 11, 2008, 
http://www.news.navy.mil/ search/display.asp?story_id=34256 (self-describing Task 
Force 134 as the U.S. military group that “manages detainee operations for all of Iraq”); 
Coalition Begins Releasing Detainees Under New Security Agreement, MULTI-NATIONAL 
FORCE—IRAQ, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=25249&itemid=128 (identifying task force 134 as “the 
organization that handles detainee affairs for MNF-I.”). 
182. See U.S.-Iraq SOFA, supra note 111, art. 22 (“The United States Forces shall . . . 
turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi 
arrest warrant and shall release all the remaining detainees in a safe and orderly 
manner . . . .”). 
183. See id. (“No detention or arrest shall be carried out by the United States 
Forces . . . except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law . . . .”). 
184. See Camp Bucca Detention Center Closes in Iraq, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ, 
Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/headlines/camp-bucca-detention-center-
closes-in-iraq (proclaiming that the detention practice at Camp Bucca ended on 
September 17, 2009, in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq strategic agreement); Martin 
Chulov, Prison Break-Up: Camp Bucca to Shut, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 16, 2009, at 15 
(“The largest of America’s two prisons in Iraq, Camp Bucca, will close by the weekend 
. . . .”). 
185. See Maria Mengrone, US Forces Begin Transfer of Detainees to GoI, MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ, Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/headlines/us-
forces-begin-transfer-of-detainees-to-goi (declaring that there are approximately 6000 
prisoners left in the U.S.-controlled detainee population). 
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intelligence in the war on terror. First, it was reported that the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) transferred suspected 
terrorists under a clandestine process of rendition to the 
temporary custody of countries with questionable records of 
human rights practices—such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Syria—for purposes of interrogation.186 Unlike extradition or 
“ordinary” rendition, there is no connection between the person 
rendered and the country to which they are sent; hence the term 
for this process: “extraordinary rendition.”187  
In addition, a number of high-value suspects were also held 
in a global network of secret CIA holding facilities, known as 
“black sites” due to the secrecy of the stations.188 In one of several 
executive orders issued on January 22, 2009, President Obama 
expressly ordered that all CIA detention facilities be 
decommissioned.189 However, a fleeting clause in the same order 
ostensibly left open the continued use of extraordinary rendition 
 
186. One of the first journalists to propel extraordinary rendition into the public 
spotlight was Jane Mayer in her highly publicized article Outsourcing Torture: The Secret 
History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, supra note 147, at 106–07 (revealing 
the use of extraordinary rendition in the war on terror). See generally European 
Parliament Rendition Report, supra note 122, 2007 O.J. C 387 E/309 (noting the 
operation of rendition systems within Europe). 
187. See Ingrid Detter Frankopan, Extraordinary Rendition and the Law of War, 33 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 657, 662 (“The difference to ordinary rendition and to 
deportation or extradition is essentially that, in the case of extraordinary rendition, 
there is no link between the person ‘rendered’ and the country to which he is sent.”); 
James R. Silkenat & Peter M. Norman, Jack Bauer and the Rule of Law: The Case of 
Extraordinary Rendition, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 535, 535 (2007) (“Extraordinary 
rendition . . . differs from ordinary forms of rendition, since the latter refers broadly to 
any circumstance where a government takes or transfers custody of a person by means of 
procedures outside those of extradition treaties.”). 
188. See Mayer, supra note 147, at 107 (“Rendition is just one element of of the 
[Bush] Administration’s New Paradigm. The C.I.A. itself is holding dozens of ‘high 
value’ terrorist suspects outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. . . . .”); see also 
U.S. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. OF 
PRES. DOCS. 1569, 1570 (Sept. 6, 2006) (disclosing to the public the existence of a secret 
detention program run by the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)); ICRC RENDITION 
REPORT, supra note 118 (providing detailed account of CIA detention program in the 
case of fourteen prisoners later transferred to Guantánamo Bay); Jane Mayer, The Black 
Sites, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46 (describing black sites as “secret prisons outside 
the United States.”). 
189. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, § 4(a), 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“The 
CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently 
operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.”); see also Greg 
Miller, Obama Preserves Renditions as Counter-Terrorism Tool, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at 
A1 (“The CIA’s secret prisons are being shuttered.”). 
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as a political option.190 
2. Detention at Home 
The U.S. naval base in Charleston, South Carolina, is home 
to a 288-person consolidated military prison—or “brig,”191 in 
Navy parlance—that serves the Army, Navy, and Air Force.192 In 
addition to its traditional purpose as a confinement center for 
military personnel, this brig also served as an indefinite detention 
facility for a discrete population of enemy combatants who either 
held U.S. citizenship193 or were apprehended within the 
territorial United States.194 Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri was the last 
remaining enemy combatant held without charges in the United 
States following the resolution of cases involving the other 
detainees in this category.195 Al-Marri has since been released 
 
190. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 189, § 2(g) (“The terms ‘detention 
facilities’ and ‘detention facility’ in [the section relating to closing CIA detention sites] 
do not refer to facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.”); 
Miller, supra note 189 (citing the clause and stating that “the CIA still has authority to 
carry out what are known as renditions, secret abductions and transfers of prisoners to 
countries that cooperate with the United States”). 
191. The purpose of a “brig,” as defined by the U.S. Navy, is to provide a secure 
confinement facility for persons pending or serving sentences under the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice or courts-martial. See, e.g., U.S. NAVY, TEMPLATE BRIG INSTRUCTIONS § 
101(a)-(b) (n.d.), available at http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/4e4c623c-3d18-
4a27-9a35-1f6feae4bf01/0/sampleafloatbriginst.doc. 
192. See U.S. Navy, Navy Corrections History, http://www.npc.navy.mil/ NR/
rdonlyres/8860EA92-5DAA-4C27-B9E1-7423C7186474/0/navycorrectionshistory.doc 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (advising that the Charleston brig serves all military branches 
and carries a 288-person capacity); see also Sophia Yan, If Not Gitmo, Then Where Should 
Detainees Be Held?, TIME, Jan. 24, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/articles/
0,8599,1873669,00.html (describing the Charleston brig as “[a] medium-security prison, 
[that] can hold up to 288 inmates”). 
193. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(transferred to Charleston naval brig upon learning of U.S. citizenship). 
194. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (arrested at O’Hare 
airport); Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (arrested at home in 
Illinois), vacated as moot on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
195. See Memorandum from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to The Attorney 
General et al., Review of the Detention of Ali Saleh Kahlah, 2009 DAILY COMP. OF PRES. 
DOC. 11 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Al-Marri is the only individual the Department of Defense is 
currently holding as an enemy combatant within the United States.”); see also Jane 
Mayer, The Hard Cases: Will Obama Institute a New Kind of Preventive Detention for Terrorist 
Suspects?, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 2009, at 38 (“The last ‘enemy combatant’ being 
detained in America is incarcerated at the U.S. Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, 
South Carolina . . . .”). 
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into the civilian court system,196 and there are now no remaining 
prisoners held on U.S. soil as enemy combatants.197 
3. Other Facilities Available for Combatant Detention 
On the campaign trail, Barack Obama pledged to shut down 
the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.198 Anticipating the 
news, media outlets began to speculate that a U.S. military base 
or federal prison would replace the Cuban camp.199  
The U.S. military maintains its own corrections system under 
which each branch of the Armed Forces operates a number of 
detention centers at varying levels of security to accommodate 
different terms of confinement.200 The only maximum-security 
detention barracks is located in Fort Leaventhal, Kansas, and is 
intended to serve members from all branches of the military 
subject to long-term sentences.201 Apart from these mainland 
 
196. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
197. See Around the Nation, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, at A2 (noting that Al-Marri 
was “the only ‘enemy combatant’ held on U.S. soil”); Mayer, supra note 195 (observing 
that Al-Marri is the last enemy combatant in the United States); see also Government 
Motion to Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, To Vacate the Judgment Below and Remand 
with Directions to Dismiss the Case as Moot at 14, Al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368 
(2009) (warning that “upon [Al-Marri’s] release and transfer, there will be no remaining 
individuals detained as enemy combatants on American soil.”). 
198. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Closing Down Detention Centre ‘Not so Easy,’ 
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 11, 2008, at 18 (“Obama has repeatedly promised to shut 
down Guantánamo . . . .”); Eugene Robinson, After the Torture Era, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 
2008, at A27 (quoting then-Senator Obama as declaring “I have said repeatedly that I 
intend to close Guantanamo, and I will follow through on that”). 
199. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, Pentagon Studies Bases as Alternative to Guantánamo; 
G.O.P. Lawmakers Object, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A10 (reporting that Pentagon 
officials were considering “several military bases in the United States” or “federal 
prisons” that could be used to replace Guantánamo Bay); Yan, supra note 192 
(speculating on six possible alternative mainland locations for detaining Guantánamo 
inmates). 
200. See David K. Haasenritter, The Military Correctional System: An Overview, 
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2003, at 58, available at http://www.aca.org/publications/
ctarchivespdf/dec03/hassenrittter.pdf [hereinafter Haasenritter, Military Corrections 
Overview] (describing the structure of the military corrections system); Timothy E. 
Purcell & William E. Peck, U.S. Navy Corrections: Purpose and Policy, CORRECTIONS TODAY, 
at 35, Dec. 2008, available at http://www.aca.org/fileupload/177/ahaidar/
Purcell_Peck.pdf (same); see also David K. Haasenritter, Military Corrections and ACA 
Evolve Together, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2008, at 8, available at http://www.aca.org/
fileupload/177/ahaidar/1_1_1_Commentary.pdf (“Today, the military correction 
system consists of . . . 64 correctional facilities throughout the world.”). 
201. See Haasenritter, Military Corrections Overview, supra note 200 at 59 (“Fort 
Leavenworth is the only facility in the third and highest tier of the military correctional 
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penal facilities, the military also operates a number of short-term 
sites overseas in a number of different locations.202 The Navy 
additionally carries a group of brigs aboard twenty-one of its 
active vessels, although their uses are limited.203 Unlike their 
civilian counterparts, these military detention facilities are 
historically under-occupied.204 Most importantly, any military 
facility run by the United States, either home or abroad, will 
usually be within its indefinite and full operational control.205 
 
system and is the only Department of Defense maximum-security confinement facility. 
For the most part . . . inmates with sentences longer than seven years are confined 
[there].”); U.S. Disciplinary Barracks Homepage, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/usdb/ 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (“[Our] mission is to incarcerate U.S. military prisoners 
sentenced to long terms of confinement.”). 
202. See Haasenritter, Military Corrections Overview, supra note 200 at 59 (listing 
Germany, Japan, and Korea as temporary facilities); Ashore Western Region, U.S. Navy, 
http://www.npc.navy.mil/CommandSupport/CorrectionsandPrograms/Brigs/Ashore/
AshoreWesternRegion.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (providing the contact information 
of a U.S. correctional facility in Japan); see also Detention Facilities, U.S. Navy, 
http://www.npc.navy.mil/CommandSupport/CorrectionsandPrograms/
Detention+Facilities.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (indicating the existence of U.S. 
detention facilities in Diego Garcia, Guam, Iceland, and Italy). 
203. See Purcell & Peck, supra note 200, at 35 (noting that there are twenty-one 
such brigs, but that they “generally . . . function similarly to small jails supporting 
individuals in pretrial confinement, post-trial inmates with short sentences (less than 30 
days) or inmates awaiting transfer to a longer-term facility.”); see also U.S. Navy, Afloat 
Western Region, http://www.npc.navy.mil/commandsupport/
correctionsandprograms/brigs/afloat/afloat+western+region.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010) (acknowledging a variety of afloat brigs on the western coast); U.S. Navy, Afloat 
Eastern Region, http://www.npc.navy.mil/commandsupport/correctionsandprograms/
brigs/afloat/afloat+eastern+region.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (acknowledging a 
variety of afloat brigs on the eastern coast). 
204. See Haasenritter, Military Corrections Overview, supra note 200 at 58 (“The total 
population in military facilities at year-end 2002 was 2,377, comprising 57 percent of its 
design capacity and 73 percent of its operational capacity.”). Bureau of Justice statistics 
compiled at the end of 2005 confirm that these figures remained static. See BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2005, 11 (Nov. 2006), available 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p05.pdf (“There were 2,322 prisoners 
under military jurisdiction at yearend 2005. . . . The operational capacity of the 58 
military confinement facilities was 3,286 [or about] 71% of their operational capacity.”). 
In fact, the latest figures show that the number of military prisoners decreased to 1,944 
by the end of 2008. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS 
IN 2008 at 8 tbl. 9 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p08.pdf. 
205. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.D.C. 2009) (observing 
that “long-term leases . . . are not uncommon” for leases on military bases located 
abroad); id. at 222 (quoting a government stipulation that “near-total operational 
control” will be “true of any military facility that the United States runs anywhere in the 
world.” (quoting Transcript of January 7, 2009 Hearing at 39, Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 205 (Civ. No. 1:06-CV-01669))). 
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C. Legal Challenges 
The detention practices at Guantánamo went largely 
unchallenged for nearly a year and a half. In fact, the Supreme 
Court proclaimed in 2004 that the President’s power to detain 
individuals fighting U.S. forces abroad in the course of a conflict 
“is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an 
exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’” within the 
meaning of the AUMF.206 This war power comprises the right to 
detain citizen enemy combatants to the same extent as it pertains 
to alien enemy combatants.207 In either case, the obvious concern 
is that a conflict and therefore detention could easily drag out 
over the course of a prisoner’s entire lifetime, given the 
unprecedented realities of the ongoing war on terror.208 
The first major impediment to the post-9/11 detention 
practice manifested in the landmark, albeit concise, decision of 
Rasul v. Bush.209 The Court held that alien detainees secured at 
Guantánamo were entitled to invoke the federal habeas corpus 
 
206. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion). The Court 
agreed in 2008 to hear a case challenging the President’s power to indefinitely detain an 
individual lawfully in the United States on suspicion of engaging in terrorism. See Al-Marri 
v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
orders/courtorders/120508zr.pdf (order granting writ of certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). The case, however, was dismissed as moot after 
the government changed its position, opting instead to transfer the detainee to a civilian 
jail for indictment on traditional criminal charges. See Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 
1545 (2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/
030609zr.pdf (order granting the application of transfer and dismissing the case as 
moot). Notably, the order of the Supreme Court vacates a decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that upheld the President’s ability to detain suspected 
terrorists that are lawfully in the United States without trial—the only precedent on the 
matter. See generally Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 543 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), 
vacated as moot, Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545. 
207. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its 
own citizens as an enemy combatant. . . . [S]uch a citizen, if released, would pose the 
same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict.”). 
208. See id. at 520 (“[T]he national security underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ 
although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government concedes, 
‘given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal 
cease-fire’ . . . [and] detention could last for [a lifetime].”). The Court cautioned, 
however, that although the current case did not yet warrant such a drastic departure, 
“[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the 
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may 
unravel.” Id. at 521. 
209. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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statute.210 Under the peculiar terms of the Guantánamo lease 
agreement the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction over 
the naval station, and the statute required nothing more for a 
court to entertain a habeas petition.211 Moreover, the protections 
of the habeas statute ran to alien petitioners because the statutory 
language was not strictly confined to U.S. citizens.212 
Viewing these holdings as an invitation rather than a 
restriction, the Pentagon ordered the creation of Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRT”) on July 7, 2004, in order to 
formally review the “enemy combatant” status of each detainee, 
as defined by the DOD.213 Congress supplemented this action 
with the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.214 
The Act covers a variety of matters related to detainees, but in 
relevant part amended section 2241 of the U.S. Judicial Code to 
strip article III courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions 
from alien detainees held at Guantánamo.215 The Court held, 
soon after, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld216 that, “[o]rdinary principles 
of statutory construction” rendered this amendment inapplicable 
 
210. See id. at 481 (“Aliens held at the base . . . are entitled to invoke the federal 
courts’ authority under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.”). 
211. See id. at 480 (“By the express terms of its agreement with Cuba, the United 
States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay,” and the 
habeas statute requires no more); see also supra note 35 (providing the precise language 
of the habeas statute). 
212. See id. at 481 (“Considering that the statute draws no distinction between 
Americans and aliens held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress 
intended the geographical coverage of the state to vary depending on the detainee’s 
citizenship.”). 
213. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Defense, to the 
Sec’y of the U.S. Navy § d (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (“[A] Tribunal shall be convened to review the detainee’s 
status as an enemy combatant.”). The order defines “enemy combatant” as “an 
individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” 
Id. § a. This definition was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to be “a 
person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents . . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006). 
214. Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
215. See id. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2741–42. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
appended the federal habeas statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241) with the following language at 
section 2241(e): “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear . . . an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained [at] 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Id. 
216. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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to cases that were pending at the time of its enactment.217 In 
order to void this legal gap, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”),218 which expressly extended 
these provisions to pending cases and broadened its scope to 
cover all aliens detained by the United States.219 
1. Boumediene 
In June 2008, the Supreme Court directly addressed these 
maneuvers in Boumediene v. Bush.220 Petitioners in this 
consolidated appeal were alien detainees held at Guantánamo 
who, notwithstanding the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the 
MCA, challenged their CSRT designation as enemy combatants 
by asserting a common law right to habeas corpus.221 The Court 
held that alien prisoners maintained a right to pursue a writ of 
habeas corpus in U.S. courts in order to challenge the legality of 
their detention because the Suspension Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”222 In order to 
reach this conclusion, the Court isolated several factors relevant 
to defining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause: 
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the 
 
217. Id. at 575–78. At the time of the ruling, there were over 100 cases pending at 
the district court level and nearly 450 detainees held at the camp. See Tim Golden, After 
Ruling, Uncertainty Hovers at Cuba Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A1 (citing “more 
than 100 district court cases” as being unaffected by ruling); Transcript of 
Teleconference with Senior Officials Regarding the Supreme Court’s Ruling in the 
Hamdan Case, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 30, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2006/June/06_opa_411.html (quoting a senior Department of Justice member 
as stating that “there are hundreds of [pending] cases” as of that date). 
218. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 
10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
219. See id. § 7(a)–(b), 120 Stat. at 2635–36. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“MCA”) specifically amends section 2241(e) to read: 
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien 
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States 
to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination. 
Id. The Act conspicuously makes no mention of U.S. citizens and, by its very terms, only 
applies to “alien[s] detained by the United States.” Id. (emphasis added). 
220. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
221. Id. at 2241 (describing characteristics of petitioners); Brief for Petitioners at 
9–10, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No.06-1195), 2007 WL 2441590 
(advancing argument that petitioners hold a common-law right to habeas corpus). 
222. Id. at 2262 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 
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adequacy of the process through which that status 
determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s 
entitlement to the writ.223 
These components were selected only after a careful survey 
of the historical record. At the outset, Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the majority, stated the well-recognized principle that the 
Framers intended the writ to hold a central role in the tripartite 
system of government as a check on each political branch.224 He 
found founding-era English authority, however, to be 
inconclusive as to the reach of this ancient protection.225 
U.S. case law, on the other hand, provided greater guidance. 
The Court pointed to the Insular Cases as the first to address the 
general extra-sovereign reach of the U.S. Constitution.226 Rather 
than interpreting the Insular decisions as placing a limit on the 
reach of the Constitution, Kennedy emphasized that they stood 
for the proposition that fundamental rights apply in distant and 
dissimilar lands.227 Citing heavily to Justice Harlan and 
 
223. Id. at 2259. 
224. See id. at 2246 (“[T]he Framers deemed the writ to be an essential mechanism 
in the separation-of-powers scheme.”). 
225. See id. at 2248. It was plain that the writ was not denied to prisoners at 
common law merely due to their status as an alien or enemy alien. See id. (citing Khera v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [1984] A.C. 74, 111 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); 
Case of Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (C.P.); R. v. Knowles ex parte 
Somersett, (1772) 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80, 82 (K.B.); King v. Schiever, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 
551 (K.B.); Du Castro’s Case, (1697) 92 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.)). English common-law 
courts regularly exercised habeas jurisdiction over claims put forward by aliens 
imprisoned within the territorial realm of the Crown. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446, 481 
(2002) (collecting common-law cases). Early U.S. courts followed this practice as well. Id. 
(citing Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas. 131 (No. 17,810) (C.C. Mass. 1813); Ex parte D’Olivera, 
7 F. Cas. 853 (No. 3, 967) (C.C. Mass. 1813); United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370 (C.C. 
Pa. 1797)). But the precise geographic reach of the writ beyond the Crown’s sovereign 
territory remained unclear, given the unique circumstances of the limited case law, 
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249 (“Guantanamo Bay . . . and the exempt jurisdictions 
discussed in the English authorities are not similarly situated” and “[t]he Supreme 
Court of Judicature (the British Court) sat in Calcutta; but no federal court sits at 
Guantanamo.”), and “prudential concerns” present at the time of those cases. Id. at 
2250. 
226. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“Fundamental questions regarding the 
Constitution’s geographic scope first arose at the dawn of the 20th century when the 
Nation acquired noncontinguous Territories . . . .”). 
227. See id. at 2253–54 (“[These cases] held that the Constitution has independent 
force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of legislative grace.”). 
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Frankfurter’s concurring opinions in Reid, the Court went on to 
confirm that the “‘specific circumstances of each particular case’ 
are relevant in determining the geographic scope of the 
Constitution.”228 The prisoner’s U.S. citizenship in that case was 
clearly important.229 But “practical considerations,” among them 
the place of the confinement and courts-martial, also received 
attention.230 
Justice Kennedy pronounced that the Court’s precedent 
underscored a “functional approach” toward determining the 
Constitution’s reach.231 Under this functional framework, 
“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and 
practical concerns, not formalism.”232 Consistent with this 
principal, the Court observed that de jure sovereignty in the strict 
legal sense was not outcome-determinative for purposes of the 
writ of habeas corpus.233 Indeed, such an arrangement would 
raise troubling separation-of-powers concerns because the 
political branches would be authorized sub silentio to act without 
legal check by surrendering formal sovereignty while retaining 
plenary control of an area (such as in the Guantánamo lease)—a 
result which the Suspension Clause was conceived to prevent.234 
To the contrary, courts should “inquire into the objective degree 
of control [a] Nation asserts over foreign territory.”235 
Prior to the Guantánamo line of cases, the Court’s only 
other occasion to analyze the extraterritorial contours of the 
 
228. Id. at 2255 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957)). The Boumediene 
Court also discussed the precedential value of Ross v. McIntyre (In re Ross), 140 U.S. 453 
(1891). 128 S. Ct. at 2256. Kennedy reconciled this case with Reid by explaining that it 
was decided correctly because it, too, turned on “practical considerations.” Id. 
229. See id. (“That the petitioners in Reid were American citizens was a key factor in 
the case and was central to the plurality’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments apply to American civilians tried outside the United States.”). 
230. See id. (intimating that the prisoner’s citizenship and place of confinement 
“were relevant to each member of the Reid majority” and “decisive” for the concurring 
justices). 
231. See id. at 2258 (indicating that the Insular Cases and, later, Reid mark a 
“functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality”). 
232. Id. 
233. See id. at 2252. (“[T]hat de jure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction . . . is unfounded [and] inconsistent with our precedents.”). 
234. See id. 2258–59 (admonishing that “[o]ur basic charter cannot be contracted 
away like this” and observing that “the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable 
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers”). 
235. Id. at 2252. 
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habeas corpus writ was in Johnson v. Eisentrager236 at the end of 
the Second World War. The case involved alien saboteurs that 
were repatriated to a U.S.-run prison in occupied Germany 
(“Landsberg”) after being tried for war crimes in China and 
petitioned for habeas corpus on both constitutional and statutory 
grounds.237 The Eisentrager Court succinctly concluded that 
“[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, 
nor does anything in our statutes.”238 The prisoners lacked 
standing to claim entitlement to the writ due to several common 
objective features concerning citizenship and location.239 
However, Boumediene observed that practical concerns also played 
a significant role in the case.240 Kennedy appreciated that at the 
time of the decision the United States was responsible for 
overseeing reconstruction efforts in an area covering 57,000 
square miles and containing residual militants.241 
Drawing on this rich history, the Boumediene Court 
constructed the three-prong list that guided their analysis.242 
 
236. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
237. See id. 765–66 (describing the procedural posture and nationality for each 
petitioner); see also Brief for Respondent at 9, 27, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (No. 306) 
(advancing arguments under “28 U.S.C. § 2241” and “Article I, Section 9”). 
238. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768. 
239. Those factors included that each petitioner:  
(a) [was] an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; 
(c) was captured outside of our territory and there held as a prisoner of war; 
(d) was tried by a Military Commission sitting outside of the United States; (e) 
for offenses against laws of war committed outside of the United States; (f) and 
is at all times imprisoned outside of the United States. 
Id. at 777. 
240. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257 (remarking that “[p]ractical considerations 
[also] weighed heavily”). Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Eisentrager, drew 
particular attention to the difficulty in administering habeas petitioners from overseas: 
A basic consideration in habeas corpus practice is that the prisoner will be 
produced before the court. . . . To grant the writ to these prisoners might 
mean that our army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This 
would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and 
rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the 
prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend 
legality of the sentence. 
339 U.S. at 778–79. 
241. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at at 2261 (“[T]he United States became responsible for 
an occupation zone encompassing over 57,000 square miles with a population of 18 
million. In addition . . . American forces stationed in Germany faced potential security 
threats from a defeated enemy.” (citations omitted)). 
242. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (laying out the three-factor test for 
determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause). 
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Because Eisentrager previously denied access to the writ under 
ostensibly similar circumstances, the Court went through pains to 
distinguish the case. As to the first factor, the Court observed that 
the alien petitioners deny their status as enemy combatants,243 
and additionally did not receive the same procedural protections 
as was provided by the military tribunals in Eisentrager.244 As to 
the second factor, the precise nature of the German prison was 
“critically differen[t]”245 because the United States shared what 
authority it retained at Landsberg with the combined Allied 
Forces, and instead maintains plenary control over the 
Guantánamo naval base.246 The Court even squared Eisentrager 
with the Insular Cases in light of the temporal occupation of the 
Allied Forces at Landsberg.247 As for the third factor, military 
operations at Guantánamo would remain virtually unaffected by 
accommodating the petitioners,248 and U.S. intervention would 
not usurp the authority of Cuban courts because the unique 
terms of the Guantánamo lease precluded them from asserting 
jurisdiction over the base.249 Kennedy cautioned, however, that 
practical concerns are unique to each case and the result might 
well come out differently under other circumstances.250 On the 
 
243. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (“[P]etitioners in Eisentrager did not contest 
. . . that they were ‘enemy aliens.’”). 
244. See id. at 2260 (describing the procedures of the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (“CSRT”) as “far more limited” and “fall[ing] well short of the procedures 
and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review”). 
245. Id. at 2260. 
246. See 1903 Cuba Lease, supra note 141 and accompanying text (vesting the 
United States with full control); Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252 (“Unlike its present 
control over the naval station, the United States’ control over the prison in Germany was 
neither absolute nor indefinite.”); see also id. at 2253 (“[T]he United States, by virtue of 
its complete jurisdiction and control over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty . . . .”). 
247. See id. at 2260–61 (“The Court’s holding in Eisentrager was thus consistent with 
the Insular Cases . . . .”). 
248. See id. at 2261 (“The Government presents no credible arguments that the 
military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had 
jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims. . . . The situation in Eisentrager was far 
different . . . .”). In short, Guantánamo simply did not present any exigencies similar to 
those in Eisentrager. See id. at 2262 (“Under the facts presented here . . . there are few 
practical barriers to the running of the writ.”). 
249. See id. at 2251 (“No Cuban court has jurisdiction to hear these petitioners’ 
claims, and no law other than the laws of the United States applies at the [Guantanamo 
Bay] naval station.”). 
250. See id. (“[T]he United States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no 
other sovereign for its acts on the [naval] base. Were that not the case, or if the 
detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ 
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basis of these factors, the majority concluded that the Suspension 
Clause extends to aliens detained at Guantánamo and that the 
MCA therefore effects an unconstitutional suspension of that 
right.251 
The Court tackled the difficult question presented by 
espousing a malleable “functional approach” toward the 
extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause.252 At the 
very least, the Court eschewed a strict “territorial definition” of 
constitutional domain for purposes of the Suspension Clause.253 
Reading the holding at its broadest, some some assert that 
Boumediene extends the protections of the Suspension Clause to 
anyone in U.S. custody.254 Others in the academic community view 
the Court’s shift as a signal that the functional model will become 
the new paradigm for determining the geographic coverage of 
 
would be ‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more weight.” (quoting Reid v. 
Covert 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
251. See id. (“Art. I, §9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay 
[and] Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension 
Clause.”). Consequently, the Court concluded that “MCA § 7 thus effects an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.” Id. at 2274. The Court keenly acknowledged 
the novelty of extending constitutional rights to noncitizens in delivering its holding. Id. 
at 2262 (“It is true that before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained 
by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure sovereignty 
have any rights under our Constitution.”). 
252. See supra notes 226–33 (extracting a “functional approach” from prior 
precedent to the Constitution’s application beyond U.S. territory). 
253. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 594 (2009) 
(“In Boumediene, the Supreme Court appeared to reject a narrowly territorial definition 
of constitutional domain.”); see also Burnett, supra note 9, at 976 (“[T]he Boumediene 
Court got it right when it rejected the proposition that the Constitution stops where de 
jure sovereignty ends (a.k.a. ‘strict territoriality’) . . . .”). Burnett makes the provocative 
argument that the functional test in fact strengthens the importance of strict 
territoriality in the extraterritorial application of the Constitution by sharply contrasting 
foreign and domestic circumstances in the assessment of practical considerations. See 
Burnett, supra note 9, at 977 (“[The functional approach] assumes a sharp distinction 
between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ territory for purposes of determining whether a given 
element of the Constitution applies in a liminal or extraterritorial situation, and in that 
way strengthens the basic premise of strict territoriality even as the same test purports to 
follow from a rejection of strict territoriality.”). 
254. See Kevin Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy 
and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87, 113 
(2008) (“[S]weeping jurisdiction . . . to review the legal sufficiency of persons detained 
by the government outside U.S. territory [w]as indicated by Boumedeine.”); Neuman, 
supra note 11, at 286 (“For Kennedy, it appears from Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez 
that persons in U.S. custody are [entitled to protection], at least for the purposes of the 
Suspension Clause.”). 
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the Constitution, generally.255 In this sense, the case might raise 
more questions than it answers. 
More generally, a common theme to the Guantánamo line 
of cases is the judiciary’s willingness to temper the other braches 
of government from operating without scrutiny. Despite 
longstanding doctrine advocating deference in matters of foreign 
affairs,256 particularly in times of war,257 these concerns gave way 
to the writ’s central purpose—what Boumediene described as 
“maintain[ing] the ‘delicate balance of government.’”258 In no 
 
255. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of 
Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 479, 493 (2008) (“Kennedy and the majority adopt a 
‘functional approach’ to the question of the extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution.”); Neuman, supra note 11, at 261 (“Boumediene confirms and illustrates the 
current Supreme Court’s ‘functional approach’ to the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional rights.”); Zick, supra note 253, at 595 (“If Boumediene’s functional 
approach is any indication, we shall likely continue to see the Constitution’s domain 
decided in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion.”); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s 
Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 
2145–49 (2009) (arguing that the separation-of-powers approach in Boumediene should 
apply more broadly to all denial of access cases). It bears note that there is another camp 
that questions the exact extent of constitutional coverage flowing from Boumediene. See 
Robert M. Chesney, International Decision, Boumediene v. Bush, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 
853 (2008) (“Ultimately, the logic of Boumediene—particularly its emphasis on the 
absence of security threats in Cuba—cuts against [extending the holding to Iraq or 
Afghanistan].”); Anthony J. Colangelo, Brief Remarks on the Supreme Court’s Role After 
9/11: Continuing the Legal Conversation in the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 17, 20 (2009) 
(“In Boumediene, the Court . . . did not say that habeas extends to all persons in U.S. 
custody around the globe.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected 
Terrorists, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2009) (contending that the entire 
Guantánamo line of cases will eventually be seen as “abberational and not a harbinger of 
a Brave New World”); cf. Burnett, supra note 9 (suggesting that the functional model 
conflates the distinct inquiries of whether the constitution should apply and abroad and 
how the right should be enforced, if it applies). 
256. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (in executive actions) (citing 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)); Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981) (in congressional actions); see also Matthews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976) (wartime decisions of government generally). 
257. See, e.g., Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the deference 
afforded to “the Executive in military and national security affairs” and collecting cases). 
258. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 (2008) (quoting Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2006) (plurality opinion)). Indeed, the Hamdi plurality 
took this very position. 542 U.S. at 535–36 (“[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s 
assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for 
the courts . . . this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of 
government.”). One of the key functions of the judiciary in the tripartite structure is to 
ensure that the Executive operates within its wartime bounds. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 
2277 (“Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial 
power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the 
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small part due to these cases, roughly 550 detainees have been 
released from Guantánamo, reducing the total number of 
inmates from about 779 at its peak to a current level of 183.259 
Making good on campaign promises, U.S. President Barack 
Obama issued an executive order on January 22, 2009, directing 
that the Guantánamo detention site close at latest by January 22, 
2010.260 As of the date of this Note, this has yet to occur. 
2. Beyond Guantánamo: Recent Developments 
Although the U.S. missions in Guantánamo and Iraq are 
winding up, the broader war on terror continues.261 The renewed 
pledge to defeat terrorism, taken together with a troop surge in 
Afghanistan,262 appears indicative of an overall U.S. plan to 
continue the practice of detaining suspected terrorists in the war 
on terror.263 The prior subsection focused solely on Guantánamo 
 
authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”); see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2, 125 (1866) (“[The Framers] knew [that] the nation they were founding, be its 
existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long continued, 
human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a 
time, was especially hazardous to freemen.”). Kennedy used this separation-of-powers 
principle to validate the Court’s action: “[T]he exercise of [Presidential] powers is 
vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judical Branch.” Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 
at 2277. 
259. See The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
260. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009); see also Closure 
of Guantanamo Detention Facilities, The White House, Jan. 22, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
closure_of_guantanamo_detention_facilities/ (ordering the closure of Guantánamo 
within one year). 
261. See Christina Bellantoni, Obama Zeros In On Afghanistan: Pledges More Troops, 
Funds and Diplomacy, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A1 (“President Obama . . . will send 
more troops to Afghanistan, more money to Pakistan and push for renewed diplomatic 
attention to the region to combat terrorism.”); Press Release, White House, What’s New 
in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (March 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-
Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (stating as the Obama administration’s mission to “disrupt, 
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens”). 
262. See supra note 108 (discussing the authorization of the troop surge in 
Afghanistan). 
263. See Eric Schmitt, Two Prisons, Similar Issues for President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2009, at A1 (quoting a U.S. official as stating that no changes will be made in 
Afghanistan); Mark Thompson, Another Gitmo Grows in Afghanistan, TIME, Jan. 5, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/ time/nation/article/0,8599,1869519,00.html (“[E]ven if 
Guantánamo closes, the controversial U.S. practice of jailing suspected al-Qaeda 
militants and other terrorists indefinitely won’t end, because such detentions continue 
DALOIA_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  4:17 PM 
2010] THE REACH OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE 1009 
Bay, but the case law is nonetheless illustrative of the Court’s 
overall sensibility toward detention challenges mounted by 
wartime prisoners. This subsection will explore case law that 
arises from contexts other than Guantánamo but still provides 
guidance on the overseas use of habeas corpus. 
a. In the Supreme Court 
On the same day as the Boumediene decision, the Court 
issued another—often overlooked—opinion bearing on the 
availability of habeas corpus to overseas prisoners. In Munaf v. 
Geren264 a unanimous Court ruled that “American citizens held 
overseas by American forces operating subject to an American 
chain of command” may seek statutory habeas relief, even 
though the forces holding them act as part of a multinational 
coalition.265 The consolidated appeal was levied by two U.S. 
citizens captured in Iraq by the MNF-I for engaging in suspicious 
activities.266 The MNF-I held the two citizens at Camp Cropper 
for the benefit of the Iraqi government during their criminal 
proceedings in Iraqi court, under its role as outlined by U.N. 
mandate.267 The government relied heavily on Hirota v. 
 
on an even greater scale . . . at Bagram.”); USA: President Obama’s Executive Orders on 
Detentions and Interrogations, AMNESTY INT’L, AI Index No. AMR 51/015/2009 (Jan. 30, 
2009) (“The executive order appears to leave open the possibility of transferring 
Guantánamo detainees to other US detention facilities outside of the USA, [such as] 
Bagram air base in Afghanistan . . . .”). In fact, recent press releases by the Department 
of Defense confirm that detentions are still taking place in Afghanistan under the 
Obama presidency. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Forces Clash with Enemy 
Fighters in Afghanistan (Sept. 6, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=54701 (“U.S. and Afghan forces killed an undetermined number of 
enemy fighters and detained 13 suspected militants in three operations in Afghanistan 
early today . . . .”). 
264. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
265. Id. at 2213. The U.S. prisoners sought relief under section 2241 because the 
MCA only precluded its use by alien prisoners. See supra note 219 and accompanying 
text (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) and its availability to U.S. citizens). 
266. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213 (“These consolidated cases concern the 
availability of habeas corpus relief arising from the MNF-I’s detention of American 
citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and are alleged to have committed crimes 
there.”). 
267. See id. at 2214 (“At all times since his capture, Omar has remained in the 
custody of the United States military operating as part of the MNF-I[,]” even though 
“the Department of Justice informed Omar that the MNF-I had decided to refer him to 
[Iraqi courts] for criminal proceedings.”); id. at 2215 (indicating Munaf stayed in 
custody of the MNF-I pending outcome of criminal proceedings in Iraqi Court). As 
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MacArthur,268 which summarily denied Japanese citizens, held in 
Japan by a post-World War II multinational coalition, leave to file 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.269 The Court quickly 
distinguished Hirota from the facts at hand because the tribunal 
from which the Hirota petitioners appealed was subject to a 
“broken” chain of U.S. command and therefore autonomous of 
U.S. influence.270 Furthermore, petitioners in Hirota were 
aliens.271 Jurisdiction under section 2241 lay for the Munaf 
petitioners in the fact that the MNF-I, including the unit in 
charge of detainee operations, was “[a]s a practical matter,” 
under complete U.S. control.272 As was the case in Rasul, the 
habeas statute requires no more.273 The Court made clear that its 
jurisdictional holding was limited to U.S. citizens seeking relief 
under the statutory habeas scheme and not under the 
Suspension Clause.274 
Turning to the merits, the Court was ultimately unable to 
 
noted earlier, supra notes 133–34, the U.S.-led MNF-I held detained persons in Iraq both 
posing a security threat and standing trial on domestic charges. 
268. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curium). 
269. Id. at 198 (“[T]he courts of the United States have no power or authority to 
review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these 
petitioners . . . .”). 
270. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (“General MacArthur, as pertinent, was not 
subject to United States authority. . . . Here, in contrast, the Government acknowledges 
that our military commanders do answer to the President.”). The war tribunal that 
sentenced the Hirota petitioners was set up by a U.S. commander, but he only acted on 
behalf of the occupying Allied Forces. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 197. 
271. See Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2218 (“Even if the Government is correct that the 
international authority at issue in Hirota is no different from the international authority 
at issue here, . . . [t]hese cases concern American citizens while Hirota did not . . . .”). 
272. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2216 (“‘[A]s a practical matter,’ the Government 
concedes, it is the ‘the President and the Pentagon, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
American commanders that control . . . what American soldiers do,’ including the 
soldiers holding Munaf and Omar.” (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Munaf, 
128. S. Ct. 2207 (No. 06-1666), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-1666.pdf). 
273. See id. at 2216–17 (“We think these concessions the end of the jurisdictional 
inquiry . . . . The disjunctive ‘or’ in § 2241(c)(1) makes clear that actual custody by the 
United States suffices for jurisdiction, even if that custody could be viewed as ‘under . . . 
color of’ another authority, such as the MNF-I.”). The Court took notice that a prisoner 
is “in custody” for purposes of section 2241 “when the United States official charged 
with his detention has ‘the power to produce’ him.” Id. at 2217 (quoting Wales v. 
Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)). 
274. See id. at 2216 n.2 (“These cases concern only American citizens and only the 
statutory reach of the writ. Nothing herein addresses jurisdiction with respect to alien 
petitioners or with respect to the constitutional scope of the writ.”). 
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grant any form of relief to the prisoners. The petitioners sought 
the unconventional remedy of a preliminary injunction enjoining 
their transfer to Iraqi custody following their trial in domestic 
courts.275 Prudential concerns of comity and international civility 
precluded the Court, in its equitable capacity, from granting 
relief out of respect for the “sovereign[’s] undoubted authority” 
to prosecute the prisoners.276 In addition, MNF-I was holding the 
prisoners at the behest of the Iraqi government,277 and in the 
midst of ongoing hostilities.278 The forbearance exhibited by the 
Court was based on the same policy underlying the general rule 
of U.S. courts from refusing to engage in collateral review of 
foreign judicial rulings.279 
b. Lower Courts 
Long before the Supreme Court delivered its decision in 
Boumediene, the detentions taking place in Afghanistan received a 
 
275. See id. at 2221 (“The typical remedy [afforded by habeas corpus] is, of course, 
release. But here the last thing petitioners want is simple release; . . . what petitioners are 
really after is a court order requiring the United States to shelter them from the 
sovereign government seeking to have them answer for alleged crimes committed within 
that sovereign’s borders.” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973))). 
276. Id. at 2223. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first noted that “‘[a] 
sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed 
within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.’” 
Id. at 2221–22 (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957)). The result stood 
notwithstanding that the citizens might be subject to procedures that fall short of U.S. 
constitutional standards. See id. at 2222 (“[The right of a sovereign to prosecute offenses 
committed within its borders] is true with respect to American citizens . . . whether or 
not the pertinent criminal process comes with all the rights guaranteed by our 
Constitution.”). 
277. See id. at 2223–24 (observing that “Omar and Munaf are being held by United 
States Armed Forces at the behest of the Iraqi Government[,]” and “MNF-I detention is 
an integral part of the Iraqi system of criminal justice [through] functioning, in essence, 
as its jailor.”). 
278. See id. at 2224 (“There is of course even more at issue here: . . . the detainees 
were captured by our Armed Forces for engaging in serious hostile acts against an ally in 
what the Government refers to as ‘an active theater of combat.’” (quoting Brief for the 
Federal Parties at 16, Munaf, 128. S. Ct. 2207 (No. 06-1666), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-
394_FederalParties.pdf). 
279. See id. at 2224 (“To allow United States courts to intervene in an ongoing 
foreign criminal proceeding and pass judgment on its legitimacy seems at least as great 
an intrusion as the plainly barred collateral review of foreign convictions.” (citing Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417–18 (1964))). 
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modest amount of attention in the shadow of Guantánamo.280 
Reports surfaced in 2006 that indicated that the channels in 
place to review a prisoner’s detention were substandard.281 Later 
that year, several habeas actions were initiated in rapid succession 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf 
of a number of different Bagram detainees.282 Affidavits sworn by 
military personnel stationed at Bagram that were filed in these 
cases confirmed the use of a five-member Enemy Combatant 
Review Board (“ECRB”) that sporadically inspects each 
prisoner’s status in ex parte panels on the basis of “all reasonably 
available and relevant information.”283 The government was 
 
280. See Eviatar, supra note 161 (explaining that to date “the Bagram detainees 
have failed to garner the same level of public attention and outrage [as Guantánamo]—
or the stampede of offers for pro bono representation from major commercial law 
firms.”). 
281. See Golden, supra note 159 (first to report identifying that Bagram detainees 
“have no access to lawyers, no right to hear the allegations against them and [receive] 
only rudimentary reviews of their status as ‘enemy combatants’ . . . .”); see also Amnesty 
Int’l, Afghanistan ‘Success’ Ebbing Away, WIRE, March 2006, at 4, AI Index No. NWS 
21/002/2006 (claiming that detainees are “held without charge, trial or access to legal 
representation” after interviewing several prisoners). 
282. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-
01707 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2006cv01707/122762/1/0.pdf (petition on behalf 
of prisoner only known as “Ruzatullah” and his cousin); Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, Wazir v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01697 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (petition on behalf 
of four prisoners detained at Bagram); Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
Mohammed v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01680 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Bagram%20petition.pdf (draft 
amalgamated petition on behalf of twenty-five detainees); Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, Al Maqaleh v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01669 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/
1:2006cv01669/122669/1/0.pdf (petition on behalf of sole Bagram prisoner). 
283. The first time this information was disclosed on the public record was in a 
November 2006 declaration by Colonel Rose M. Miller in the Ruzatullah case. See Miller 
Decl., supra note 156, ¶¶ 10–12 (summarizing the general Enemy Combatant Review 
Board (“ECRB”) procedure). Declarations subsequently submitted in connection with 
the other cases by the commander who replaced Colonel Miller corroborate the same 
review procedure. See, e.g., Declaration of Colonel James W. Gray ¶¶ 10–12 (attached as 
Ex. B to Respondents’ Response to Order to Show Cause and Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Jurisdiction), Mohammed v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01680 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006), 
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/
dcdce/1:2006cv01680/122640/4/2.pdf (utilizing the same text as included in Rose 
Declaration); Declaration of James W. Gray ¶¶ 11–13 (attached as Ex. 1 in Respondents’ 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction), Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 5, 2007) (No. 06-CV-01669), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2006cv01669/122669/7/1.pdf (same). For 
further discussion on the review procedure used by the ECRBs, see Eviatar, supra note 
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afforded an opportunity to change its position after the 2009 
election, but instead chose to rely on its previous filings.284 
A decision recently issued in one of these cases marked the 
first and only major application of Boumediene’s functional model 
in a context other than Guantánamo. The district court in Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates285 ruled that the protections of the Suspension 
Clause extend to a limited group of alien prisoners who were 
transferred to the Bagram internment facility from elsewhere and 
therefore the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA 
worked an unconstitutional suspension of the writ as applied to 
them.286 
Al Maqaleh is important in several respects. First, the 
 
161 (criticizing that ECRB procedures as “even more circumscribed” than the CSRTs 
offered at Guantánamo). See also Eric Lewis, Custody Dispute: Why Is the U.S. Stashing 
Detainees at Policharki Prison in Afghanistan?, SLATE, Aug. 16, 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2172334/ (chastising ECRB process, as “not made through 
any evidentiary hearing, but rather by the commanding officer at Bagram, who has 
discretion whether to gather evidence, hear witnesses, or allow the detainee to present 
his story”). 
284. See, e.g., Government’s Response to this Court’s Order of January 22, 2009 at 
2, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 06-CV-01669), available 
at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/us-reply-re-bagram-2-
20-09.pdf (“Having considered the matter, the Government adheres to its previously 
articulated position.”). 
285. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). 
286. See id. at 235 (“MCA § 7(a), the statute stripping habeas jurisdiction, is 
unconstitutional as to three of the four petitioners. Under Boumediene, Bagram detainees 
who are not Afghan citizens, who were not captured in Afghanistan, and who have been 
held for an unreasonable amount of time . . . without adequate process may invoke the 
protections of the Suspension Clause.”). On June 1, 2009 the same judge who issued the 
ruling granted the government’s motion for an interlocutory appeal and stayed the case 
pending appeal. See Del Quentin Wilber, Nation Digest: Bagram Detainees, WASH. POST, at 
A16 (reporting that court granted motion); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com (June 2, 2009, 4:25pm) (same); see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 
No. 06-1669 (D.D.C. June 1, 2009), http://www.docstoc.com/docs/6764307/al-
maqaleh-v-gates (reproducing a copy of the order). As of the date of this Note, the only 
action taken in the appeal was a brief that was filed by the government on September 14, 
2009. See Amnesty Int’l, USA: Government Opposes Habeas Corpus Review for Any Bagram 
Detainees; Reveals ‘Enhanced’ Administrative Review Procedures, AI Index No. AMR 
51/100/2009, Sept. 16, 2009 [hereinafter Amnesty Government Appellate Brief Review], 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/100/2009/en/825cb177-
59b8-4db6-a2b2-ac6874310ce3/amr511002009en.html (writing extensively on substance 
of government filing); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com (Sept. 15, 2009, 11:40am) (reporting on filing); see also Brief 
for Respondents-Appellants, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-14-
09.pdf (reproducing the filing). 
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decision interprets Boumediene as holding section 7(a) of the 
MCA unconstitutional only as applied to Guantánamo detainees, 
rather than facially invalidating that provision.287 The result of 
this distinction is that section 7(a) of the MCA remains intact as 
against all aliens detained elsewhere and continues to foreclose 
their use of statutory habeas corpus.288 Secondly, the case marks a 
significant expansion of Boumediene by extending the reach of the 
Suspension Clause to a select group of aliens detained both in a 
theater of war and at a location where the United States does not 
exercise de facto sovereignty.289 
The district court’s opinion also provides a helpful 
distillation of Boumediene’s functional model. The court 
subdivided the three Boumediene factors into six for purposes of 
analysis.290 As for their citizenship, detention status, and sites of 
 
287. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (“Fairly read, Boumediene was an as 
applied rejection of MCA § 7.”). While Boumediene at times was framed in general terms, 
the Court specifically focused on the unique character of Guantánamo and even noted 
that it might reach a different conclusion if the prisoners were held somewhere else. See 
id. (“The Supreme Court [in Boumediene] examined the history of the U.S. presence at 
Guantanamo, the degree of U.S. control at Guantanamo, and the practical obstacles of 
extending habeas rights to Guantanamo. The Supreme Court did not examine those 
very fact-specific factors with regard to any other place the United States presently 
operates or confines detainees.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, any broader reading 
would conflict with the Supreme Court’s longstanding admonition for courts to favor 
“‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation.’” Id. at 213–14 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (in turn quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985))). 
288. See id. at 214 (“Because the Court interprets Boumediene as a rejection of MCA 
§ 7 as it applies to Guantanamo specifically, rather than a broader facial rejection, MCA 
§ 7 (and, therefore, § 2241(e)(1)) continues to deprive this Court of statutory 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by Bagram detainees.”). 
289. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining that the long-term lease 
with Cuba provides the United States with “de facto sovereignty” over base). Notably, 
Kennedy remarked that the result in Boumediene might be different if the petitioners 
were detained “in an active theater of war.” See supra note 250. 
290. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (D.D.C. 2009) (“For the sake of 
analysis, these three factors can be subdivided further into six.”). Specifically, the court 
dissected the Boumediene factors as follows: “(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the 
status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status 
determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature of 
the site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the 
petitioner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. The court also noted that “the length of a 
petitioner’s detention without adequate review” implicitly motivated the Boumediene 
majority because of their care to caution that the Executive was entitled to a reasonable 
amount of time to determine a detainee’s status before it would be practical for a court 
to consider their habeas petition. Id. at 216. Even so, this implicit concern was 
inapposite to the Bagram petitioners because they, like the Boumediene detainees, were 
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apprehension, the Bagram petitioners were considered to be 
“situated no differently than the detainees in Boumediene.”291 
Consequently, the outcome of the case turned on the remaining 
three considerations: detention site, adequacy of process, and 
prudential concerns.292 
Regarding the site of detention, the court took the position 
that Boumediene’s lengthy comparison of Guantánamo and 
Landsberg prison highlighted the need to examine the objective 
“degree and duration of U.S. ‘control.’”293 The court started by 
highlighting the several respects in which general U.S. presence 
differs at Bagram from Guantánamo: it was authorized by the 
sovereign Afghan government by means of the SOFA-A,294 the 
jurisdiction granted to the United States is not exclusive,295 a 
handful of non-U.S. personnel work out of the base,296 and U.S. 
 
held for over six years, which was already seen in Boumediene as exceeding that threshold. 
See id. (“The Boumediene petitioners—like petitioners here—had been held for six years 
or more. Hence, whatever ‘reasonable period of time’ the Executive was entitled to had 
long since passed.” (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008))). 
291. Id. at 217–18. More precisely, each petitioner is an alien that was apprehended 
outside of the United States, brought into Afghanistan, and later determined to be an 
enemy combatant. Id. at 218. As was the case with Guantánamo detainees held in Cuba, 
“[s]uch rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power the Supreme 
Court sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive could 
move detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them 
indefinitely.” Id. at 220. The court aptly noted, however, that prisoners captured on the 
Afghan battlefield are qualitatively different. Id. (“Bagram detainees captured in 
Afghanistan are qualitatively different than Bagram detainees who . . . were captured 
elsewhere.”). 
292. See id. at 221 (“[F]or these three factors, petitioners are not much different 
than the petitioners in Boumediene. . . . The primary comparison of these cases and 
Boumediene, then, rests on an analysis of the remaining three factors.”). 
293. See id. at 221–22; see also id. at 221 (“The touchstone of the site of detention 
factor is the ‘objective degree of control’ the United States has over Bagram.” (quoting 
Boumedeiene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2252 (2008))). 
294. See id. at 222 (“A SOFA governs the terms of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, 
and the very existence of a SOFA is a ‘manifestation of the full sovereignty of the state 
on whose territory it applies.’” (quoting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 13–15, Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 15, 2009) (06-CV-01669))). 
295. See id. at 222–23 (appreciating that the United States maintains a lesser degree 
of jurisdiction at Bagram because the SOFA only provides criminal jurisdiction over U.S. 
personnel). 
296. See id. (“[I]n addition to the U.S. allies who operate out of the base, a sizable 
population of Afghan workers and contractors is there.” (citing Tennison Decl., supra 
note 106, ¶¶ 7–8)). 
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forces operate with the support of NATO allies.297 But, to the 
court, these differences did not significantly undercut the near 
absolute day-to-day U.S. control at Bagram. First, the lack of 
complete jurisdiction within the overall country did not 
significantly curtail the absolute control of the air base enjoyed 
by U.S. forces under the Bagram lease.298 Moreover, allied forces 
also engaged in the country do not supervise or even share 
control of the detention facility at Bagram with the United 
States.299 Thus, the degree of practical U.S. control at Bagram is 
“slightly less complete than at Guantanamo” but still vastly 
greater than Landsberg.300 Temporally, the Bagram lease is 
indefinite.301 The court distinguished the use of Bagram from 
Guantánamo, however, on the basis that the U.S. long-term 
objective in the region is not permanent.302 And prior U.S. 
occupation of Bagram is nowhere near as extensive as it was at 
Guantánamo.303 In short, U.S. ambitions at Bagram drew a closer 
temporal parallel to Landsberg than Guantánamo, but the 
United States still exercises exercised a high quantum of control 
at Bagram on balance.304 
A detailed analysis of the ECRB process was not warranted in 
 
297. See id. at 224 (“To be sure, the United States is supported by allies in 
Afghanistan.”). 
298. See id. at 223 (reasoning that “[t]he existence of a SOFA . . . does not affect 
the actual control the United States exercises at the Bagram detention facility, which is 
practically absolute” and “[p]erhaps the difference in jurisdiction precludes the United 
States from operating at Bagram [without] scrutiny of the host country [but] the lack of 
complete ‘jurisdiction’ does not appreciably undermine the conclusion that the United 
States exercises a very high ‘objective degree of control’”); see also Bagram Lease, supra 
note 156 (granting “exclusive . . . and uninterrupted possession” of the airbase). 
299. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (“[I]t is the United States, not U.S. 
allies, that detains people at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility and that operates 
(and hence fully controls) that prison facility and its occupants, which was not the case 
at Landsberg.” (citing Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948))). 
300. Id. 
301. See id. at 225 (noting the limited duration of the Bagram lease). 
302. See id. at 224–25 (“At Bagram, the United States has declared that it only 
intends to stay until the current military operations are concluded and Afghan 
sovereignty is fully restored.” (citing Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan 
Strategic Partnership, supra note 106). 
303. See id. at 224 (analogizing that the short-lived U.S. presence at Bagram is a “far 
cry” from the century-long occupation at Guantánamo). 
304. See id. at 225–26 (“Whereas the site of detention factor in Boumediene plainly 
supported application of the Suspension Clause, [the duration factor] does not favor 
petitioners to quite the same extent here. Nonetheless, it is still fair to say that the 
United States has a high objective degree of control at Bagram.”). 
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the eyes of the court because it was enough to merely “recognize 
that the [ECRB] process at Bagram falls well short of what the 
Supreme Court found inadequate at Guantanamo.”305  
The court finally turned to practical concerns, pinpointing 
the impact on daily military operations and maintenance of 
comity as those identified in Boumediene.306 Bagram, much like 
Landsberg, is under the constant threat of attack by rebel forces 
given its close proximity to the frontlines.307 Though diverting 
resources in this type of forum may at first appear to thwart the 
military mission,308 technological advances alleviate the stress 
caused by managing the habeas petitions309 and only a limited 
segment of the Bagram population would benefit from a narrow 
ruling.310 In terms of diplomacy, the court warned of tension that 
could result from reviewing petitions by Afghan detainees on 
account of the U.S. policy to eventually transfer these prisoners 
to Afghan authorities.311 All other prisoners, on the other hand, 
remain in exclusive U.S. custody and therefore present no source 
 
305. See id. at 227 (“Respondents concede, as they must, that the process used for 
status determinations at Bagram is less comprehensive than the CSRT process used for 
the Guantanamo detainees.” (quoting Transcript of Jan. 7, 2009 Hearing at 53, Al 
Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 06-CV-01669))). 
306. See id. (“The Supreme Court . . . focus[ed] on the impact that habeas review 
would have on the military mission and on whether litigating habeas cases would cause 
friction with the host government.”). 
307. See id. at 228 (“Bagram resembles Landsberg more than Guantanamo, since it, 
like Landsberg, is under constant threat by suicide bombers and other violent 
elements.” (citing Bomber Strikes Outside Main US Base in Afghanistan, VOICE OF AMERICA, 
Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-04-voa30.cfm). 
308. See id. (acknowledging that “the practical difficulties of providing habeas 
review are enhanced in an active war zone”). 
309. See id. (explaining that real-time video is a viable substitute for in-court 
appearance and is currently in use for most habeas appeals by Guantánamo prisoners). 
310. See id. at 230 (“Only a limited subset of detainees—non-Afghans captured 
beyond Afghan borders—will be affected by this ruling . . . .”). 
311. See id. (“[O]nly Wazir is an Afghan citizen, and hence only he is subject to 
such transfer [to Afghan prison].”); see also Tennison Decl., supra note 106, ¶ 16 and 
accompanying text. Quite problematically, a U.S. court adjudicating their habeas 
petition may reach a different result than an Afghan tribunal or potentially usurp the 
prerogative of the Afghan government by granting release. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 
2d at 230 (pointing out that “[i]t is by no measure unlikely that a federal court . . . 
would arrive at a different result than an Afghan court applying an entirely different 
process and legal standards” and that “unilateral release of Bagram detainees [into 
Afghanistan] could easily upset the delicate diplomatic balance the United States has 
struck with the host government.”). 
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of friction as against Afghanistan.312 
Each of the four petitioners in the case was captured outside 
of Afghanistan, but only one held Afghan citizenship.313 Thus, 
the only real difference dividing the detainees in Boumediene and 
the non-Afghan petitioners is that Bagram operates with a high, 
but not plenary, level of U.S. control and each is afforded an 
even less adequate review process.314 In essence, the three alien 
detainees were more closely aligned with the prisoners at 
Guantánamo, who were provided constitutional protection, than 
with those at Landsberg, who were not. The Afghan petitioner 
was situated differently, though, because his citizenship posed an 
obstacle to habeas review.315 Based on this balancing, the court 
held that non-Afghan detainees, captured outside Afghanistan, 
can invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge their detention.316 
The court lastly acknowledged Boumediene’s admonition that a 
different outcome might result “if the detention facility were 
located in an active theater of war.”317 However, detainees 
transferred to Bagram from elsewhere are only in the theater by 
strategic U.S. choice,318 which implicates an executive practice 
unrestrained by authority.319 
Seizing on language found in the district court’s opinion, 
government officials in September 2009 signaled that they were 
crafting a new review system that provided detainees at Bagram 
 
312. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 230 (“[Non-Afghan petitioners] are not 
subject to transfer to Afghan custody, so the United States is ‘answerable to no other 
sovereign’ for their detention . . . .”).  
313. See id. at 209 (indicating that each petitioner alleged capture outside of 
Afghanistan and listing respective citizenship). 
314. See id. at 232 (“It is worth repeating that the Bagram detainees in these cases 
are virtually identical to the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene . . . .”). 
315. See id. at 231 (“[F]or detainees who are Afghan citizens, the possibility of 
friction with the host country cannot be discounted and constitutes a significant 
practical obstacle to habeas review.”). 
316. See id. (“Providing habeas review for [the three non-Afghan petitioners] is not 
so onerous, so fraught with danger, or so likely to cause friction with the Afghan 
government as to warrant depriving them of the protections of the Great Writ.”). 
317. Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2261–62 (2008)). 
318. See id. at 230–31 (“The only reason these petitioners are in an active theater of 
war is because respondents brought them there.”). 
319. See id. at 230 (“[I]t would be far more anomalous to allow respondents to 
preclude a detainee’s habeas rights by choosing to put him in harm’s way through 
detention in a theater of war.”). 
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with greater rights.320 The details of these new tribunals, designed 
to meet traditional standards of wartime detention, were revealed 
just days later by the government in the merits brief it submitted 
in connection with the interlocutory appeal of Al Maqaleh.321  
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE 
EXECUTIVE DETENTION 
In its traditional role, the executive branch is afforded wide 
latitude to capture and detain prisoners during active 
hostilities.322 But, as the aforementioned case law illustrates, the 
atypical character of the war on terror has forced the U.S. 
judiciary to reconsider the position of prisoners to challenge 
their traditionally uncontroversial detention. Boumediene, for the 
first time in U.S. history, extended constitutional protections to 
aliens located beyond U.S. borders.323 More specifically, the 
Court determined that the Suspension Clause provided wartime 
prisoners with the ability to judicially challenge their military 
detention on habeas review.324 But the holding was confined to 
 
320. See Karen De Young and Peter Finn, U.S. Gives New Rights to Prisoners: Indefinite 
Detention Can Be Challenged, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, at A01 (citing Obama officials 
as indicating that prisoners in Afghanistan will soon receive enhanced rights in a new 
review system); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1 (same). 
321. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 61, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf. Under the new review procedure, 
detainees at Bagram would receive a “personal representative” as well as the ability to 
testify and call witnesses in their favor. Id. at 61–62. The review board, moreover, reaches 
its determination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 62 (“The board will make 
its determination using the well-established preponderance of evidence standard . . . .”). 
For the government memoranda outlining the exact nature of the new review 
procedures, see Id. adds. 1–8. For more information on the interlocutory appeal, see 
supra note 286. 
322. See supra notes 206–07 (recognizing detention of enemy combatants on hostile 
ground for duration of conflict as a “fundamental . . . incident of war”); see also infra 
notes 383–86 (elaborating on the discretion that the executive holds on the battlefront). 
323. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (conceding the novelty of its 
holding); see also supra notes 60–77 (establishing that citizens were the only class of 
persons who received constitutional protection beyond U.S. border prior to Boumediene). 
324. See supra note 251 (extending the protections of the Suspension Clause). As 
noted earlier, the court had not, prior to Boumediene, expressly determined whether a 
parallel right to habeas corpus inheres in the Suspension Clause. See supra note 33. 
Justice Kennedy in Boumediene used language that could be seen as indicating that 
habeas corpus rests implicitly in the Clause or, alternatively, that the Clause only 
protects against the arbitrary repeal of the statutory grant of habeas corpus. Compare 
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Guantánamo Bay.325 So while the Suspension Clause is capable of 
reaching the shores of Cuba, the all-important question is where 
else its protections may flow.326  
As noted earlier, the writ of habeas corpus is presently 
codified in our statutory scheme as positive law. Part III.A will 
therefore delineate who can currently rely on the habeas statute 
as a source of relief and who else must fall back on the 
Suspension Clause. Part III.B turns to the Suspension Clause and 
crytically examines Boumediene against the law that influenced the 
case’s outcome in order to develop a guide for assessing who else 
is entitled to the clause’s protections. Finally, Part III.C will then 
use these principles in a set of hypothetical situations to more 
clearly display the geographic coverage of the Suspension Clause, 
as it stands under current law. 
A. Statutory Habeas Corpus 
The Court’s precedent on the extraterritorial reach of 
section 2241 is inconsistent on the surface, but a more cogent 
line of authority emerges by reading the case law in context. In 
Eisentrager, Justice Jackson flatly proclaimed that “[n]othing in 
. . . our statutes” confers aliens detained abroad with a right to 
habeas corpus.327 Yet Rasul extended the protections of section 
2241 to alien prisoners detained by the United States in Cuba.328 
This anomaly can be ascribed to the fact that Eisentrager was 
 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2008) (endorsing dicta in St. Cyr theorizing 
that the Suspension Clause protects “at the absolute minimum” the privilege “‘as it 
existed in 1789.’” (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
301 (2001) (in turn quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996)))), with id. at 
2262 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo 
Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us, 
Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”). 
The outcome under either interpretation is the same, so this article will use the term 
“protections of the Suspension Clause” to refer to whatever right that provision 
embodies. 
325. See infra note 341 (recognizing that Boumediene only invalidated the MCA as 
applied to the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay). 
326. See supra note 11 (expressing curiosity as to where else the Suspension Clause 
could provide protection beyond Guantánamo Bay). 
327. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950). 
328. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (permitting the use of statutory 
habeas by Guantánamo prisoners). 
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decided under the authority of Ahrens v. Clarke.329 As explained 
by the Rasul Court, Ahrens demanded the prisoner’s presence—
as opposed to the jailor’s—within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the district court in order to satisfy the statutory language of 
section 2241.330 An individual detained in Germany would clearly 
not be within the jurisdiction of a U.S. district court.331 But 
Ahrens was overruled after Eisentrager was decided and section 
2241 now only requires the custodian’s presence in the 
jurisdiction of the trial court.332 Therefore, the use of section 
2241 is not presently precluded merely because of a prisoner’s 
location outside of the United States.333 In fact, some legal writers 
contend that, after Munaf, section 2241 will now “follow the flag” 
overseas.334 
The use of section 2241 to challenge executive detention 
does not presently turn on a prisoner’s location, but instead 
centers on his or her citizenship. Previously, section 2241 was 
available to citizens and aliens alike.335 Congress, however, made 
several important amendments to section 2241 under the 
 
329. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778 (citing Ahrens v. Clarke, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), 
abrogated by Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)). 
330. See 542 U.S. 466, 477 (2004) (“[Ahrens read] the phrase ‘within their 
respective jurisdictions’ as used in the habeas statute to require the petitioners’ presence 
within the district court’s territorial jurisdiction.”). 
331. In fact, this is precisely why the district court dismissed the habeas application 
of the Eisentrager prisoners at the trial level and the Supreme Court resorted to 
“fundamentals.” Id. 
332. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (settling that jurisdiction under 
section 2241 is determined by the jailor’s location, not that of the prisoner). The 
precedential value of the passage quoted above, supra note 327, must be seen in this 
light. 
333. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Munaf is a prime example of a case 
where section 2241 can run to a prisoner held abroad. See supra note 273 (holding that 
section 2241 runs to U.S. prisoners abroad). 
334. See, e.g., Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/ (June 13, 2008, 3:39pm EST) (“[T]he Court has dropped 
a hint that, in the new global village, habeas will follow the American flag overseas—
possibly everywhere except an active battlefield.”); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, 
International Decision, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 854, 858 
(2008) (“The Court’s decision is actually considerably broader than it might have 
been . . . . [F]ederal courts have jurisdiction over a petitioner [under section 2241] 
‘when the United States official charged with his detention has ‘‘the power to produce’ 
him.’” (citing Munaf, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2217 (2008) (in turn quoting Wales v. Whitney, 
114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)))). 
335. See supra note 212 (proclaiming that section 2241 did not discriminate 
between citizens and aliens as of the time of Rasul in 2004). 
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MCA.336 By its very terms, the MCA only constricts the statutory 
habeas rights of alien detainees.337 U.S. citizens can therefore still 
turn to section 2241 following the enactment of the MCA, 
irrespective of their location, in order to challenge their 
detention by the U.S. military.338 Aliens are currently without this 
protection. 
As a result, alien detainees must overcome section 7(a) of 
the MCA in order to mount a habeas petition in an article III 
court.339 To be sure, this provision of the MCA was determined to 
be constitutionally infirm in Boumediene.340 But Boumediene only 
served as an invalidation of section 7(a) of the MCA as against 
aliens detained at Guantánamo, so this provision still forecloses 
the use of section 2241 by all other alien detainees imprisoned 
elsewhere.341 Accordingly, alien detainees held at locations other 
than Guantánamo must turn to the Suspension Clause in order 
to invalidate section 7(a) of the MCA.342 
Boumediene in substance recognized that the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions of the MCA are unconstitutional as used 
 
336. See supra note 219 (detailing MCA’s amendments to section 2241); see also 
supra note 37 and accompanying text (establishing that Congress may alter its statutory 
scheme within constitutional bounds). 
337. See supra note 219 (denying “alien detaine[es]” access to section 2241). 
338. See supra notes 333–34 (indicating that section 2241 is not presently 
dependent on a prisoner’s location within the United States); supra note 337 
(recognizing that the MCA only denies aliens access to section 2241). Munaf again is 
illustrative in displaying the ability of a U.S. citizen to invoke the protections of secion 
2241 following the passage of the MCA. See supra note 273 (holding that section 2241 
runs to U.S. prisoners abroad in spite of the MCA). 
339. To clarify, the MCA does not simply deprive alien petitioners access to the 
habeas statute, but more broadly deprives competent courts of “jurisdiction” to consider 
habeas petitions filed by alien enemy detainees—which potentially includes claims 
asserted under a constitutional right to habeas corpus. See supra note 219 (reproducing 
text of MCA). 
340. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (proclaiming section 7(a) of the 
MCA to work an unconstitutional suspension of the writ). 
341. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (clarifying that Boumediene was not a 
facial invalidation of the MCA). 
342. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (highlighting that Congress may only 
amend its positive law to the extent that it comports with the Constitution); see also Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (2009) (explaining that Bagram petitioners 
“must look to the constitutional right to habeas corpus as protected by the Suspension 
Clause, and whether that provision extends to them” due to the MCA). 
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against anyone who is protected by the Suspension Clause.343 The 
majority, however, confined the application of this principle to 
alien prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay. As mentioned 
earlier, a statute cannot possibly transgress the Constitution by 
depriving a person of a protection to which they are not entitled 
in the first instance.344 And the Court’s inconsistency in defining 
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution is indicative that 
there is no clear-cut answer as to whether the Suspension Clause 
is operative in remote locations or contexts other than 
Guantánamo.345 Thus, entitlement to the protections of the 
Suspension Clause becomes the threshold question for all aliens 
imprisoned abroad at a facility other than Guantánamo who seek 
to challenge the legality of their detention in a U.S. civilian 
court. 
B. The Suspension Clause 
Boumediene marks yet another sea change in the 
extraterritorial jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. This 
framework departs from a history steeped in a series of rigid 
techniques for determining the force of constitutional provisions 
beyond U.S. borders.346 Unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of the 
functional approach suffers, as one prominent scholar put it, 
“from the lack of certainty that bright-line rules would 
provide.”347 Indeed, there appears to be wide disagreement in 
academic circles over what implications Boumediene may hold.348 
But the overall analysis in Boumediene is not entirely novel. The 
 
343. See supra note 251 (determining that section 7 of the MCA “effects an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ” because the Suspension Clause protects 
detainees held at Guantánamo Bay). 
344. See supra note 85 (discussing the issue of standing). 
345. See supra notes 43–77 and accompanying text (navigating the jurisprudential 
shifts in the area of the Constitution’s extraterritorial application). 
346. See supra notes 43–77 and accompanying text (distilling the case law 
concerning the reach of the Constitution beyond the U.S. borders). 
347. Neuman, supra note 255, at 273. This type of judicial minimalism is not 
uncommon to the Court; it can be found with prominent use at various other points in 
history where national security was threatened. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50–51 (2004) (identifying the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the 
Cold War, and the current War on Terror as periods of judicial minimalism). For a more 
elaborate discussion of judicial minimalism in the Supreme Court, see generally CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINAMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
348. See supra notes 253–55 (advancing several theories with regard to Boumediene’s 
significance). 
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functional model, as Kennedy called it, can be traced back to the 
dissent of Justice Harlan in Reid.349 By the time that his 
“impracticable and anomalous” test was advertised by Kennedy in 
Verdugo-Urquidez, it was generally understood as a model that 
favored global constitutional coverage under which protections 
extend unless offset by operative barriers.350 Within this 
framework, the elements isolated in Boumediene fit neatly into two 
categories: objective indicia that establish a propensity for 
constitutional application (“proclivity factors”) and 
considerations that preclude the operation of constitutional 
rights (“inhibiting factors”).351 This subsection will take up each 
element of the Boumediene functional model, as they were 
presented in Al Maqaleh, and critically analyze each in turn: (a) 
citizenship; (b) detainee status; (c) process used to reach that 
determination; (d) nature of the site of apprehension; (e) nature 
of the site of detention; (f) practical obstacles; and (g) the 
implicit element of the duration of a prisoner’s detention. 
1. Citizenship 
Citizenship is a central influence in the Court’s discussions 
of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, but all that can 
be gleaned from Boumediene is that a lack of citizenship is not 
dispositive. To use the general outcome of Boumediene as a 
starting point, alien detainees received protection under the 
Suspension Clause.352 In this sense, the Court obviously did not 
find their lack of citizenship dispositive to the constitutional 
question.353 The district court in Al Maqaleh elaborated on this 
point in observing that citizenship was not a “litmus test” for 
determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension 
 
349. See supra notes 67–68 (advancing an “impracticable or anomalous” test that 
extends constitutional coverage overseas unless imprudent to do so). 
350. See supra notes 75–77 (describing the “impracticable or anomalous” test as a 
theory of “global due process” at the time Verdugo-Urquidez was decided). 
351. See supra note 232 (distilling the functional model as turning on “objective 
factors” and “practical concerns”); see also supra notes 75–77 (signaling that under 
model of global due process factors that establish a proclivity for constitutional 
application are weighed against practical considerations). 
352. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (paraphrasing the general holding 
of Boumediene). 
353. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (recognizing the novelty of 
providing noncitizens with constitutional coverage when located abroad). 
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Clause.354 This assertion presupposes that holding citizenship is also 
nondispositive as well. But this is not necessarily true; after all, 
the Court was only confronted with an issue relating to alien 
rights.355 
The Court previously employed language in Reid v. Covert 
that arguably extended the full range of constitutional rights to 
all citizens affected by government action abroad.356 But 
Boumediene qualified that passage. Kennedy chalked up the 
holding in Reid as a result of practical considerations, and not 
simply the petitioner’s citizenship.357 He also ascribed the 
outcome in Ross as dependent on practical concerns as well.358 
But all that this establishes is that citizenship, like any proclivity 
factor, is subject to inhibiting limitations. 
The Court’s past precedent underscores a strong favor for 
citizenship. The law recognizes inherent distinctions between 
aliens of hostile and friendly countries, as well as those who have 
initiated the transition into the U.S. system of laws and those who 
have not.359 Accordingly, aliens are afforded more robust 
protections, in what is described as “an ascending scale of rights,” 
as they increase their integration into U.S. institutions and 
culture.360 But because the claim to these safeguards is not as 
 
354. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 218 (2009). 
355. See supra note 221 (describing each petitioner as an alien to the United 
States). 
356. See supra note 63 (declaring “we reject the idea that when the United States 
acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights”). 
357. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text (dicussing Reid precedent). 
358. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (providing brief description of 
Ross). 
359. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (“[O]ur law does not 
abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between citizens 
and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, nor between resident 
enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens 
who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy governments.”); see also Ex 
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942) (“By universal agreement and practice the law of 
war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of 
belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.”). 
360. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770. For instance, (friendly) aliens are provided with 
limited safeguards when they enter the doors of the United States. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Equal Protection to illegal aliens); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (Just Compensation of Fifth Amendment to non-
resident “alien friend”); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (habeas 
corpus to alien immigrants). After taking steps to establish residence in the country, they 
receive greater protections. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (Due 
Process of Fifth Amendment to resident aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) 
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secure as a citizen’s, their protections may become circumscribed 
in times of war if they hold allegiance to an enemy state.361 In 
short, courts regard the quality of citizenship, in and of itself, in 
high esteem.362 
Because of its great importance, citizenship would likely play 
a significant role in the Suspension Clause calculus. First, 
Boumediene did not provide an occasion to discuss the impact of 
citizenship on the domain of the Suspension Clause vis-à-vis the 
functional model.363 Moreover, Ross and Reid only involved the 
geographic scope of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.364 As 
distinct from the supplementary nature of the protections at 
issue in those cases, habeas corpus rather basically ensures that 
executive detentions are carried out within lawful bounds.365 The 
Court, accordingly, might be predisposed to give greater weight 
to citizenship in this context. In fact, there exists strong language 
in recent case law that resonates with this proposition: the Hamdi 
plurality wrote that a citizen’s “interest in being free from 
physical detention by one’s own government” is the most 
 
(First Amendment to resident aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) 
(Fourteenth Amendment to resident aliens); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (explaining that presence “within the territory of the United 
States” was decisive to the above cases). 
361. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952) (providing that due to 
the “ambiguity of [an enemy’s] allegiance, his domicile here is held by a precarious 
tenure” in times of war); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775 (“The resident enemy alien is 
constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a 
‘declared war’ exists.”). Eisentrager clarifies that, even in this context, the settled practice 
is to review an alien’s plea against executive action only to determine that there is, in 
fact, a state of war and he is an enemy alien subject to the internment or deportation 
provisions of federal law. 339 U.S. at 775. 
362. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 520 n.3 (1981) (expressing 
that “the weighty interest in citizenship should be neither casually conferred nor lightly 
revoked” in the immigration context (citing Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630, 
636–37 (1967))); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 586 (recognizing that aliens of any type are not 
afforded “legal parity with the citizen”); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770 (describing 
citizenship as a “‘a high privilege’” (quoting United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 
(1928))). 
363. In fact, the Court’s caution to not disturb other areas of constitutional law is 
entirely consistent with the piecemeal practice of judicial minimalism. See supra note 
347. 
364. See supra notes 44–50, 60–69 and accompanying text (indicating that both Reid 
and Ross involved the extraterritorial application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to 
citizens). 
365. See supra notes 30–40, 224 (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus serves to 
ensure that detentions are carried out in accordance with the law). 
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“elemental of liberty interests” that is not offset by the accusation 
of treasonous behavior.366 Though Hamdi was clearly entitled to 
habeas corpus by virtue of his location within the United 
States,367 it would be inconsistent and anomalous with the spirit 
of the case law interpreting the high privilege of citizenship to 
deny a U.S. citizen detained abroad the right to challenge the 
denial of such a significant interest—the freedom of restraint 
from one’s own government—short of some extraordinary 
exigency.368 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that a lack of citizenship 
is clearly not outcome-determinative under the functional test.369 
On the other hand, the Court’s strong favor of citizenship in 
both historic and current case law makes clear that, all else being 
equal, U.S. citizenship creates a very high proclivity for extending 
the Suspension Clause to those detained abroad.370 The Court’s 
precedent also establishes a nuanced approach for cases in the 
middle—enemy aliens with ties to the United States.371 
2. Status of the Detainee and Process Used to Reach that 
Determination 
A potential conflict arises in reading the precise wording of 
these two intertwined criteria. It bears repeating that habeas 
corpus is a tool used to challenge illegal detention in a variety of 
 
366. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
367. Id. at 525 (explaining that “it is undisputed that Hamdi was properly before 
an Article III court to challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” even though he 
was captured abroad because he was presently located in the United States). 
368. See supra notes 359–62 (emphasizing the importance of citizenship in case 
law). 
369. See supra notes 354–55 (citing the outcome in Boumediene as an example). 
370. See supra notes 366–68 and accompanying text (arguing that citizenship 
carries a presumption that one’s government cannot detain an individual without 
proper review). It is unlikely the Court would ever consider the question of a citizen’s 
constitutional right to extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause because 
citizen-detainees are currently entitled to invoke the protections of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
beyond the border of the United States; the Court would only reach the hypothetical 
situation if section 2241 were amended to the detriment of the citizenry or repealed. See 
supra note 333 (illustrating that the protections of section 2241 run to citizens detained 
abroad). 
371. See supra note 360 (underscoring that the law accords greater levels of 
protection to persons as they increase their connections to U.S. institutions). 
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contexts.372 And executive detention may result from a 
preliminary finding that a prisoner is an enemy combatant373 or, 
more permanently, after trial by military commission.374 But these 
two elements (detainee status and process) are worded in 
Boumediene in terms specific only to an initial status 
determination.375  
Nevertheless, Kennedy went on to compare the process used 
to reach the status of the Boumediene prisoners with the process 
used to try the Eisentrager prisoners before a military 
commission.376 This comparative analysis suggests that the three-
prong test in Boumediene is not limited solely to initial status 
challenges, but is rather designed to encompass all 
extraterritorial contexts where the Suspension Clause might be 
invoked. Thus, the more appropriate inquiry is one of the 
general basis for detention. 
With this broader understanding in mind, another concern 
arises in evaluating the two distinct bases for executive detention. 
It is uncontroversial that the prisoners in both Eisentrager and 
Boumediene were designated as enemy combatants.377 The 
Boumediene majority made a point, though, of observing that the 
Guantánamo detainees deny their status determinations.378 Yet, a 
habeas petition inherently challenges some aspect of a prisoner’s 
detention and thus implies a denial of legitimacy as to some 
 
372. See supra note 90 (recognizing the variety of situations in which an executive 
detention may be challenged and listing examples). 
373. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (documenting the authority of 
the President to detain prisoners captured on the battlefield as enemy combatants). 
374. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (habeas petition by alien 
combatant challenging authority of military commission to try and detain prisoner); Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (habeas petition by alien and citizen combatants 
challenging the constitutionality of the military commission process). 
375. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2228, 2259 (framing the inquiry in terms 
of “status of the detainee” and “process through which that status determination was 
made”). 
376. See Id. at 2259–60 (“[U]nlike Eisentrager, there has been no trial by military 
commission for violations of the laws of war. The difference is not trivial. The records 
from the Eisentrager trials suggest that . . . there had been a rigorous adversarial 
process.” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 2260 (“In comparison the procedural 
protections afforded to the detainees in the CSRT hearing are far more limited.”). 
377. See supra notes 221, 239 (indicating that the Eisentrager and Boumediene 
prisoners were enemy aliens at the time of their military detentions). 
378. See supra note 243 (identifying that the Boumediene petitioners deny their 
status). 
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process used to arrive at their imprisonment.379 Implicit in the 
habeas petitions filed in Eisentrager was that the German 
prisoners denied the legitimacy of their “trial, conviction, and 
imprisonment.”380 Even so, Kennedy went on to write that in 
contrast to the Eisentrager petitioners, the prisoners in Boumediene 
deny their status.381 By elevating the claims brought by the 
Guantánamo prisoners, Kennedy suggests that a challenge based 
on an initial status determination carries more weight than one 
based on a subsequent trial by military commission.382 Express 
mention of their status denial signifies that the inquiry also 
contemplates what aspect of the process is disputed. 
3. Nature of the Site of Apprehension 
Even prior to the ratification of the Constitution, militaries 
have historically maintained considerable latitude to act against 
all persons within a warzone due to the extraordinary 
circumstances present on the battlefront.383 Among these actions, 
the ability to detain enemy combatants for the duration of a 
conflict is widely recognized as a legitimate practice of armed 
conflict.384 As a result, the Court is willing to provide greater 
leeway to the executive on the battlefront385 because separation-
 
379. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (clarifying the function served by 
habeas corpus). 
380. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 767 (1950). 
381. See supra note 243 (comparing the challenge mounted in Eisentrager with 
those presented by the Boumediene petitioners). 
382. Though both challenges raise important questions, this hierarchy is 
analytically sound because the status determination is usually the initial basis for 
detention directly from the battlefield; if that detention is invalid, then so is any 
subsequent action, such as trial by military commission. The Hamdi plurality indicated 
that it was quite sensitive to the threat posed by capricious battlefield detentions. See 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530–31 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Ex Parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866)). 
383. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (“In the face of an actively hostile enemy, 
military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront. 
From a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances 
present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit 
[executive action against civilians].”). 
384. See supra notes 206–07 (recognizing the detention of enemy combatants on 
hostile ground for the duration of a conflict as a “fundamental . . . incident to war”). 
385. See supra notes 256–58 (displaying deference in various areas of government 
affairs). In fact, the Court in Munaf made a point to observe that it was concerned about 
intruding on the executive’s authority to conduct military operations because the 
petitioners were captured and detained in “an active theater of combat.” 128 S. Ct. 2207, 
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of-powers concerns are not as strong when detentions are borne 
of military necessity.386 
Since 9/11, however, suspects in the war on terror have 
been captured throughout the world.387 A concern arises where 
an alien is captured somewhere other than a battlefield.388 
Outside of this universally accepted setting, military-led detention 
implicates a type of executive action that does not enjoy the same 
set of considerations. By securing broad diplomatic arrangements 
and generous lease agreements with the host state, the executive 
sets up a temporary system of governance where military action 
can go unsupervised and without accountability.389 Prisoners 
captured on the battlefield are sent through this system as a 
practical consequence of their proximity to the detention site. 
But prisoners captured elsewhere lack this proximate 
connectivity. This raises a concern that their transfer to a zone of 
lawlessness is made in part to operate outside of traditional 
norms. Part of what animated Kennedy’s separation-of-powers 
discussion in Boumediene was that the executive strategically sent 
prisoners to a location where they could exert full control 
without judicial review.390 
This, however, does not entirely foreclose the possibility that 
someone detained on a foreign battlefield can use habeas corpus. 
In fact, the prisoners that successfully invoked habeas corpus in 
Munaf were apprehended and detained in what the Court 
 
2224 (2008) (quoting Brief for the Federal Parties at 16, Munaf, 128. S. Ct. 2207 (Nos. 
06-1666, 07-394) available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-
08/07-394_FederalParties.pdf). 
386. On the battlefield, separation-of-powers concerns simply do not find their way 
into the functional analysis. In this context, the location of combatant detainee 
confinement is a result of practicality and necessity, not strategy. 
387. See supra notes 117–29 and accompanying text (listing various countries off 
the battlefield in which detainees allege that their capture took place). 
388. See supra note 291 (distinguishing that battlefield detainees are “qualitatively 
different” from prisoners captured elsewhere). 
389. See supra notes 32, 234, 317–19 (relying on separation-of-powers principles 
when the executive creates authority for itself to act without accountability). 
390. See supra note 234 (declaring that the executive branch cannot bypass judicial 
oversight by strategically detaining prisoners in Cuba); cf. Neuman, supra note 11, at 279 
(“[T]he Court's salutary inclusion of both the site of apprehension and the site of 
detention as factors should prevent the government from evading constitutional 
constraint by deliberately moving detainees from locations where the writ protects them 
(including the mainland United States) to locations where it does not.”). 
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described as “an active theater of combat.”391 Nevertheless, in 
contrast to non-battlefield detainees, the Court is willing to 
provide greater deference to the executive branch on the 
battlefront because separation-of-powers concerns are not as 
strongly implicated.392 
4. Nature of the Site of Detention 
The objective amount of control over the sites of detention 
proved to be a pivotal factor in the cases that have addressed the 
extraterritorial application of habeas corpus. The Court in 
Boumediene was clearly influenced by the fact that the United 
States exercised plenary control over Guantánamo.393 The brief 
opinion in Hirota indicates, however, that there is a minimum 
imperative—U.S. forces must operate under an undisrupted 
command chain in order to attribute detention practices to 
them.394 U.S. control (or lack thereof), in this sense, acts as an 
absolute inhibitor to constitutional coverage unless and until that 
minimum level is satisfied.395 
The difficulty lies in assessing those cases falling between the 
two extremes. The court in Al Maqaleh arrived at the conclusion 
that the United States commands a degree of control over 
Bagram that is not quite commensurate with Guantánamo but 
still objectively high, notwithstanding the facts that U.S. forces 
are aided by others and U.S. jurisdiction is not exclusive.396 The 
 
391. Supra note 278. The precedential value of Munaf must be viewed in current 
context: the opinion was delivered at a time before the promulgation of the U.S.-Iraq 
status of forces agreement (“SOFA-I”) and before the focus of U.S. forces in the region 
shifted from combating “terror” to helping restore stability in Iraq. See supra notes 111–
15, 183 (outlining character of U.S. presence in Iraq before and after formalizing the 
SOFA-I). The prisoners also pursued relief under section 2241, which is considerably 
more generous in its application than the Suspension Clause. See Cohen, supra note 334 
(“The Court could have differentiated Hirota . . . [but i]nstead, the Court relies mainly 
on the open-ended language of the habeas statute and the petitioners’ presence within 
the ‘actual custody’ of the United States.”). 
392. See supra notes 383–86 (recognizing that executive branch does not act with 
unrestrained power when conducting universally recognized wartime activities). 
393. See supra note 246 (describing U.S. control as “absolute” and “indefinite”). 
394. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (paraphrasing the case’s 
holding). 
395. See supra note 351 (differentiating between proclivity factors and inhibiting 
factors). 
396. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text (detailing the precise nature of 
U.S. control at Bagram). To simplify matters, nearly every overseas U.S. military facility 
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analysis of the court reveals that the strict language of the legal 
documents governing U.S. presence is not conclusive; instead a 
holistic examination is used to measure to practical day-to-day 
authority asserted by the United States.397 Furthermore, any 
discussion of U.S. control within the country as a whole would be 
a non sequitur because the inquiry is concerned solely with the 
control directly over the detention facility.398 Finally, Al Maqaleh 
looked to past control as an aspect of its temporal inquiry, but 
this conflicts with the basic premise of the Insular Cases.399 The 
doctrine of territorial incorporation was unconcerned with past 
presence because every new territory was de facto a “new 
acquisition.”400 
In sum, the Suspension Clause is inoperative unless a bare 
minimum is established.401 But after meeting the initial 
threshold, the greater the level of U.S. control, the greater the 
proclivity for application of the Suspension Clause.402 Once the 
proper scope of U.S. influence is identified, it is then possible to 
isolate the constitutionally-relevant level of U.S. control.403 
5. Practical Considerations 
Two distinct prudential limitations can be discerned from 
recent case law: issues relating to the ongoing military effort and 
those regarding the maintenance of comity. 
The Court in Boumediene devoted significant attention to the 
impact that habeas review would have on military resources, but 
 
will fit this classification absent some special diplomatic agreement. See supra note 205 
(conceding that nearly all overseas U.S. facilities operate with a full degree of control). 
397. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (pinpointing the “practical” U.S. 
control). 
398. See supra note 299 (discounting aid for allies in the control calculus as 
unrelated to control at the detention facility). Of course, an instrument governing the 
U.S. presence in the country as a whole may also bear on the authority the United States 
exercises over its military bases. 
399. See supra notes 226, 247 (discussing the doctrine of territorial incorporation). 
400. See supra notes 51–59 accompanying text (supplying a brief background on 
Insular Cases). 
401. See supra notes 394–95 and accompanying text (recognizing that the 
Suspension Clause is precluded from operating in places where the United States 
cannot produce the prisoner). 
402.  See supra notes 350–51 (perceiving that proclivity factors strengthen alien 
grounds for constitutional protection under a model of “global due process”). 
403. See supra notes 396–400 and accompanying text (identifying the relevant 
constitutional scope of U.S. control). 
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did so without reference to military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.404 This omission implies that this consideration is 
only concerned with strain imposed on the military unit directly 
responsible for supervising the petitioning class of detainees and 
not U.S. forces-at-large.405 Al Maqaleh further refined this inquiry 
by breaking down the impact on military operations into 
detention facility security,406 procedural difficulties in managing 
habeas claims,407 and the number of prisoners who would benefit 
from a favorable ruling.408 Given that military resources are not 
static, it follows that the military unit directly responsible for a 
detention facility may be strained at one point in time but not at 
another when the same procedures are used. 
Although Munaf was forced to bifurcate the analysis of the 
habeas petition because the question on appeal was statutorily-
based, the discussion of equitable barriers in the merits section 
nevertheless carries constitutional significance.409 Because habeas 
corpus is an equitable concept, concerns of interstate comity can 
directly inhibit a court from exercising its habeas power.410 This 
understanding rings with constitutional significance because it 
teaches that prudential barriers arising from interstate comity 
may deter a court from issuing the writ, even where all other facts 
 
404. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (focusing solely on the “military 
mission at Guantanamo”). 
405. Cf. supra note 398 and accompanying text (limiting the degree of control to 
that asserted over the detention facility alone). 
406. See supra note 307 (describing the burden on detention security). 
407. See supra note 309 (describing administrative difficulties). The district court in 
Al Maqaleh quickly disposed of this issue because technological advances, which were 
already in use in the Guantánamo cases, mitigate many administrative burdens. See supra 
note 309 (downplaying the impact of administering habeas petitions due to 
technological advances). 
408. See supra note 310 (describing the number of affected detainees). 
409. Munaf takes on even greater importance because, with the exception of one 
Bagram petitioner, neither Boumediene nor Al Maqaleh disposed its case on the ground 
that U.S. intervention would usurp the jurisdiction of a foreign court. See supra notes 
249, 311 (punting the comity issue). Munaf, however, engages in a lengthy discussion on 
comity. 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2221 (2008). 
410. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976) (“[C]onsiderations of 
comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice [may] require a 
federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.” (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391 (1963))); accord Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2008) 
(indicating that courts “adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and 
prudential considerations.” (citations omitted)); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has long recognized that habeas 
corpus [is] governed by equitable principles”). 
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favor its use.411 A common theme to modern-day international 
relations is that “we live in a world of nation-states in which our 
Government must be able to ‘functio[n] effectively in the 
company of sovereign nations.’”412 As one aspect of this 
understanding, it is undisputed that all nations have exclusive 
jurisdiction to punish offenses by any person within its borders 
unless they expressly or implicitly surrender jurisdiction.413 This 
principle precludes domestic courts from reviewing habeas 
claims that relate to an ongoing or concluded foreign tribunal.414 
Al Maqaleh took this a step further by extending the principle to a 
prisoner who was potentially subject to transfer to the host state 
and did not necessarily even face criminal charges under their 
custody.415 
6. Reasonable Amount of Time 
Finally, Al Maqaleh pointed to a passage in Boumediene that 
indicated that the executive is entitled to a “reasonable period of 
time” before habeas review would become practical.416 
Specifically, the Court cautioned that it would be an 
“unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that 
habeas corpus would be available at the moment the prisoner is 
 
411. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2221 (“The question, therefore, even where a habeas 
court has the power to issue the writ, is ‘whether this be a case in which [that power] 
ought to be exercised.’” (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 201 (1830))). 
412. Verdugo-Urdiquez v. United States, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (quoting Perez v. 
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)). 
413. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (“A sovereign nation has 
exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, 
unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.”). As to this latter 
point, the Court declared nearly two hundred years ago that “[t]he jurisdiction of [a] 
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no 
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an 
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty.” Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). Justice Marshall went on to state that 
“[a]ll exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own 
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no 
other legitimate source.” Id. 
414. See supra note 279 (citing authority that disfavors collateral review of foreign 
tribunals). 
415. See supra note 311 (precluding U.S. review on possible transfer to Afghan 
authority). It bears note that Munaf involved prisoners who imminently faced transfer to 
Iraqi authorities. See supra note 267 (tracing the procedural history of Munaf 
petitioners). 
416. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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taken into custody.”417 In neither case did the courts address 
where that point lies because six-plus years was seen as exceeding 
a reasonable amount of time.418 
This initial window of reasonableness, however, should not 
be seen as a static concept. Kennedy explained that the initial 
window of reasonable time is largely a function of the interplay 
between the desire to carry out detentions under a streamlined 
executive framework and the role of the judiciary to prevent 
excessive executive power within the separation-of-powers 
scheme.419 As noted earlier, however, detentions carried out 
directly from the battlefield carry a level of implied legitimacy 
under the laws of war that detentions off the battlefield do not 
enjoy.420 The time it would take to reach a formal disposition 
would not significantly differ in these two scenarios, but the 
detention of a prisoner captured from the battlefield is already 
sustained by international law and the initial window of time set 
aside for them to exhaust administrative channels of relief should 
reflect this understanding. While the exact point may be 
uncertain in these two situations, the discussion of this issue by 
the courts reveals that time at least initially acts as acts as a strict 
bar to judicial review.421 
Although all of the authorities to consider the influence of 
time have thus far perceived it as an inhibiting factor, time can 
also act as a proclivity consideration. The Court at other times 
has displayed great sensitivity to the danger of prolonged 
detention by an unchecked executive.422 And with no clear end 
 
417. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008). 
418. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing “reasonable amount of 
time” in cases of the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh petitioners). 
419. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275 (“Here, as is true with detainees 
apprehended abroad, a relevant consideration in determining the courts’ [habeas] role 
is whether there are suitable alternative processes in place to protect against the 
arbitrary exercise of governmental power.”); see also supra notes 256–58 (recognizing the 
prominence with which the separation-of-powers principle figured into the role of 
habeas corpus in the Boumediene opinion). 
420. See supra notes 383–86 (explaining that detentions carried out on the 
battlefield do not involve the same separation-of-powers considerations because they are 
widely accepted as a legitimate practice of war). 
421. See supra note 351 (distinguishing between proclivity factors and inhibiting 
factors). 
422. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that detention in 
the current war on terror could last for a prisoner’s lifetime); see also supra note 258 
(cautioning the necessity for restraint on unlimited executive power in times of war). 
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in sight, the war on terror is already one of the longest in our 
country’s history.423 The plurality in Hamdi took care to warn that 
traditional laws of war concerning enemy imprisonment may 
“unravel” in the face of protracted enemy detention.424 Because 
the writ is used as a check on the executive, time is clearly a 
significant consideration. Habeas corpus is a device used to 
rectify illegal detention, so the longer that a prisoner is detained 
under what is alleged to be unlawful authority, the graver the 
potential breach of the principle underlying habeas corpus.425 
Someone imprisoned for decades under the justification of war 
would certainly have a greater interest in receiving judicial review 
than someone freshly captured from the battlefield. On the 
continuum of time, the longer that a prisoner is detained beyond 
the initial window of reasonableness, the greater their claim to 
the Suspension Clause would become.426  
C. Implications Through Example 
The Court recognizes the inherent authority of the 
executive to detain persons on the battlefield as enemy 
combatants.427 Although the Court has yet to squarely address 
whether this power extends off the battlefield in the current war 
on terror,428 it still remains theoretically possible for the 
executive to capture suspected combatants anywhere in the 
world.429 The following section fleshes out some of the concepts 
addressed above to better illustrate the current geographic scope 
of the Suspension Clause. Although this Note is centrally 
 
423. See RICHARD HOLMES ET AL., OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY 
HISTORY 849 (2001) (specifying that terror conflict is among the longest wars in U.S. 
history). 
424. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (warning that the traditional laws of 
war may “unravel” if war on terror continues into the future). 
425. See supra notes 30–40, 224 (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus serves to 
ensure that detentions are carried out within lawful bounds). 
426. See supra notes 350–51 (explaining that proclivity factors strengthen alien 
grounds for constitutional protection under a model of “global due process”). 
427. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (authorizing battlefield 
detentions for the duration of a conflict as a “fundamental . . . incident to war”). 
428. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s decision to 
vacate consideration of a case involving detention of a terror suspect off the battlefield); 
see also supra note 208 (noting unconventional nature of war on terror). 
429. See supra notes 117–29 and accompanying text (providing that captures off the 
battlefield is still a viable option and listing countries in which current detainees were 
captured). 
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concerned with the extraterritorial application of the 
constitutional right to habeas corpus, it is important to first 
address who can invoke habeas corpus domestically in order to 
provide a fuller picture of the Suspension Clause’s true domain. 
Therefore, this section will proceed by exploring the habeas 
rights of detainees domestically, and then internationally. 
1. Detention within a U.S. Territory 
a. Suspected Citizen Combatant 
The writ of habeas corpus is plainly available in both its 
statutory and constitutional forms to any citizen located within 
the territory of the United States.430 This would seem to end the 
inquiry for any suspected citizen combatant held at a facility 
within the sovereign territory of the United States. It is of no 
instance whether said citizen was initially apprehended outside 
the sovereignty of the United States, even if on a foreign 
battlefield, because any person presently located within the 
United States or one of its territories is entitled to invoke the 
protections of habeas corpus to challenge their detention.431 
b. Suspected Alien Combatant 
There are several under-occupied, high-security military 
prisons located within the United States that many speculate may 
be used as a detention site for the remaining Guantánamo Bay 
inmates once the base is shut down.432 All aliens that are not 
confined at Guantánamo Bay naval base remain deprived of 
statutory habeas corpus by way of the MCA.433 Therefore, an alien 
detained at a mainland holding facility must look to the 
constitutional right to habeas corpus in order to overcome 
 
430. See supra note 89 (synthesizing the statutory and constitutional right to habeas 
corpus within U.S. territory); see also supra notes 335–38 (concluding that the MCA does 
not affect citizens’ rights under section 2241). 
431. See supra note 367 (entitling a citizen combatant to invoke habeas protection 
because of their present location within the United States, even though captured 
overseas). 
432. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text (speculating as to where 
Guantánamo detainees will be transferred). 
433. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (clarifying that Boumediene only 
served as an as-applied invalidation of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA). 
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section 7 of the MCA and receive review in an article III court.434 
However, the functional approach intimated in Boumediene only 
relates to the extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause 
and is therefore presumably inapplicable in the domestic 
arena.435 
Even without relying on the functional model, the 
protections of the Suspension Clause should nevertheless run to 
enemy aliens detained within U.S. borders. For aliens, physical 
location within a U.S. territory strongly favors application of 
constitutional protections.436 And because the Suspension Clause 
does not discriminate between citizens and aliens, the Court 
recognizes that it is available to all individuals within the United 
States.437 This construction is consistent with the writ’s common-
law application.438 
It is true that the rights aliens enjoy domestically may be 
constitutionally circumscribed in times of war if they hold enemy 
allegiance.439 However, this general principle does not apply to 
the entire panoply of limited protections that aliens receive 
within the United States. The retraction of habeas corpus 
privileges from aliens, even in times of war, would belie the 
narrow constitutional grounds provided for its suspension by 
Congress.440 The Eisentrager Court even acknowledged that aliens 
with enemy ties are entitled to a brief judicial review of what is 
referred to in Boumediene as their “status determination” if they 
 
434. See supra notes 342–45 and accompanying text (concluding that alien 
detainees must turn to Suspension Clause to receive habeas review in wake of MCA). 
435. See supra note 223 (specifically defining the three-prong functional test as 
relating to the general “reach” of the Suspension Clause beyond U.S. territory). 
436. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (stating presumption that aliens 
within U.S. territory receive limited constitutional protection). 
437. See supra note 89 (maintaining that all persons within the United States may 
turn to the Suspension Clause for its protections); cf. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 
142 U.S. 651 (1892) (vesting alien immigrants with the right to habeas corpus). Because 
the right is available to anyone within the United States, and Guantánamo “[i]n every 
practical sense . . . is not abroad,” Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 22261 (2008), the 
Court extended statutory and, then later, constitutional habeas corpus to aliens detained 
there. 
438. See supra note 225 (collecting founding-era authority that displays aliens 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Crown had standing to levy a habeas action). 
439. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (noting that the rights aliens enjoy 
during peace may be restrained in times of war if they hold allegiance to an enemy 
nation). 
440. See supra note 29 (emphasizing the importance of writ of habeas corpus to 
Framers given its narrow grounds for suspension). 
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are detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.441 In part due to these considerations, the Court has 
consistently entertained, although not always issued, habeas 
petitions filed by or on behalf of enemy aliens located within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.442  
Munaf instructs, however, that even outside of the functional 
framework a court must consider equitable barriers before 
issuing the writ.443 However, the traditional considerations are 
inapposite in the case of domestically transferred Guantánamo 
inmates. Holding prisoners in a U.S. military prison that is 
already appropriately staffed for the purpose of prison security 
would not divert or strain resources from the broader military 
mission at home.444 And concerns of comity are irrelevant in the 
domestic context because there is no other government with 
which habeas proceedings would cause friction.445 In short, the 
writ could issue domestically without any major prudential 
obstacles. An enemy alien held at a detention facility within the 
United States would thus have standing under the Suspension 
Clause to challenge their detention on habeas corpus review. 
2. Detention Outside of the United States 
a. Citizen Combatant Outside the Territorial United States 
Because the MCA does not impact citizens, section 2241 still 
remains a valid avenue of relief for all U.S. citizens.446 Use of the 
statute is not precluded by the presence of the citizen petitioner 
 
441.  See supra note 361 (conceding that an enemy alien is entitled to limited 
judicial review of executive status determination). 
442. See supra note 90 (collecting authority entertaining habeas applications by 
enemy aliens). 
443. See supra note 411 (subjecting habeas corpus to the equitable discretion of 
court). 
444. See supra notes 404–05 (restricting the scope of inquiry to the impact on the 
military unit directly responsible for detainee operations); see also supra note 204 
(quantifying how military penal facilities are historically under-occupied and adequately 
staffed). 
445. See supra notes 413–15 (indicating that comity relates to usurping authority of 
another government). 
446. See supra notes 335–38 (concluding that the MCA does not affect citizens 
rights under section 2241). 
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in a foreign country.447 This does not mean, however, that section 
2241 will “follow the flag.”448 The most common subsection of 
the statute used to seek relief requires U.S. “custody” over the 
prisoner,449 which, in the extrajurisdictional context, is a function 
of control.450 However, legal control is lacking where U.S. forces 
are present but operate subject to a “broken” chain of 
command.451 Moreover, prudential barriers may prevent an 
otherwise cognizable habeas application from issuing.452 Thus, a 
citizen’s overseas habeas rights turn on the level of U.S. control 
and practical concerns. 
i. Detention at a U.S. Military Base 
Take the situation of a U.S. citizen combatant captured on 
the Afghan battlefield and detained at Bagram. Munaf found 
custody satisfied for purposes of section 2241 where the official 
charged with the prisoner’s detention exercises enough control 
to produce the prisoner.453 This level of control was displayed at 
Camp Cropper in Iraq, even though U.S. presence there was 
uniquely fashioned by a set of diplomatic agreements unlikely to 
ever be reproduced.454 But in most other contexts, U.S. control at 
any of its overseas facilities will far exceed this low threshold.455 A 
U.S. court would therefore usually have jurisdiction to hear a 
claim filed by the U.S. detainee at Bagram. 
 
447. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (elaborating that section 2241 
jurisdiction will attach even where prisoner is located beyond the reach of a federal 
district court). 
448. Supra note 334 (quoting a commentator as portending that habeas will “follow 
the flag” in the wake of Boumediene). 
449. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1). 
450. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (equating custody with the power to 
produce the prisoner); see also, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 438 (2004) 
(explaining that a prisoner may name “the entity or person who exercises legal control” 
over their custody, when the immediate custodian is unreachable by the process of any 
U.S. district court). 
451. See supra notes 270, 394 and accompanying text (considering “chain of 
command” theory on control and custody). 
452. See supra note 411 (subjecting habeas corpus to the equitable discretion of 
court). 
453. See supra note 273 (holding that custody, for purposes of section 2241, lays 
where the United States has the power to produce the prisoner). 
454. See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text (outlining the legal contours of 
U.S. occupation in Iraq prior to the Munaf decision). 
455. See supra note 205 (conceding that almost any overseas U.S. military facility 
will necessarily operate with a high level of U.S. control). 
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In this particular scenario, there is the added element of 
battlefield capture. As a result, the Court may accord the 
executive branch greater deference in its detention practice.456 
This fact, however, only weighs on prudential concerns incident 
to issuing the writ and is distinct from the jurisdictional inquiry 
under section 2241.457 It bears noting that in Munaf U.S. citizens 
were denied access to the writ when captured on the battlefield 
in Iraq.458 However, the primary reason they were denied the writ 
was due to concerns of friction with the host government; the 
wartime authority of the executive branch was only mentioned as 
a mere afterthought.459 Moreover, the usual leeway provided to 
the executive branch in this context is unlikely to overcome the 
citizen’s fundamental interest in being free from physical 
detention by one’s own government in the face of treasonous 
charges.460 Consequently, a U.S. citizen detained at any of the 
U.S. military’s traditional bases, such as Bagram, would likely be 
able to seek relief under section 2241 so long as it would not 
jeapordize international diplomacy by undermining the 
prerogative of some domestic entity of the host nation. 
ii. Detention by Extraordinary Rendition 
The nature of detention is significantly affected where the 
prisoner is held at a location operated by a third party. The use 
of extraordinary rendition was not conclusively prohibited by 
President Obama’s January 22, 2009 executive order.461 Under 
this program, prisoners are transferred to the temporary custody 
 
456. See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text (resolving that executive 
decisions are accorded greater leeway in the area of battlefield detentions because laws 
of war recognize practice as a legitimate use of executive power). 
457. See supra notes 275–78, 409 and accompanying text (observing that practical 
considerations in analyzing section 2241 in Munaf were relevant to the merits of the 
petition and distinct from the jurisdictional inquiry). 
458. See supra notes 275–79 and accompanying text (denying habeas relief to U.S. 
prisoners captured in Iraq). 
459. See supra note 278 (noting in passing that detentions occurred during active 
hostilities). 
460. Supra note 366 and accompanying text (explaining that the interest in being 
free from one’s own government is a “fundamental” liberty interest of all U.S. citizens). 
461. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (ordering all secret holding 
facilities run by the United States to close but holding open the continued vitality of 
extraordinary rendition). 
DALOIA_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  4:17 PM 
1042 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:957 
of another country.462 As in Munaf, this simple reality would seem 
“the end of the jurisdictional inquiry” for purposes of section 
2241.463 After handing over the prisoner to the custody of another 
entity, the United States relinquishes its control over their 
person.464 And control over the prisoner is the touchstone of 
section 2241 jurisdiction.465 Although the United States might be 
in a position to request that the prisoner be released back to U.S. 
custody, this is precisely the type of broken command chain that 
proved fatal to the habeas application of the Japanese 
commander in Hirota.466 
Just because the citizen combatant lacks standing to use 
section 2241 does not mean he is completely without recourse. 
After all, citizenship is a crucial factor that strongly favors 
extending constitutional protections.467 However, prudential 
obstacles can stand in the way of habeas corpus, even where all 
other factors favor its application.468 Skipping ahead directly to 
the analysis of practical concerns, then, there exists a distinct 
problem relating to comity. The relief that the hypothetical 
prisoners would likely seek is release from the country in charge 
of their detention.469 It is axiomatic that the United States cannot 
dictate what another sovereign nation should or should not do.470 
This type of unilateral directive would subvert the comity 
essential to inter-state harmony471 far more severely than second-
guessing another country’s institutions or usurping it of an 
 
462. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (summarizing the transfer 
process involved in extraordinary rendition). 
463. See supra note 273. 
464. See supra note 450 (equating custody with control in the international 
context). 
465. Supra note 273 and accompanying text (providing that custody under section 
2241 is measured by the control a state has over a prisoner). 
466. See supra notes 270, 394–95 (displaying that broken command chain acts as an 
absolute inhibitor to extraterritorial application of habeas corpus). 
467. See supra notes 355–70 and accompanying text (underscoring the importance 
of citizenship in assessing the reach of the Suspension Clause). 
468. See supra note 411 (subjecting habeas corpus to the equitable discretion of 
court). 
469. See supra notes 22–26 (identifying the traditional relief secured by habeas 
corpus as relief from custody). 
470. See supra note 413 (proclaiming that the authority of a nation-state within its 
own jurisdiction is absolute and exclusive). 
471. See supra note 412 and accompanying text (perceiving that an essential aspect 
of modern international relations is that governments must coexist with one another). 
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opportunity to try suspected criminals.472 Consequently, a citizen 
combatant in such a situation would be blocked from seeking 
refuge under the Suspension Clause.473 
b. Alien Combatant Outside of the Territorial United States 
Unlike citizens, aliens detained abroad are foreclosed from 
using section 2241 under the MCA.474 Therefore, they must turn 
to the Suspension Clause for relief.475 To date, the two cases to 
tackle an alien’s standing to mount a constitutional habeas 
challenge involved situations where the petitioner was detained 
in a location other than his or her point of capture.476 Justice 
Kenedy’s opinion in Boumediene cautiously noted that the 
constitutional balance would be different if the detention facility 
was located in an area with ongoing hostilities.477 The natural 
question is whether prisoners detained on the battlefield also 
enjoy the protections of the Suspension Clause and therefore 
have standing to challenge their detention on habeas review. 
Constitutional coverage is generally favored under the theory of 
“global due process” that is associated with the functional 
model.478 On the other hand, generally accepted laws of war 
recognize the inherent wartime authority of a nation to detain 
enemy combatants from the battlefield.479 
Take the three petitioners in Al Maqaleh who were provided 
habeas corpus rights, but instead assume that they were captured 
on the battlefield. The salient question is whether capture in a 
 
472. See supra notes 279, 414–15 and accompanying text (restricting the use of 
habeas corpus when issuing the writ would usurp jurisdiction of foreign tribunals). 
473. Given the important prudential barriers present in this situation, the same 
could be said for an alien combatant. 
474.  See supra note 341 and accompanying text (clarifying that Boumediene only 
served as an as-applied invalidation of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA).  
475. See supra notes 342–45 and accompanying text (concluding that alien 
detainees must turn to Suspension Clause to receive habeas review in the wake of the 
MCA). 
476. See supra notes 233–34, 317–19 (reaching conclusion in part due to separation-
of-power concerns present when prisoners are transferred to a remote detention 
facility). 
477. See supra note 250 (speculating that Boumediene might come out differently if 
the detention site were located in an active theater of war). 
478. See supra notes 75–77 (associating the theory of “global due process” that 
favors constitutional protection with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez). 
479. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (authorizing battlefield 
detentions as“fundamental” and “incident to war”). 
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theater of war would alter the result reached in that case. 
Clearly, the site of apprehension does not impact a 
prisoner’s citizenship,480 the basis for their detention,481 or U.S. 
control over the detention facility.482 These factors therefore 
remain as they stood in Al Maqaleh. Notwithstanding these 
consistencies, there are several notable differences. First, the 
procedures used to reach a detainee’s status were recently 
overhauled to conform to generally-accepted international 
practices.483 Furthermore, the site of apprehension element is 
diminished in value from its place in Boumediene and Al Maqaleh 
because capture is made on a battlefield.484 Since these 
detentions do not implicate the same prospect of unrestrained 
executive power, they should receive an appropriate level of 
deference.485 The issue is thus whether an alien combatant 
should receive protection under the Suspension Clause when he 
is held at a facility with a high, but not plenary, degree of control 
and disputes a presumptively valid detention that was arrived at 
through a standard process. 
There is, however, even more at play when practical 
concerns are considered. The vast majority of the roughly 800 
detainees currently held at new facility at Bagram were detained 
on the battlefield.486 The new facility also currently serves as the 
preferred site for indefinite detention.487 By inference, a vast 
majority of all new detainees to go through Bagram’s doors 
 
480. See supra notes 362–71 and accompanying text (discussing relevant 
considerations under the citizenship factor). 
481. See supra notes 372–82 and accompanying text (discussing relevant 
considerations under the status and process factors). 
482. See supra notes 393–400 and accompanying text (discussing relevant 
considerations under the site of detention factor). 
483. See supra notes 320–21 (revealing new procedures in use at Bagram to 
determine and periodically review a prisoner’s status). 
484. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (qualifying that prisoners captured 
on the battlefield are “qualitatively different” than other detainees); see also supra notes 
206–207 and accompanying text (regarding battlefield detentions as “fundamental” and 
“incident to war”). 
485. See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text (resolving that executive 
decisions are accorded greater leeway in the area of battlefield detentions because laws 
of war recognize the practice as a legitimate use of executive power). 
486. See supra notes 163, 170 and accompanying text (disclosing that the current 
detainee population is around 800, most of which come from the Afghan battlefield). 
487. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (revealing that that Bagram is the 
current default location for indefinite detention). 
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would be battlefield combatants as well.488 Extending habeas 
corpus rights to this class of detainees would benefit a large, and 
continuously growing, number of prisoners.489 Even with the 
technological advances used to administer habeas proceedings,490 
the military resources necessary to accommodate this number of 
habeas petitions would impose a significant strain on the military 
mission in Afghanistan generally and, more precisely, on the 
orderly management of the base itself.491 
In terms of the functional model, these circumstances draw 
a closer comparison to the situation in Eisentrager than 
Boumediene on the Suspension Clause continuum. Standing in the 
way of extending constitutional protection to these prisoners is 
the practical difficulty in administering the sheer number of 
habeas petitions, which bears a strong resemblance to the 
concern identified by Justice Jackson in Eisentrager.492 Each 
prisoner is an alien, captured in a location where military action 
receives considerable deference, and detained on the basis of a 
process designed to meet generally accepted standards—all of 
which disfavor extending the protections of the Suspension 
Clause. The strong, but not absolute, level of U.S. control at 
Bagram provides a modicum of support for extending 
constitutional safeguards493 but is unlikely, on its own, to 
overcome the practical difficulties noted above. In sum, this 
situation is more closely analogous to Eisentrager than Boumediene, 
making it very likely that the Suspension Clause would not run to 
 
488. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (announcing the troop surge in 
Afghanistan). 
489. See supra notes 310, 408 and accompanying text (displaying that the number 
of prisoners that would benefit from a favorable ruling is a relevant practical 
consideration). 
490. See supra note 309 (identifying technological advances that mitigate the 
impact of administering habeas corpus proceedings). 
491. See supra notes 404–05 (specifying that practical impact on military activity 
relates only to unit responsible for detainee operations). 
492. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (drawing attention to the 
difficulties facing military forces charged with administering habeas petitions overseas). 
Justice Kennedy in Boumediene identified this consideration as playing a crucial role in 
the outcome of Eisentrager. See supra note 241. 
493. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text (detailing the precise nature of 
U.S. control at Bagram). 
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aliens captured and detained in Afghanistan.494 
The outcome reached in the above example, however, could 
be quite different if a prisoner is detained for a prolonged period 
of time. Unlike all other objective factors, the length of time that 
a prisoner is held is the only variable that increases at a constant 
rate over the course of a conflict. As a result, a prisoner’s 
assertion to the Suspension Clause would grow stronger the 
longer that he or she is detained without judicial review.495 
Speaking in the abstract, it is difficult to establish the type of 
impact an unreasonably long detention would have on the 
functional framework. Suffice it to say, a detention so 
unreasonably long may tip the equities to the point where the 
constitutional balance in the above example would vest the 
prisoner with standing to lay claim to the Suspension Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
In Boumediene, the U.S. Supreme Court ventured into new 
constitutional territory. After nearly two centuries of repose, the 
basic influence of the Suspension Clause finally reached a head 
when aliens imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, looked to its 
language in order to challenge the legality of their detentions. 
Not only did the Court crystallize its nascent understanding of 
the protection that inheres in the Clause, it also revealed its 
current position on the Constitution’s extraterritorial force. But 
the case arguably raised more questions than it answered. Most 
significant to this Note, the case did not specifically address the 
extraterritorial force of the Clause beyond Guantánamo Bay. 
Boumediene only provides a loose framework—the “functional 
model”—for answering this question. This framework, however, 
assumes greater clarity when it is seen as part of the normative 
model underpinning the majority’s opinion. Against that 
backdrop, this Note explored the likely operation of the 
Suspension Clause under the “functional model” in order to give 
a full picture of its true domain. Simply put, the Suspension 
 
494. See supra notes 236–40 and accompanying text (denying protection under the 
Suspension Clause where there existed practical barriers to executing the writ and the 
prisoner’s citizenship and location disfavored extension). 
495. See supra notes 423–26 (concluding that a prisoner’s right to the protections of 
the Suspension Clause grows stronger the longer that he or she is detained past the 
initial “reasonable” window to reach a disposition on their status). 
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Clause currently stands as a dynamic extraterritorial device in the 
wake of Boumediene. While it might run halfway around in the 
world, it could just as well stand impotent five feet across the U.S. 
border. Its length and strength vary depending on the fact-
specific circumstances surrounding the prisoner invoking its 
venerable protection. Although the intersection of constitutional 
liberties and geography has plagued U.S. courts for as long as the 
country is old, perhaps the “functional model” will serve as a new 
panacea for courts confronting these difficult issues. As the “war 
on terror” progresses and U.S. tribunals continue to adjudicate 
habeas petitions mounted by prisoners in this war, the analysis 
contained herein should serve as a useful resource for 
practitioners, academics, and jurists alike. 
